

**Trade Policy Review Body****OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT****ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL<sup>1</sup>***(Mid-October 2024 to mid-October 2025)*

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\* This document has been republished in English only to correct typographical errors.

<sup>1</sup> This Report covers the period mid-October 2024 to mid-October 2025. It is presented pursuant to Paragraph G of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism mandate and aims to assist the Trade Policy Review Body to undertake its annual overview of developments in the international trading environment that are having an impact on the multilateral trading system. The Report is issued under the sole responsibility of the Director-General. It has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of Members, nor does it have any legal implications with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the Report with any WTO Agreements or any provisions thereof.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This WTO Trade Monitoring Report shows that between mid-October 2024 to mid-October 2025, trade policy activity intensified amid rising tensions among major trading partners. Heightened and more widespread protectionism, regional conflicts, and growing geopolitical uncertainty contributed to a highly volatile global trading environment. At the same time, WTO Members and Observers continued to pursue constructive dialogue, and intensified efforts to reach negotiated solutions, rather than engaging in retaliation.

2. During the review period, WTO Members and Observers introduced a large number of new measures on goods (331 trade-facilitating and 272 other trade and trade-related measures), most of which were import-related. Notably, the number of other measures represents the second highest ever recorded since the inception of the Trade Monitoring Exercise in 2009 and the trade covered by such measures affecting imports increased more than fourfold to USD 2,640 billion (11.1% of world imports). Out of this, USD 2,350 billion—representing 9.9%— can be linked to specific developments since early 2025. These include a series of bilateral and global trade measures made on grounds of national and economic security. As a consequence, the stockpile of import-related other trade and trade-related measures in place since the Global Financial Crisis also increased substantially, with trade covered by such measures now representing 19.7% of world imports compared to just 12.6% of world imports a year earlier.

3. Despite fears of economic turmoil and higher inflation, new tariff measures seem to have had a milder-than-projected initial impact. Trade growth was stronger than expected in the first half of the year, driven by import frontloading and strong demand for AI-related products, supported also by a high number of trade-facilitating measures in technology-related sectors. The delayed implementation of tariff measures, broad product exclusions, and legal uncertainties surrounding enforcement may also have contributed to this development and also point to further uncertainty ahead. As part of these developments, several Members have also struck new bilateral trade deals or frameworks and reinforced negotiations on regional trade agreements.

4. The multilateral trading system has shown resilience with about 72% of global goods trade<sup>2</sup> still being conducted under MFN tariff rates, thus reaffirming the WTO's central role in global trade governance. Recent policy developments also offer WTO Members an opportunity to reimagine global trade and put additional emphasis on the need to reposition and reform the organization for the future.

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<sup>2</sup> Gonciarz T. and Verbeet T., (2025), "Significance of Most-Favoured-Nation Terms in Global Trade: A Comprehensive Analysis", WTO Staff Working Paper, [ERSD-2025-02](#), 15 January, 2025.

## SPECIFIC FINDINGS

5. Despite heightened trade policy uncertainty and sharply increased tariffs, trade growth in the first half of the year was stronger than expected. In October, WTO economists' forecast for **world merchandise trade** volume growth in 2025 has risen to 2.4% (up from the estimate of 0.9% in the August interim outlook), while the outlook for 2026 has been downgraded to 0.5% (from the August estimate of 1.8%), which still implies a positive global increase in trade over the 2-year forecast period. Import frontloading and surging demand for AI-related products were key drivers of trade growth in the first half of 2025, as well as continuing trade growth among most WTO Members, notably developing economies. In both 2025 and 2026, North America is projected to have a negative contribution to trade volume growth, while contributions are expected to remain positive in other regions. In value terms, merchandise trade growth in AI-related products increased over 20% year-on-year in the first half of 2025, while non-AI related trade grew less than 4%. AI-related trade accounted for nearly half of trade growth during this period despite representing less than one sixth of merchandise trade.

6. Growth in the volume of **world commercial services exports** is expected to slow from 6.8% in 2024 to 4.6% in 2025, reflecting weakness in transport and travel. Exports of transport services are projected to grow just 1.8% in 2026, while exports of travel should increase by 4.4%. Growth in digitally delivered services trade in 2025 should be slightly stronger than in 2024, at 6.1%. In value terms, several major reporting economies experienced double-digit services exports growth in the first half of 2025, including the United Kingdom (14%), China (15%), India (12%), and Japan (11%), while the United States recorded solid single-digit growth (7%).

7. During the review period, WTO Members and Observers introduced **331 new trade-facilitating measures and 272 other trade and trade-related measures on goods**. Most of these measures were import-related. The trade coverage of the trade-facilitating measures affecting both imports and exports was estimated at USD 2,090 billion (approximately 1.5 times higher than the USD 1,441 billion recorded in the last Report), while the trade coverage of other trade and trade-related measures was estimated at USD 2,966 billion (more than three times the USD 888 billion recorded in the last Report). Notably, the trade coverage of other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports marked a more than fourfold increase, rising to USD 2,640 billion (11.1% of world imports) from USD 611 billion in the last Report. Out of this amount, import measures introduced in response to specific developments since early 2025 accounted for USD 2,350 billion, representing 9.9% of world imports.

8. Since 2009, the **stockpile<sup>1</sup> of import-related other trade and trade-related measures in force** has steadily increased—both in value terms and as a share of global trade. As of 15 October 2025, the trade covered by such measures was estimated at USD 4,693 billion, representing 19.7% of world imports. This marks a significant increase compared to 2024, when import-related measures covered USD 3,007 billion (12.6% of world imports) and notably reflects the implementation of several new import tariff measures since the beginning of the year.

9. During the review period, WTO Members initiated an average of 32.3 trade remedy investigations per month—lower than the monthly averages of 36.1 and 37.3 recorded in 2020 and 2024. More than 94% of these new investigations were initiated by G20 economies. The average number of trade remedy terminations was 11.4 per month, among the lowest levels recorded since 2012. Trade remedy actions—particularly anti-dumping measures—remain a key trade policy instrument for WTO Members, accounting for 46.5% of all trade measures on goods recorded in this Report.

10. During the review period, WTO Members introduced an increased number of **general and economic support measures**, many of which were linked to key sectors such as the environment, energy, and agriculture. Although economic support measures continue to play a significant role in government policies, the overall focus appears to have shifted toward non-financial interventions and the pursuit of broader strategic policy objectives. External data sources provide more comprehensive coverage of these types of measures.

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<sup>1</sup> The stockpile encompasses all other trade and trade-related measures introduced since 2009 that remain in force.

11. WTO Members continued to use the **SPS and TBT Committees' transparency mechanisms** to notify their sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT) and to discuss and often resolve their specific trade concerns (STCs) non-litigiously. Food safety was the most frequent objective identified in the regular SPS notifications submitted by WTO Members. A total of 79 STCs were discussed during the review period, of which 10 addressed persistent problems that have been discussed 16 times or more. Most of the new regular TBT notifications submitted by WTO Members during the review period indicated the protection of human health or safety as their main objective. A total of 201 STCs were discussed during the review period in the TBT Committee, of which 11 were persistent STCs.

12. WTO Members continued to raise **trade concerns** in various WTO Committees and bodies. Throughout the review period, WTO Committees remained important platforms for addressing trade-related issues, enabling Members to engage constructively on actual or potential areas of friction. For instance, in the **Committee on Agriculture (CoA)**, Members posed a total of 834 questions on specific implementation matters (SIMs), individual notifications, notification compliance, and outcomes achieved in agricultural negotiations. Most of these (88% of questions on notifications and 60% on SIMs) concerned domestic support policies. The Committee also actively engaged on the topic of technology transfer in agriculture and continued its discussions on food security under the dedicated Work Programme targeting the food security concerns of least-developed countries (LDCs) and net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), and within the Committee's Q&A-based review process.

13. **In services**, WTO Members and Observers introduced 124 new measures between mid-October 2024 and mid-October 2025, with most aimed at facilitating trade or improving the regulatory framework. More than half of the measures were horizontal policies impacting multiple service sectors and modes of supply, with half specifically affecting mode 3 (commercial presence), around a quarter concerning mode 4 (movement of natural persons) and a fifth targeting Internet- and other network-enabled services.

14. WTO Members and Observers continued to fine-tune **their intellectual property (IP)** regimes. During the review period, they actively pursued the strengthening and modernization of their intellectual property (IP) systems, reflecting global, regional, and domestic efforts to align IP governance with technological and economic change.

15. This Report also provides updates on several other important trade-related developments and discussions, including fisheries subsidies; e-commerce; Aid for Trade; government procurement; dispute settlement; trade and development; trade facilitation; trade finance; micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs); regional trade agreements (RTAs); and trade and environment.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1. This Report is submitted to the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) pursuant to Paragraph G of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism mandate in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement. This provides for an annual Report by the Director-General to assist the TPRB in undertaking its annual overview of developments in the international trading environment that are having an impact on the multilateral trading system. The previous Report was circulated on 20 November 2024.<sup>1</sup>

1.2. This Trade Monitoring Report covers the period from 16 October 2024 to 15 October 2025, unless otherwise indicated.<sup>2</sup> The Report is issued under the sole responsibility of the Director-General and is intended to be factual. It has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of Members, nor does it have any legal implication with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the Report with any WTO Agreement. The Report does not pronounce itself on the right of Members to implement trade measures (Box 1.1). The objective of the Trade Monitoring Reports is to assist in providing transparency across the multilateral trading system regarding the very latest trends and developments in the implementation of a broad range of trade policy measures. The Report includes specific and concise updates on a wide range of substantive WTO activities and provides the latest information on the main indicators of the world economy and on the state of global trade.

1.3. At the WTO's 8<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Conference in December 2011, Ministers recognized the regular work undertaken by the TPRB through the monitoring exercise of trade and trade-related measures, took note of the work initially done in the context of the global financial and economic crisis, and directed it to be continued and strengthened. They invited the Director-General to continue presenting the Trade Monitoring Reports on a regular basis and asked the TPRB to consider these Reports in addition to the meeting dedicated to undertaking the annual overview of developments in the international trading environment. Ministers committed to duly comply with the existing transparency obligations and reporting requirements needed for the preparation of these Reports, and to continue to support and cooperate with the WTO Secretariat in a constructive fashion.<sup>3</sup>

1.4. Information on measures included in this Report and in the [WTO Trade Monitoring Database \(TMDB\)](#)<sup>4</sup> has been collated from inputs submitted by WTO Members and Observers and from other official sources, including notifications to the WTO and public sources. The latter includes governmental websites, portals of other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and specialized monitoring initiatives such as the [Global Trade Alert](#). For the preparation of this Report, initial responses to the Director-General's request for information along with information gathered from other public and official sources, were made available to delegations for verification. Overall, responses to the Director-General's request for information and to the subsequent verification request were received from 71 Members (counting the European Union and its member States separately) (Box 1.2), which represents 42.8% of the membership, and covers around 75.1% of world imports. Two Observers also replied to the request for information.

1.5. Since 2023, the WTO Secretariat introduced an online platform via the [TMDB](#) to streamline the submission and verification of trade measures by Members and Observers. The platform aims to increase participation in the Trade Monitoring Exercise and facilitate the exchange of information between the Secretariat and delegations. The online platform continues to be a work in progress, with some features set for further refinement based on inputs and suggestions from delegations.

1.6. The structure of this Trade Monitoring Report is as follows: Section 1 provides an Introduction. Section 2 provides a brief account of recent economic and trade developments and includes the most recent forecasts for world trade growth. Section 3 presents selected trade and trade-related policy trends for the review period, with a particular focus on goods trade, as well as concise updates in several areas of WTO work. Policy developments in trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) are included in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 provides a factual overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' notifications to the WTO.

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<sup>1</sup> WTO document [WT/TPR/OV/27](#), 20 November 2024.

<sup>2</sup> In addition to the trade policy measures implemented during the period under review and recorded by this Report, other measures that impact trade flows may have been taken by WTO Members and Observers.

<sup>3</sup> WTO document [WT/L/848](#), 19 December 2011.

<sup>4</sup> WTO, *Trade Monitoring Database*. Viewed at: <http://tmdb.wto.org>.

1.7. Trade measures implemented during the review period are available online through the [TMDB](#). Measures implemented outside the review period, along with measures recorded since the beginning of the Trade Monitoring Exercise in October 2008, are also available through the [TMDB](#).

1.8. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Global Trade Alert (GTA) have kindly contributed topical boxes to this Report.

### Box 1.1 About the WTO Trade Monitoring Report

Since 2009, the WTO Trade Monitoring Reports have provided Members with regular updates on trade and trade-related developments. Initially conceived to provide the WTO Director-General with regular briefings on the trade implications of the global financial crisis, the WTO trade monitoring effort under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) quickly became a close collaborative exercise with WTO Members and Observers. The verification process is central to the exercise, allowing Members and Observers to verify, adjust, or rectify the description and coverage of their own trade and trade-related measures before publication. Several TPRM Appraisals since 2009 have confirmed the importance that delegations attach to the verification process to ensuring a strong collaboration between the WTO Secretariat and WTO Members and Observers. The ability of the Trade Monitoring Exercise to capture trade and trade-related developments in its regular reports has been highlighted by delegations as a significant contribution towards increased transparency.

The Trade Monitoring Report is a transparency exercise, aiming to highlight the latest trends in the implementation of a broad range of policy measures affecting trade flows, while also providing an up-to-date overview on the state of the global trading environment. It is intended to be purely factual and has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of WTO Members. In line with the overall objectives of the TPRM, the information it contains carries no legal implication with respect to the conformity of any measure with any WTO Agreement.<sup>a</sup>

The Reports categorize trade measures as: Measures Facilitating Trade; Trade Remedies; Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures; and Measures Affecting Trade in Services.<sup>b</sup> Over the years, during the regular TPRB meetings on Trade Monitoring, as well as consultative processes in the context of the TPRM Appraisals, delegations have emphasized the importance of recognizing the specific, and sometimes complex, contexts in which trade measures are implemented. Delegations have provided input and suggestions in connection with Trade Remedies and Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures.

Regarding Trade Remedies, i.e. anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures, it has been noted in discussions among WTO Members that some of these measures are taken to address what is perceived by some as a market distortion resulting from trade practices of other trading partners. The Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures allow WTO Members to impose anti-dumping (AD) or countervailing duties (CVD) to offset what is perceived to be injurious dumping or subsidization of products exported from one Member to another. The Reports aim to enhance transparency in the use of such instruments. They do not categorize the use of trade remedies as protectionist or WTO-inconsistent and do not seek to verify the existence or impact of potentially distortive practices.

Trade measures on goods that do not fall under Measures Facilitating Trade or Trade Remedies are classified under Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures. This category reflects the fact that only some of these measures may directly restrict trade (following for example the definition of Deardorff (2014)<sup>c</sup>), while others may have more ambiguous effects on trade, depending, for instance, on how they are designed or applied in practice. This category therefore serves as the repository for measures that are neither clearly trade-facilitating nor trade remedies.

Some delegations have noted that measures listed in the Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures category, must be considered with greater nuance and contextual understanding. For instance, some measures imposing restrictions on imports may have been introduced in response to actions taken by other trading partners. While such measures may result in a reduction in trade flows, some delegations emphasized the importance of adopting a broader perspective on the context and rationale behind their implementation. Often, such reasons are reflected in the description of the measures, which are typically derived from an official source or provided by the relevant delegation during the verification process. The Trade Monitoring Reports do not further analyse or assess the motivation or justification of trade and trade-related measures.

Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures covered in the Reports are not included in either of the categories listed above, and therefore they are neither classified nor counted as trade-facilitating or as other measures. In each of the substantive sections covering developments in these two areas, the Report notes that an increased number of SPS and TBT notifications does not automatically imply their greater use, but rather enhanced transparency regarding these measures, including through notifications. They also note that the SPS and TBT Agreements provide Members with the possibility to adopt such measures in the pursuit of legitimate policy objectives.

#### Trade Monitoring Reports – Circulation

The vehicle chosen for the Trade Monitoring Reports in 2009 was the WTO document series [WT/TPR/OV](#), also known as "Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment" – Annual Report by the Director-General, i.e. a document series with roots in Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing

the WTO and aimed at assisting the TPRB in its deliberations. The Trade Monitoring Report is a regular WTO document and not a publication made available through the WTO Publications portal. This is significant when considering and comparing download and user statistics with other WTO publications.

For example, the World Trade Report and the WTO Annual Report are WTO publications prepared and marketed for a wider audience and are circulated through the [WTO Publications portal](#). The Trade Policy Reviews are circulated through the WTO Publications portal and through [DocsOnline](#), i.e. the official documentation portal of the WTO.

WTO publications and official documents are also accessible and downloadable through the WTO website. The WTO webpages relative to the publication of the WTO-wide and G20 Trade Monitoring Reports circulated in November/December 2023 were visited 26,448 times (19,607 times in 2024).<sup>d</sup> The 2023 Reports were downloaded from the WTO webpages 5,435 times and the 2024 edition 7,816 times.

With respect to the [WTO Trade Monitoring Database](#), which provides the platform upon which the Reports are built, the earliest statistics date back to 7 December 2020. Between that date and 5 September 2025, the database has been visited by 43,536 unique visitors (a 28% increase compared to last year) for a total of 49,925 visits. Of these 12,707 visits were made in the past 12 months (an 8% increase compared to the last Report) by 11,061 unique visitors. The top five countries of origin for these visits were China (more than 5,400 visits), Switzerland (3,800), the United States (3,300), the Russian Federation (2,100) and Türkiye (1,900).

- a See also paragraphs A and G of Annex 3 to the Marrakesh Agreement.
- b In previous years, trade measures were presented in the Annexes of the Reports as follows: Annex 1 – Measures Facilitating Trade; Annex 2 – Trade Remedies; Annex 3 – Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures; and Annex 4 – Measures Affecting Trade in Services. Trade measures have been often referred to by their corresponding Annex number.
- c Deardorff, A. V. (2014), *Terms of Trade: Glossary of International Economics*, 2nd Revised Edition.
- d These figures reflect data up to the end of August 2025.

Source: WTO Secretariat statistics from WTO website and DocsOnline.

### Box 1.2 Participation in the preparation of this Report

1. Albania	24. Malaysia
2. Andorra <sup>a</sup>	25. Mauritius
3. Argentina	26. Mexico
4. Australia	27. Montenegro
5. Azerbaijan <sup>a</sup>	28. Myanmar
6. Brazil	29. New Zealand
7. Canada	30. Nicaragua
8. Chile	31. Paraguay
9. China	32. Peru
10. Colombia	33. Philippines
11. Costa Rica	34. Russian Federation
12. Dominican Republic	35. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
13. Egypt	36. Seychelles
14. European Union	37. Singapore
15. Honduras	38. South Africa
16. Hong Kong, China	39. Switzerland
17. Indonesia	40. Chinese Taipei
18. Israel	41. Thailand
19. Jamaica	42. Türkiye
20. Japan	43. Ukraine
21. Republic of Korea	44. United Kingdom
22. State of Kuwait	45. Uruguay
23. Macao, China	46. Viet Nam

- a Observer.

Note: Participation refers to responses received from Members and Observers to the Director-General's requests for information on 5 March and 1 September 2025, as well as to the requests for verification on 23 May and 6 October 2025.

Source: WTO Secretariat.



## 2 RECENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS


### 2.1 Trade volume developments and outlook

2.1. This Report arrives against the backdrop of an unprecedented rise in trade policy uncertainty and sharply higher tariffs imposed by one of the WTO's largest Members. The changed trade policy environment since the start of the year prompted WTO economists to adjust their forecasting methodology, adopting a dual approach that blends conventional econometric estimates with policy simulations to account for the impact of tariffs.

2.2. Following this approach, the Secretariat issued its initial forecast for 2025 and 2026 in the Global Trade Outlook and Statistics (GTOS) report of 16 April 2025, foreseeing a small contraction of -0.2% in the volume of world merchandise trade in 2025 and a 2.5% increase in 2026; then revised its estimates in August to 0.9% in 2025 and 1.8% in 2026. Stronger than expected trade growth in the first half of 2025 caused the Secretariat to recently further revise its estimates for world merchandise trade volume growth in 2025 to 2.4%, while the outlook for 2026 was downgraded to 0.5%. In the current forecast, the contribution of North America to trade growth is expected to be negative in both years while the contributions of Europe, Asia, and the rest of the world are expected to remain positive (Chart 2.1).

**Chart 2.1 World merchandise trade volume growth, 2019-2026**

Index, 2015=100 and annual % change



Note: Trade refers to average of exports and imports. Figures for 2025 and 2026 are projections. The original baseline projection from the April GTOS, represents the likely growth of trade in the absence of tariffs imposed in early April.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

2.3. Growth of merchandise trade in the first half of 2025 was driven by importers accelerating purchases in anticipation of higher tariffs, and by surging demand for AI-related products linked to structural investments in digital infrastructure. Precautionary frontloading of imports was particularly pronounced in North America in Q1, although it showed signs of unwinding in Q2. Trade in AI-related products was strong in both periods, particularly in Asia and North America, although it was also evident in other regions.


2.4. The timing of the trade impact of tariffs changed between the April and October forecasts but the medium-term outlook improved only slightly. The current forecast in the October GTOS had trade growing 2.9% cumulatively over 2025 and 2026. By comparison, the Secretariat's April forecast showed a cumulative increase of 2.3% over the same period. Both forecasts are weaker than the baseline projection from the April GTOS, which represents the likely growth of trade in the absence of tariffs. This had merchandise trade growing 2.7% in 2025 and 2.9% in 2026, resulting in a cumulative increase of 5.8%.



2.5. The GTOS reports now include services trade forecasts based on experimental data on commercial services trade in volume terms.<sup>1</sup> Taking into account the influence of tariffs, growth in the volume of world commercial services exports is expected to slow from 6.8% in 2024 to 4.6% in 2025, then to 4.4% in 2026 (Chart 2.2). The reduced outlook for 2025 mostly reflects weaker than expected growth in transport (2.5%) and travel (3.1%). Growth in the category "other commercial services" should be slightly weaker in 2025 (5.8%) than in 2024, while its sub-category of digitally delivered services should be slightly stronger (6.1%).

**Chart 2.2 Commercial services trade volume, 2015-2026**

Index, 2015=100



Note: Trade refers to exports. Figures for 2025 and 2026 are projections.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

2.6. In 2026, exports of transport services are expected to grow just 1.8%, reflecting weakness in merchandise trade. Meanwhile, exports of travel should increase by 4.4%. Other commercial services and digitally delivered services should both expand at a steady pace next year, growing 5.1% and 5.6%, respectively.

2.7. Details of the merchandise and services forecasts are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. If current assumptions hold, Asia should record the fastest merchandise export volume growth of any region in 2025 (5.3%), followed by Africa (also at 5.3%), South and Central America and the Caribbean (2.4%), the Middle East (2.0%), Europe (0.7%), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member states (-0.7%), and North America (-3.1%). Finally, least developed countries (LDCs) are expected to see strong export growth this year (6.1%).

<sup>1</sup> These consist of conventional commercial services trade values based on balance of payments statistics, which are then deflated by country and sector specific prices. The methodology is described in Box 1 on page 11 of the April 2025 Global Trade Outlook and Statistics. Viewed at: [WTO | Global Trade Outlook and Statistics - April 2025](#).

**Table 2.1 Merchandise trade volume and GDP growth, 2023-2026**

Annual % change

	Historical		Revised forecast (a)		Original forecast (April) (b)		Difference (b-a)	
	2023	2024	2025	2026	2025	2026	2025	2026
<b>World Trade<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>-0.9</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>-0.2</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>-2.1</b>
<b>Exports</b>								
North America	3.6	2.3	-3.1	-1.0	-12.6	-1.2	9.5	0.2
South America <sup>b</sup>	2.4	6.2	2.4	-1.9	0.6	0.9	1.8	-2.9
Europe	-2.9	-1.7	0.7	2.0	1.0	2.5	-0.3	-0.5
CIS <sup>c</sup>	-4.3	2.3	-0.7	3.5	4.4	0.1	-5.1	3.5
Africa	5.7	1.3	5.3	0.0	0.63	1.7	4.7	-1.7
Middle East	8.1	3.7	2.0	-0.9	5.3	5.1	-3.3	-6.0
Asia	0.2	8.0	5.3	0.0	1.61	3.5	3.7	-3.4
<b>Imports</b>								
North America	-2.2	4.7	-4.9	-5.8	-9.6	-0.8	4.7	-5.0
South America <sup>b</sup>	-4.0	6.0	8.8	-0.6	5.0	0.5	3.8	-1.1
Europe	-4.9	-2.3	2.4	0.8	1.9	2.7	0.6	-1.9
CIS <sup>c</sup>	18.0	4.8	2.7	2.6	0.5	2.1	2.2	0.5
Africa	2.6	2.6	11.8	5.4	6.5	5.3	5.4	0.1
Middle East	8.6	11.8	3.7	1.8	6.3	6.7	-2.6	-5.0
Asia	-0.7	5.1	5.7	2.7	1.6	3.8	4.1	-1.1
<b>GDP at market exchange rates</b>								
World	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.2	2.4	0.5	0.2
North America	2.8	2.6	1.7	1.5	0.4	1.1	1.3	0.4
South America <sup>b</sup>	1.9	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.4	0.0	0.2
Europe	0.8	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.4	0.2	0.1
CIS <sup>c</sup>	4.3	4.5	2.0	1.7	2.3	1.8	-0.3	-0.1
Africa	2.9	2.9	3.9	4.1	4.0	3.9	0.0	0.2
Middle East	1.7	1.8	2.6	3.6	3.2	3.5	-0.6	0.0
Asia	4.5	4.0	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.8	0.3	0.0
<b>Memo items:</b>								
World Trade excl. intra-EU	-0.3	4.0	3.0	0.9	-0.3	2.3	3.3	-1.4
Exports of Europe excl. intra-EU	-1.9	-1.3	1.7	3.8	1.1	1.8	0.6	2.0
Imports of Europe excl. intra-EU	-5.7	-1.3	4.9	1.7	2.6	3.0	2.3	-1.3
Exports of least developed countries	7.1	5.0	6.1	1.1	4.8	3.9	1.3	-2.8
Imports of least developed countries	-0.4	4.4	13.5	5.7	7.6	5.6	5.9	0.1
GDP of least developed countries	3.7	2.1	3.7	3.9	3.9	4.5	-0.2	-0.6

a Average of exports and imports.

b Refers to South and Central America and the Caribbean.

c Refers to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member states.

Sources: WTO-UNCTAD for historical trade statistics. WTO Secretariat estimates for trade forecasts and consensus estimates based on data from OECD, World Bank, IMF, UN, national statistics and WTO calculations for GDP.

2.8. On the import side, Africa should have the fastest merchandise trade growth of any region in 2025 (11.8%), followed by South and Central America and the Caribbean (8.8%), Asia (5.7%), the Middle East (3.7%), the CIS region (2.7%), and Europe (2.4%). North American imports should contract (-4.9%) due to weakness in the second half of the year. Meanwhile, LDC imports should rise sharply (13.5%) this year before moderating next year.

2.9. Turning to services, the Secretariat expects Europe's export growth in volume terms (5.4%) to outpace global growth in 2025. It should be followed by Asia (4.6%), the Middle East (4.4%), the CIS region (3.5%), North America (2.4%), South and Central America and the Caribbean (1.6%), and Africa (1.3%).

**Table 2.2 Commercial services trade volume growth, 2023-2026<sup>a</sup>**

Annual % change

	Historical		New forecast		April 2025 baseline forecast		April 2025 adjusted forecast	
	2023	2024	2025	2026	2025	2026	2025	2026
<b>World exports</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.1</b>
<b>By region</b>								
North America	5.1	4.1	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	1.6	2.3
South America <sup>b</sup>	7.1	7.0	1.6	1.6	2.7	2.2	-1.1	1.1
Europe	2.6	5.5	5.4	4.6	5.8	4.8	5.0	4.4
CIS <sup>c</sup>	7.2	8.1	3.5	3.0	3.6	3.0	1.1	3.5
Africa	15.9	4.9	1.3	2.1	1.8	3.4	-1.6	5.3
Middle East	9.9	4.1	4.4	3.9	5.4	4.2	1.7	1.0
Asia	15.4	11.1	4.6	5.5	5.5	6.6	4.4	5.1
<b>By sector</b>								
Transport	-4.4	4.5	2.5	1.8	2.9	3.3	0.5	1.7
Travel	26.4	11.0	3.1	4.4	4.2	4.6	2.6	4.7
Other commercial services	5.4	6.3	5.8	5.1	6.1	5.3	5.3	4.4
of which: Digitally delivered services	4.7	5.7	6.1	5.6	6.6	5.8	5.6	4.7

a Figures for 2025 and 2026 are projections. Trade refers to exports.

b Refers to South and Central America and the Caribbean.

c Refers to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member states.


Sources: WTO Secretariat estimates.

2.10. Risks to the outlook identified in the April GTOS report are still present, although some have started to recede. These include further tariff actions, a broader spillover of trade policy uncertainty, supply chain disruptions, and rising inflation. On the other hand, there is some upside potential if the recent surge in demand for AI-related goods proves to be durable. Investments in AI could pay dividends in terms of productivity, which in turn would lift GDP and trade growth.

## 2.2 Trade developments in value terms

2.11. Chart 2.3 shows growth in the US dollar value of merchandise trade by product group in the first half of 2025. Trade overall was up 6% year-on-year during this period. The strongest increase was in office and telecom equipment (18%), including electronic components (10%). There was also a sharp rise in demand for chemicals, which includes pharmaceuticals that were the subject of heavy frontloading in Q1 of 2025. In contrast, trade declined in automotive products (-1%) and iron and steel (-3%).

**Chart 2.3 Year-on-year merchandise trade growth by product, 2024 to 2025 (January-June)**




\* Includes electrical machinery, non-electrical machinery and power generating equipment.

Source: WTO Secretariat for total merchandise and estimates based on mirror data for products.

2.12. Chart 2.4 shows the contribution of AI-related products to merchandise trade growth in value terms in the first half of 2025. This category, which includes a variety of goods from integrated circuits to telecommunications equipment, saw its trade value rise more than 20% year-on-year, while non-AI related trade grew less than 4%. Although AI-related products account for less than one-sixth of world merchandise trade, they contributed nearly half of trade growth in the first half of 2025.

**Chart 2.4 Contributions of AI-related trade flows to world merchandise trade growth, 2024 and 2025Q1-Q2**

Year-on-year % change in USD values and percentage point contributions




Source: WTO Secretariat estimates for total merchandise trade and for AI products.

2.13. In the first quarter of 2025, the US dollar value of world commercial services trade was up 5% year-on-year, but preliminary estimates in the October GTOS showed growth rebounding to 9% in the second quarter. Growth by major reporters in the first half of the year is shown in Chart 2.5. Double-digit exports growth was recorded for the United Kingdom (+14%), China (+15%), India (+12%), and Japan (+11%). The United States also recorded solid export growth (7%) while Ireland posted the weakest growth (1%) of any major supplier. China's exports of transport and travel were particularly strong at 23% and 67% respectively. India registered the strongest export growth in the category of other commercial services (17%), followed closely by the United Kingdom (16%).

**Chart 2.5 Commercial services trade growth of selected economies by sector in the first half of 2025**

Year-on-year % change



Note: Economies are ranked according to their share in total commercial services exports in 2024.

Source: WTO Secretariat and National statistics.

### 3 TRADE AND TRADE-RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

#### 3.1 Overview of policy developments in trade in goods


3.1. This Section presents selected new trade and trade-related policy developments in the area of goods during the period from mid-October 2024 to mid-October 2025, following the standard categorisation used by the Trade Monitoring Exercise<sup>1</sup>: Measures Facilitating Trade (previously presented in Annex 1 to the Trade Monitoring Report), Trade Remedies (previously Annex 2) and Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures (previously Annex 3).<sup>2</sup>

3.2. In previous Trade Monitoring Reports, these measures were compiled and published both online and as annexes to the Reports. Each category of measure was associated with a specific annex: trade-facilitating measures appeared in Annex 1, trade remedies in Annex 2, and other measures in Annex 3. For this reporting period, the presentation of measures has shifted to an exclusively online format. All measures are now available through the [WTO Trade Monitoring Database](#), which also provides translations in French and Spanish. This transition reflects a broader move towards digital accessibility, supports resource efficiency and enables more timely, flexible, and user-friendly access to detailed information on trade developments.

3.3. A total of 1,127 trade measures were recorded for WTO Members and Observers during the review period (Chart 3.1). This figure includes measures facilitating trade, trade remedy measures and other trade and trade-related measures. The high number of new measures during the review period is unprecedented since the beginning of this exercise in 2009, notably for the category of other trade and trade-related measures, and is closely related to the series of bilateral and global trade actions by the United States and others observed since early 2025, revealing risks of heightened, more widespread protectionism. At the same time, WTO Members continued to pursue a constructive dialogue, including to address underlying imbalances, and stepped-up efforts to reach negotiated solutions.

3.4. During the review period, no new measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic were recorded.

**Chart 3.1 Number of measures introduced between mid-October 2024 and mid-October 2025**



Source: WTO Secretariat, [Trade Monitoring Database](#) (TMDB), as of 29 October 2025.


<sup>1</sup> See also Box 1.1. SPS and TBT measures are excluded from this categorization and are addressed separately in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.

<sup>2</sup> By its title, the category - Other Trade and Trade - Related Measures may cover trade-restrictive measures but also acknowledges the possible ambiguous impact on trade of certain measures or the difficulty to determine their effects. Hence, for the purposes of this report, this category serves as a repository for measures that are neither clearly trade-facilitating nor classified as trade remedies. Also, some of the measures recorded in this category may have been introduced in response to actions taken by trading partners.



3.5. Chart 3.2 illustrates the trade coverage estimates of the measures recorded for WTO Members and Observers during the review period.<sup>3</sup> It shows that, for the first time since the inception of the Trade Monitoring Exercise in 2009, the trade covered by other trade and trade-related measures has exceeded that of trade-facilitating measures.

**Chart 3.2 Trade coverage of measures introduced between mid-October 2024 and mid-October 2025 in USD billion**



Note: Values are rounded. Trade-facilitating and other trade measures cover import and export measures.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

### Specific developments since early 2025

3.6. Since early 2025, the United States took a series of bilateral and global trade measures, which it justified primarily on grounds of national security and economic emergency. Most of the measures taken in this context to date involved tariff increases. In response, some economies announced or introduced measures facilitating trade, while others implemented or announced their intention to introduce countermeasures, including export controls on critical components to certain industries.

3.7. Table 3.1 provides a summary timeline of the trade measures on goods taken in this specific context since early 2025. Given the numerous changes introduced over the past months, the timeline presents some of the measures with concise descriptions reflecting also information on earlier modifications and is organized in descending chronological order—beginning with and emphasizing the most recent measures currently in place.

**Table 3.1 Timeline of trade measures on goods since early 2025 to mid-October 2025 (context-specific)**

Date, WTO Member(s)	Description
14/10/25, U.S.	Imposition of import tariffs on softwood timber and lumber (10%), upholstered wooden furniture (25%), and kitchen cabinets and vanities, including parts (25%) referring to a Section 232 investigation. Tariffs on products originating in the UK, EU, and Japan are specifically capped according to specific trade deals
9/10/2025, China	Export licenses required for overseas transfers or domestic sharing of rare earth-related technologies, including prior approval for Chinese support for foreign rare earth activities
16/09/2025, U.S.	Exempting aircraft category from reciprocal tariffs on Japan and on United Kingdom
08/09/2025, U.S.	Modification of the scope of tariffs announced on April 2, excepting 39 tariff lines from the additional tariffs, while 8 tariff lines lost their exemption
29/08/2025, U.S.	Suspension of the <i>de minimis</i> exemption for all countries exporting to the United States
27/08/2025, U.S.	Imposition of 50% import tariffs on India, up from the previously applied 25%, covering a broad range of goods
08/08/2025, Cambodia	Elimination of all import tariffs on goods originating from the United States, excluding used goods, for a year
07/08/2025, U.S.-Rep. of Korea	Partial implementation of the U.S.- Republic of Korea (ROK) Trade and Investment Deal
07/08/2025, U.S.-Japan	Partial implementation of the United States-Japan Agreement

<sup>3</sup> The trade coverage is an estimate of annual imports/exports of the products concerned from economies affected by the measures introduced during the review period. The trade coverage does not include trade for measures that were both implemented and terminated within the review period. Trade coverage estimates for the review period were based on 2024 merchandise trade. For economies where 2024 data were not available, the latest available year was used in the calculation.

Date, WTO Member(s)	Description
07/08/2025, U.S.	Revision of the U.S. reciprocal tariffs, through Executive Order 14326, by adjusting rates between 10% and 41% for certain trading partners, listed in Annex I of the Order, that have either finalized or are close to concluding substantive trade and security agreements with the U.S. The Order also introduced an additional 10% duty on imports from partners not included in the Annex
06/08/2025, U.S.	Imposition of a 50% tariff on most Brazilian imports, with certain product exemptions and provisions
01/08/2025, U.S.	Imposition of additional import tariffs on Canadian goods from 25% to 35%. Goods that qualify under the USMCA rules of origin continue to be exempted
01/08/2025, U.S.-EU	Retroactive partial implementation of the U.S.-EU Tariffs and Trade Framework Agreement
01/08/2025, U.S.	Imposition of a 50% additional tariff on semi-finished copper products and derivatives under Section 232, citing national security concerns
31/7/2025, Canada	Introduction of a 25 % surtax on certain steel goods and aluminum goods imported into Canada that contain steel melted and poured in China or aluminum smelted and cast in China
22/7/2025, U.S. - Indonesia	Announcement of the United States – Indonesia trade framework
30/06/2025, U.S.	The United States adjusted its import duties at 10% on UK vehicles with a tariff rate quota of 100,000 (United States–United Kingdom Economic Prosperity Deal)
23/06/2025, U.S.-U.K.	Partial implementation of the United States–United Kingdom Economic Prosperity Deal
23/06/2025, U.S.	Expanding of the scope of steel products subject to Section 232 tariffs, applying to certain consumer and household products containing steel, based on their steel content. The measure applied to all partners, except for goods originating in the United Kingdom
04/06/2025, U.S.	Further tariffs increase on imports of steel and aluminium to 50%, applying to all trading partners except the United Kingdom
14/05/2025, U.S.	Temporary reduction to 10% of the additional reciprocal tariffs on imports from China (Geneva deal), for 90 days i.e. until 12 August 2025. If no agreement is reached, the tariffs will rise to 34%. The current 10% tariffs add to the 20% tariffs imposed on 3 March (fentanyl Executive Orders). For reference, the additional reciprocal tariff was increased from a baseline 10% to 34% and to 84% on 9 April 2025 and further increased to 125% on 10 April
14/05/2025, China	Temporary reduction to 10% of the additional tariffs on imports from the U.S. (Geneva deal), for 90 days i.e. until 12 August 2025. If no agreement is reached, the tariffs will rise to 34%. For reference, on 10 April 2025, the additional tariff was introduced at 34%, then increased to 84%, and further increased to 125% on 12 April
14/05/2025, U.S.	The <i>de minimis</i> duty on low-value imports from China and Hong Kong, China is reduced to 54% or USD 100 per postal item. Previously, on 2 May 2025, the duty was increased to 120% or 100 USD (announced on 9 April), following earlier increases to 90% or USD 75 (announced on 8 April), and 30% or USD 25 (announced on 2 April). The duty-free <i>de minimis</i> provision was reintroduced on 5 February, following its suspension on 1 February
03/05/2025, U.S.	Imposition of 25% tariffs on imports of vehicle parts from all trading partners
15/04/2025, EU	Imposition of additional 10% and 25% tariffs on four lists of goods imported from the United States, with implementation dates on 15 April 2025, 16 May 2025 and 1 December 2025. The measure was immediately suspended for 90 days (up to 14 July 2025)
09/04/2025, Canada	Imposition of a 25% import tariff on non-Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) compliant vehicles made in the U.S., and on the non-Canadian and non-Mexican content of CUSMA compliant vehicles manufactured in the United States
09/04/2025, U.S.	Increased reciprocal tariffs on imports from 57 trading partners suspended for 90-days, until 9 July 2025. The measure was announced on 2 April and was planned to enter into force on 9 April
05/04/2025, Zimbabwe	Suspension of all tariffs on goods imported from the United States
05/04/2025, U.S.	Imposition of a baseline additional 10% tariff on imports of most products from all trading partners, except for Canada, Mexico, and trading partners subject to rates set forth in Column 2 of the HTSUS (Russian Federation, Cuba and Belarus). On 11 April 2025, certain semiconductors were excluded from the tariffs, with the exclusion retroactively effective from 5 April 2025
04/04/2025, China	Implementation of export controls on some medium and heavy rare earth related items
04/04/2025, Cambodia	Reduction from a maximum 35% tariff bound rate to 5% applied tariff rate on 19 product categories from the United States
03/04/2025, U.S.	Imposition of 25% tariffs on imports of vehicles from all trading partners

Date, WTO Member(s)	Description
02/04/2025, U.S.	Imposition of an additional 25% tariff on imports from any trading partner that imports oil from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
13/03/2025, Canada	Imposition of a 25% tariff on a list of several steel, aluminium and other goods coming from the United States
12/03/2025, U.S.	Termination of the duty-free import quota system for steel imports from Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Japan, Republic of Korea, European Union, United Kingdom and Ukraine. Imports from these economies are now subject to 25% tariffs
12/03/2025, U.S.	Imposition of additional 25% tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium from all trading partners, except for imports of aluminium from the Russian Federation, subject to 200% tariffs. Tariffs were further increased to 50% on 4 June, except for imports from the United Kingdom. The list products affected was expanded on 12 June
10/03/2025, China	Imposition of an additional 15% tariff on chicken, wheat, corn and cotton and of an additional 10% tariff on sorghum, soybeans, pork, beef, aquatic products, fruits, vegetables and dairy products from the United States
07/03/2025, U.S.	Exemption from the 25% additional tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico complying with the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement's (USMCA) Rules of Origin. Tariffs on potash imports from Canada and Mexico are reduced from 25% to 10%
04/03/2025, U.S.	Implementation of an additional 25% tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico (fentanyl/immigration Executive Orders), except for energy resources from Canada, subject to 10% tariffs
04/03/2025, Canada	Imposition of a 25% tariff on 1,256 goods originating in the United States
03/03/2025, U.S.	Further increase of tariffs from 10% to 20% on all imports from China (fentanyl and synthetic opioid supply chain Executive Orders). The 10% tariff on all imports from China was originally introduced on 4 February
10/02/2025, China	Imposition of 15% import tariffs on coal and liquefied natural gas and 10% import tariffs on crude oil, agricultural machinery, large-displacement vehicles, pickup trucks from the United States
04/02/2025, China	Introduction of export controls on items related to tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, and indium
04/02/2025, U.S.	Imposition of an additional 10% tariff on all imports from China was originally introduced on 4 February (fentanyl Executive Orders)
02/02/2025, India	Reduction of import tariffs on some U.S. products, including high-end motorcycles and selected manufactured inputs
21/01/2025, U.S.	Restart of the review process for LNG export applications to non-FTA countries, marking the end of the temporary pause initiated in January 2024

Note: Measures implemented during the review period were sent to Members and Observers for verification.

Source: WTO Secretariat, [Trade Monitoring Database](#) (TMDB) and [WTO-IMF Tariff Tracker](#), as of 21 October 2025.

3.8. Further tariff increases have been announced for the period following the publication of this Report, and it remains to be seen to what extent these will be implemented. Several governments are also pursuing negotiations with the United States, and some have already reached specific deals. These deals, often of a framework nature but nevertheless containing certain specific commitments, have mostly been characterized as being non-binding by parties involved for the time being. As a result of these deals, primarily (but not exclusively, see Table 3.1) the United States has implemented some tariff changes under Executive Orders. Such tariffs are generally lower than the reciprocal tariffs applied to many other Members, but they are in many cases higher than the lowest applicable reciprocal tariffs, and higher than MFN tariffs that were in place in 2024. Discussions are ongoing among Members as to how to characterize these deals and how they relate to WTO rules.

3.9. On 14 May 2025, the United States signed an agreement with China in Geneva that reduced the US additional reciprocal tariffs on imports from China temporarily to 10% for 90 days i.e. until 12 August 2025. The deal indicated that if no agreement was reached, the tariffs would rise to 34%. China also temporarily reduced to 10% the additional tariffs on imports from the U.S. for 90 days, i.e. until 12 August 2025, stating that if no agreement was reached, the tariffs would rise to 34%. On 11 August 2025, the truce was extended by another 90 days, i.e. until 10 November 2025. Chinese exports to the U.S. still became subject to an additional 30% import tariff resulting from the 10% tariff imposed on all imports from China on 4 February, combined with an additional 20% tariff introduced under Executive Orders related to fentanyl and synthetic opioid deaths in the U.S. The Geneva deal contained other non-tariff and structural elements aimed at easing trade tensions and fostering longer-term cooperation. On 1 November 2025, both Members agreed to suspend most tariff and non-tariff measures in place until 10 November 2026. The United States reduced the tariffs on Chinese imports imposed to curb fentanyl flows to 10% (effective 10 November 2025) and

maintained its suspension of heightened reciprocal tariffs on Chinese imports (the current 10% reciprocal tariff will remain in effect during this suspension period). At the same time China has pledged to suspend recent export controls on critical minerals and retaliatory trade measures, while issuing general export licenses for key materials and resuming trade flows in strategic sectors. Additionally, it will take significant steps to curb the flow of fentanyl precursors and commit to substantial purchases of U.S. soybeans through 2028. As part of 1 November agreement, both Members announced that they were suspending for one year the implementation of their respective port fees targeting each other's vessels.

3.10. On 23 June 2025, the United States–United Kingdom Economic Prosperity Deal was partially implemented. The deal introduced a U.S. 10% import tariff on the first 100,000 UK vehicles imported annually, as well as on vehicle parts originating from the UK. It also removed previously imposed U.S. tariffs on UK-origin civil aircraft, engines, and related components, aligning their treatment with the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft. The deal further includes preferential tariff rate quotas for beef and ethanol imported from the United States, provisions relating to pharmaceuticals, and a framework for co-operation on steel and aluminum - including reference to ownership of relevant production facilities, and some provisions on NTMs.

3.11. On 22 July 2025, the United States also announced a joint statement outlining a framework for potential forthcoming agreement with Indonesia. Among other provisions, Indonesia expressed its intention to eliminate tariffs on approximately 99% of its imports from the United States, while the United States set its rate at 19% for Indonesian goods. Indonesia also plans to remove non-tariff barriers by accepting U.S. safety and regulatory standards for industrial and agricultural goods, endorsing key digital trade commitments, including in the context of the WTO, and adopting stronger labor standards. The agreement is still pending finalization and signature.

3.12. On 1 August 2025, the U.S.–EU Tariffs and Trade Framework Agreement was partially implemented retroactively by the U.S., providing to the EU exports of automobiles and parts, cork, aircraft and parts, and generic pharmaceuticals with their ingredients a rate calculated as the highest between the U.S. MFN tariff rate and 15%. On the same date, the EU eliminated import tariffs on U.S. industrial goods and granted preferential access to U.S. agricultural exports, though sensitive sectors like dairy and sugar remain protected. The agreement covers other elements including harmonization and recognition of standards and investment pledges.

3.13. On 7 August 2025, the United States–Japan Agreement was implemented retroactively, following its signature on 4 September 2025. Among other provisions, the agreement establishes that a baseline 15% tariff applies to nearly all Japanese imports if their existing tariff is below 15%; if the existing tariff is at least 15%, no additional tariff is applied. This approach also applies to automobiles and auto parts under Section 232 rules, replacing the previous 25% additional tariff on Japanese automobiles.

3.14. Since April 2025, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have been negotiating a Trade and Investment Deal, which was jointly announced by both governments on 7 August 2025 and reconfirmed on 29 October 2025. According to the heads of state speeches, among other provisions, the U.S. additional tariff on Korean imports was set at 15%, down from the previously announced 25%.

3.15. On 26 October 2025, the United States formalized agreements with Cambodia and Malaysia. Both agreements include provisions on market access—covering tariff and non-tariff barriers—as well as on import licensing, technical regulations, standards, conformity-assessment procedures, and investment facilitation. Several explicit references to WTO agreements were made. Since 8 August 2025, Cambodia has applied a 0% import duty on goods originating from the United States (excluding used goods). Malaysia has committed to significantly enhance preferential market access—phased over up to 10 years—for U.S. industrial and agricultural exports, including chemicals, machinery, metals, vehicles, dairy, poultry, rice, and more, while removing or streamlining non-tariff barriers and conformity assessments. The United States continues to apply MFN tariffs to all imports from Cambodia and Malaysia, along with a 19% reciprocal duty on goods not included in the respective exemption lists.

3.16. On 26 October 2025, the United States also announced joint statements outlining frameworks for potential forthcoming agreements with Thailand and Viet Nam. Among other provisions, Thailand expressed its intention to eliminate tariffs on approximately 99% of its imports from the United States, while Viet Nam plans to grant preferential market access for substantially all U.S. industrial and agricultural exports.

3.17. Several of these recent bilateral trade deals negotiated by the United States with various trading partners also include provisions or references related to services and intellectual property. See also Table 3.1 for further developments and Box 3.1 for a description of the WTO–IMF Tariff Tracker.

### Box 3.1 The WTO–IMF Tariff Tracker: Monitoring Tariff Policies in Real Time

In recent times, tariffs seem to have re-emerged as an active instrument of economic and foreign policy. The [WTO–IMF Tariff Tracker](#) provides a systematic and comprehensive overview of the evolution of applied import tariffs since the beginning of 2025 for seven selected WTO Members that have implemented unilateral or global tariff changes during this period: Cambodia, Canada, China, India, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zimbabwe. Additional WTO Members will be included in the WTO–IMF Tariff Tracker over time, and this work is currently in progress. The tool is publicly available since 22 May 2025 and has been developed by the WTO in collaboration with the IMF. The data are aggregated at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS), as well as according to the WTO's Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) categories and GTAP sector categories. Beyond its descriptive function, the WTO–IMF Tariff Tracker serves as a resource for empirical research, model-based simulations, and multilateral policy dialogue on the effects of tariffs on trade and other macroeconomic variables.

The WTO–IMF Tariff Tracker is designed to help policymakers, analysts, and the public to better understand how new tariff measures affect market access and how average tariff levels evolve over time. To ensure accuracy and consistency, it reflects only those provisions for which reliable and verifiable information is available. It also applies clear methodological rules to capture the cumulative effect of overlapping measures whenever multiple tariff actions affect the same product.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.18. Besides tariffs and increased deal-making, changes to the *de minimis* exemption for postal shipments were another noteworthy development affecting global trade this year. Box 3.2 takes a closer look at the *de minimis* exemption and its recent suspension for all economies exporting to the United States as well as reactions from other Members and Observers.

### Box 3.2 *De minimis* exemption for postal shipments

On 30 July 2025, the United States Government adopted a new Executive Order<sup>4</sup>, removing the "*de minimis* exemption" for postal shipments effective 29 August 2025. This change applies universally to shipments from all countries.

By allowing low-valued shipments to enter a country without incurring import duties, the *de minimis* exemption is designed to simplify customs clearance processes and reduce costs. Previously, the United States allowed the duty-free importation of packages valued at less than USD 800, a provision that was highly attractive for cross-border e-commerce. This threshold, which had been increased from USD 200 to USD 800 in 2015, established the U.S. as offering the highest *de minimis* value globally.

The elimination of *de minimis* exemption will require the advance collection of duties and their remittance to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency. This process will also include information regarding the origin and type of goods contained within the packages to ensure transparency and a fairer competitive environment.

Since the entry into force of the United States measure, due to unexpected additional administrative burdens, around 77 Members and 2 Observers<sup>5</sup> suspended their outbound postal services to the US through a suspension of all postal shipments (goods and documents), or a suspension of goods shipments only, or a partial goods suspension (USD 100 worth gifts and documents exempted). To mitigate potential trade disruptions, some economies<sup>6</sup> resumed shipments to the US using a "postal delivery duties paid" service.

Some other economies have also implemented or planned to implement additional tariffs on small parcels or low-value imports. For example, South Africa has already implemented a tariff of up to 20% on all parcels entering the country, including low-value shipments, since mid-2024. Similarly, the European Commission has proposed the introduction of a handling fee for parcels valued at less than EUR 150. The United Kingdom

<sup>4</sup> Viewed at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/suspending-duty-free-de-minimis-treatment-for-all-countries/>.

<sup>5</sup> Antigua and Barbuda; Armenia; Australia; Barbados; Belize; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Cambodia; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; European Union (including its member States); Fiji; Ghana; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; India; Côte d'Ivoire; Jamaica; Japan; Republic of Korea; People's Democratic Republic of Lao; Liechtenstein; Macao, China; Malaysia; Mexico; Republic of Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; New Zealand; Norway; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Russian Federation; Samoa; Serbia; Singapore; South Africa; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; United Kingdom; Uruguay; and Vanuatu.

<sup>6</sup> Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.

intends to review the customs treatment of low-value imports, which currently permits goods valued at GBP 135 or less to be imported without the imposition of customs duty.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

### Measures facilitating trade

3.19. During the review period, a total of 331 new trade-facilitating measures were recorded for WTO Members and Observers. The monthly average of the trade-facilitating measures recorded during the period was 27.6, well below the peaks observed over the last three years in 2022, 2023 and 2024 (at 37.8, 28.3 and 28.9 respectively) (Table 3.2).

3.20. Most of these measures involved the reduction or removal of import tariffs, followed by the elimination or simplification of import quantitative restrictions (QRs), the simplification of import procedures and the reduction or removal of export tariffs.

**Table 3.2 Measures facilitating trade, 2016 to mid-October 2025**

Type of measure	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Mid-Oct 23 to mid-Oct 24 (WT/TPR/OV/23)	Mid-Oct 24 to mid-Oct 25 (WT/TPR/OV/25)
<b>Import</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>358</b>	<b>267</b>	<b>283</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>246</b>
- Tariff	120	99	121	95	105	132	287	168	174	153	146
- Customs procedures	31	21	17	4	3	10	23	27	34	41	37
- Tax	6	4	7	7	10	9	7	10	19	20	8
- QRs	1	3	4	3	7	9	36	47	45	35	44
- Other	2	1	9	2	0	3	5	15	11	13	11
<b>Export</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>83</b>
- Duties	9	2	7	11	9	13	25	7	12	6	35
- QRs	7	5	2	3	3	14	58	50	33	38	29
- Other	27	20	14	4	6	3	10	14	17	12	19
<b>Other</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>339</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>331</b>
<i>Average per month</i>	<i>17.4</i>	<i>13.0</i>	<i>15.3</i>	<i>10.8</i>	<i>12.0</i>	<i>16.5</i>	<i>37.8</i>	<i>28.3</i>	<i>28.9</i>	<i>26.7</i>	<i>27.6</i>

Note: Revisions of the data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDB to fine-tune and update the available information.

Source: WTO Secretariat, [Trade Monitoring Database](#) (TMDB), as of 29 October 2025.

3.21. The trade coverage of the import-facilitating measures introduced during the review period was estimated at USD 1,940 billion, i.e. 8.1% of the value of world merchandise imports, up from USD 1,320 billion in the last annual Report (Table 3.3 and Chart 3.3). Of this total, import-facilitating measures introduced in response to specific developments since early 2025 accounted for USD 619 billion (2.6% of world imports).


3.22. The import-facilitating measures implemented during the review period targeted a wide range of products. Based on trade coverage estimates, the HS chapters within which most of the import-facilitating measures were taken include mineral fuels and oils (HS 27) (19.3%), electrical machinery and parts thereof (HS 85) (11.2%), machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) (11.1%), and pharmaceutical products (HS 30) (10.0%).

**Table 3.3 Share of trade covered by import-facilitating measures, mid-October 2016 to mid-October 2025**

(% )

	Mid-Oct 2016 to mid- Oct 2017	Mid-Oct 2017 to mid- Oct 2018	Mid-Oct 2018 to mid- Oct 2019	Mid-Oct 2019 to mid- Oct 2020	Mid-Oct 2020 to mid- Oct 2021	Mid-Oct 2021 to mid- Oct 2022	Mid-Oct 2022 to mid- Oct 2023	Mid-Oct 2023 to mid- Oct 2024	Mid-Oct 2024 to mid- Oct 25
Share in total world imports	1.07	1.68	2.80	3.88	2.74	4.72	3.80	5.30	8.14

Source: WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.

**Chart 3.3 Trade coverage of new import-facilitating measures in each reporting period (not cumulative) in USD billion**

Note: These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e. annual imports of the products concerned from economies affected by the measures) introduced during each reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.23. The trade coverage of the export-facilitating measures introduced during the review period was estimated at USD 151 billion, i.e. 0.6% of world merchandise exports up from USD 120 billion in the last Report. Of this total, export-facilitating measures introduced in response to specific developments since early 2025 accounted for USD 28.9 billion, representing 0.1% of world exports.

3.24. Based on trade coverage estimates, most export facilitating measures were implemented in HS Chapter 27, i.e. mineral fuels and oils (35.8%), followed by fertilizers (HS31) (8.3%).

3.25. Overall, the trade coverage of the import- and export-facilitating measures introduced during the review period was estimated at USD 2,090 billion (up from USD 1,440.4 billion in the last Report).



## Trade remedy actions

3.26. During the review period, 524 trade remedy actions (387 initiations and 137 terminations) were recorded for WTO Members and Observers, accounting for 46.5% of all trade-related measures covered in this Report. Anti-dumping continued to be the most frequent trade remedy action, accounting for 82.2% of all initiations and 87.6% of all terminations.

3.27. During the review period, the monthly average of initiations of trade remedy investigations stood at 32.3, just below the 2020 and 2024 peaks, with 36.1 and 37.3 initiations recorded per month, respectively. More than 94% of these new investigations were initiated by G20 economies. In contrast, the average number of trade remedy terminations during the review period was 11.4 per month, among the lowest levels recorded since 2012 (Table 3.4 and Chart 3.4).

3.28. The trade coverage of all trade remedy investigations initiated during the review period was estimated at USD 105.2 billion, i.e. 0.4% of world imports (up from USD 100.0 billion in last Report) (Table 3.5). For terminations, the trade coverage was valued at USD 18.9 billion, i.e. 0.1% of world imports, up from USD 7.6 billion in the last Report.

**Table 3.4 Number of trade remedy actions, 2016 to mid-October 2025**


Type of measure	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Mid-Oct 23 to mid-Oct 24 (WT/TPR/OV/22)	Mid-Oct 24 to mid-Oct 25 (WT/TPR/OV/25)
<b>Initiations</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>433</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>448</b>	<b>426</b>	<b>387</b>
- AD	298	249	202	215	355	186	89	191	368	344	318
- CVD	34	41	55	36	56	18	19	27	64	66	55
- SG	11	8	16	30	22	10	4	12	16	16	14
<i>Average per month</i>	28.6	24.8	22.8	23.4	36.1	17.8	9.3	19.2	37.3	35.5	32.3
<b>Terminations</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>137</b>
- AD	141	129	198	167	182	256	202	112	169	119	120
- CVD	15	12	25	8	13	23	24	9	22	13	14
- SG <sup>a</sup>	15	17	0	10	19	21	12	11	11	5	3
<i>Average per month</i>	14.3	13.2	18.6	15.4	17.8	25.0	19.8	11.0	16.8	11.4	11.4

a The figure for a specific year is the sum of the following: (i) all ongoing investigations terminated during the course of that specific year, normally as of late October, without any measure; and (ii) all imposed measures expired during the course of that specific year, normally as of late October.

Note: The information on trade remedy actions for 2016 to 2024 is based on the semi-annual notifications. For the present review period, the information is also based on the responses and the verifications received directly from Members. Anti-dumping and countervailing investigations are counted based on the number (*n*) of exporting countries or customs territories affected by an investigation. Thus, one anti-dumping or countervailing investigation involving imports from (*n*) countries/customs territories is counted as (*n*) investigations.

Source: WTO Secretariat, [Trade Monitoring Database](#) (TMDB), as of 29 October 2025.

3.29. Trade remedy actions taken during the review period, in terms of trade coverage, mainly included initiations of investigations on iron and steel (HS 72) (18.6%) and electrical machinery and parts thereof (HS 85) (16.1%).

**Chart 3.4 Trade remedies initiations and terminations, average number per month**

Note: Values are rounded.

Source: WTO Secretariat and [Trade Monitoring Database](#) (TMDb), as of 29 October 2025.

**Table 3.5 Share of trade covered by trade remedy initiations, mid-October 2016 to mid-October 2025**

(%)

	Mid-Oct 2016 to mid-Oct 2017	Mid-Oct 2017 to mid-Oct 2018	Mid-Oct 2018 to mid-Oct 2019	Mid-Oct 2019 to mid-Oct 2020	Mid-Oct 2020 to mid-Oct 2021	Mid-Oct 2021 to mid-Oct 2022	Mid-Oct 2022 to mid-Oct 2023	Mid-Oct 2023 to mid-Oct 2024	Mid-Oct 2024 to mid-Oct 2025
Share in total world imports	0.48	0.53	0.24	0.36	0.15	0.04	0.10	0.40	0.44

Source: WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.

### Other trade and trade-related measures

3.30. Other trade and trade-related measures include those measures that are neither trade-facilitating nor classified as trade remedies. Some of these measures might have direct restrictive effects on trade.<sup>7</sup>

3.31. A total of 272 new such measures were recorded during the review period for WTO Members and Observers, marking the second highest number ever recorded since the inception of the Trade Monitoring Exercise in 2009, just below the 2011 peak of 286 measures.

3.32. Most of these measures were import-related (136 or 71.2% of all measures), primarily consisting of increases of import tariffs (Table 3.6). Many of these measures were introduced in the

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. Deardorff, A. V. (2014), [Terms of Trade: Glossary of International Economics, 2nd Revised Edition](#). In some cases, measures may have been introduced as responses to actions taken by other trading partners and/or may have more nuanced dynamic and general equilibrium effects. Some WTO delegations have emphasized the importance of adopting a more holistic perspective—one that considers the broader context and underlying motivations behind the implementation of certain trade measures.

context of the evolving trade dynamics since the beginning of 2025, notably by the United States and other Members, and are further described in the dedicated section above.

**Table 3.6 Other trade and trade-related measures, 2016 to mid-October 2025**

Type of measure	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Mid-Oct 23 to mid-Oct 24 (WT/TPR/OV/23)	Mid-Oct 24 to mid-Oct 25 (WT/TPR/OV/24)
<b>Import</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>211</b>
- Tariff	63	46	64	41	39	35	44	54	60	57	136
- Customs procedures	18	21	7	9	11	24	12	36	20	24	35
- Tax	7	9	13	6	6	5	0	2	5	4	12
- QRs	13	9	17	17	12	10	17	25	24	26	20
- Other	1	2	9	5	6	2	6	9	7	4	8
<b>Export</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>61</b>
- Duties	5	4	8	7	5	14	15	15	5	4	19
- QRs	10	8	4	4	11	27	111	63	40	42	29
- Other	5	7	5	12	14	32	26	26	8	9	13
<b>Other</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
- Local content	6	9	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
- Other	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>231</b>	<b>231</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>272</b>
<i>Average per month</i>	<i>11.0</i>	<i>9.8</i>	<i>10.6</i>	<i>8.5</i>	<i>8.7</i>	<i>12.7</i>	<i>19.3</i>	<i>19.3</i>	<i>14.1</i>	<i>14.2</i>	<i>22.7</i>

Note: Revised data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDb to fine-tune and update the available information.

Source: WTO Secretariat, [Trade Monitoring Database](#) (TMDb), as of 29 October 2025.

3.33. The trade coverage of other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports implemented during the review period was estimated at USD 2,640 billion, representing 11.1% of world imports. This represents a more than fourfold increase compared to the USD 611 billion in the last Report, as shown in Table 3.7 and Chart 3.5. Out of this total, import measures introduced in response to specific developments since early 2025 accounted for USD 2,350 billion, representing 9.9% of world imports.

**Table 3.7 Share of trade covered by other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports, mid October 2016 to mid-October 2025**


(%)

	Mid-Oct 2016 to mid-Oct 2017	Mid-Oct 2017 to mid-Oct 2018	Mid-Oct 2018 to mid-Oct 2019	Mid-Oct 2019 to mid-Oct 2020	Mid-Oct 2020 to mid-Oct 2021	Mid-Oct 2021 to mid-Oct 2022	Mid-Oct 2022 to mid-Oct 2023	Mid-Oct 2023 to mid-Oct 2024	Mid-Oct 2024 to mid-Oct 2025
Share in total world imports	0.50	3.33	3.84	2.40	0.60	0.74	0.71	2.45	11.08

Source: WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.

3.34. The newly introduced other trade and trade measures affecting imports during the review period covered a wide and diverse range of products. Based on trade coverage estimates, the main sectors affected were motor vehicles including parts and accessories thereof (HS 87) (17.6%), machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) (16.4%), electrical machinery and parts thereof (HS 85) (14.6%) and optical, measuring, medical and other precision equipment (HS 90) (4.4%).

**Chart 3.5 Trade coverage of new other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports identified in each period (not cumulative) in USD billion, October 2012 to October 2025**



Note: These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e. annual imports of the products concerned from economies affected by the measures) introduced during each reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.35. The trade coverage of newly introduced other trade and trade-related measures affecting exports was estimated at USD 326 billion, i.e. 1.4% of the value of world exports (up from USD 277 billion in the last Report). Of this total, export measures introduced in response to specific developments since early 2025 accounted for USD 21 billion (0.1% of world exports).

3.36. The HS chapters within which most of these export measures were taken include motor vehicles including parts and accessories thereof (HS 87) (39.6%), mineral fuels and oils (HS 27) (21.8%), and electrical machinery and parts thereof (HS 85) (4.2%).

3.37. Overall, the trade coverage of the other trade and trade-related affecting both imports and exports implemented during the review period was estimated at USD 2,966 billion (more than three times the USD 888 billion recorded in the last Report).

### Stockpile of other trade and trade-related measures

3.38. The stockpile<sup>8</sup> of other trade and trade-related measures in force has grown steadily since 2009 – in value terms and as a percentage of world trade.<sup>9</sup>

3.39. At present<sup>10</sup>, the trade covered by such measures affecting imports<sup>11</sup> was estimated at USD 4,693 billion representing 19.7% of world imports. This marks a significant increase compared

<sup>8</sup> The stockpile encompasses all other trade and trade-related measures introduced since 2009 that remain in force. The stockpile's trade coverage refers to the estimated value of trade affected by these measures, reflecting the cumulative effect of actions taken since 2009.

<sup>9</sup> Measures that have been extended during the review period and multiple measures targeting the same trade flows (same partners and products) are counted only once in the stockpile.

<sup>10</sup> Based on trade measures recorded up to 15 October 2025.

<sup>11</sup> Only import measures where HS codes were available are included in the calculation. Cumulative figures exclude measures having an initiation and termination date within the same review period. Estimates are also conditioned by the availability of termination dates of the other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports and of the HS codes of products covered.

to 2024, when import-related measures covered USD 3,007 billion, representing (12.6% of world imports).

3.40. The stockpile of other trade and trade-related measures affecting exports stood at USD 808 billion in 2025<sup>12</sup>, accounting for 3.4% of world exports. In 2024 export-related measures trade coverage was estimated at USD 804 billion (3.4% of world exports).

3.41. Table 3.8 and Chart 3.6 show the stockpile of other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports – in value terms and as a percentage of world imports.


**Table 3.8 Cumulative trade coverage of other trade and trade related import measures, 2016-2024 (USD billion, unless otherwise indicated)**

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>Total imports (world)</b>	<b>15,875</b>	<b>17,578</b>	<b>19,483</b>	<b>18,986</b>	<b>17,620</b>	<b>22,253</b>	<b>25,242</b>	<b>23,778</b>	<b>23,827</b>
<b>Total other import measures in force</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>736</b>	<b>1,384</b>	<b>1,551</b>	<b>1,427</b>	<b>1,992</b>	<b>2,281</b>	<b>2,614</b>	<b>3,007</b>
Share in world imports (%)	3.12	4.19	7.10	8.17	8.10	8.95	9.04	10.99	12.62
Total terminated other trade and trade related import measures	44.2	29.5	5.7	37.3	8.0	32.9	82.3	47.3	15.3
Share in world imports (%)	0.28	0.17	0.03	0.20	0.05	0.15	0.33	0.20	0.06

Note: Trade coverage estimates are provisional and subject to changes based on the continuous updates to UN Comtrade data. Trade coverage estimates for a given year are calculated based on merchandise imports of that year, when available.

Source: WTO Secretariat calculations, based on UN Comtrade database and data provided by the authorities.

**Chart 3.6 Cumulative trade coverage of other trade and trade related import measures in force since 2009**



Note: The 2025 estimate is based on other trade and trade related import measures up to 15 October 2025. The cumulative trade coverage estimated by the Secretariat is based on information available in the TMDB as of 29 October 2025 on other trade and trade related import measures recorded since 2009. The estimates include import measures for which HS codes were available. The figures do not include trade remedy measures. The import values were sourced from the UN Comtrade database.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

<sup>12</sup> Based on trade measures recorded up to 15 October 2025.

3.42. Estimating the roll-back of specific measures and the consequences for the overall stockpile of measures still in place since the Global Financial Crisis is complicated by the fact that many temporary measures remain in place beyond the envisaged termination date. In addition, the Secretariat does not always receive timely, accurate information on changes to recorded measures.

### **Food, feed, and fertilizers – recent developments**

3.43. The WTO Trade Monitoring section has been paying particular attention to trade measures applied on agricultural products since the beginning of the war on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Although the outbreak of the war initially triggered a large number of export and import-related trade measures on food, feed, and fertilizers, the trade measures introduced during the current review period are no longer easily linked to this conflict. The decision to implement certain trade measures can be driven by various factors such as inflationary pressures or supply-side uncertainties affecting specific products relating to, for instance, poor harvests resulting from adverse weather events.

3.44. Since 24 February 2022, the WTO Secretariat has identified<sup>13</sup> close to 160 export trade restrictive measures introduced by 50 WTO Members and Observers on agricultural commodities. During the review period, 14 new export restrictions were identified. Although the number of measures appears to be decreasing, the precise count of those still active remains unclear due to insufficient data confirming when individual measures have been terminated.

3.45. The trade coverage<sup>14</sup> of such export measures introduced by all WTO Members and Observers is estimated at USD 113.9 billion (down from USD 116.9 billion in the last Report). The trade coverage of the measures that have been phased out is estimated at USD 107 billion (up from USD 105.1 billion in the last Report). As a result, the estimated trade coverage of export restrictions in place affecting agricultural commodities stands at USD 6.9 billion (down from USD 11.8 billion in the last Report).

### **3.2 Trade remedy trends<sup>15</sup>**

3.46. This Section describes trends in trade remedy actions between 2022 and 2024, and only draws on the information from Members' semi-annual reports of anti-dumping and countervailing actions.

3.47. WTO Members initiated 448 trade remedies investigations (i.e. anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and safeguards investigations) in 2024, a significant increase (95%) from the 230 initiations in 2023. Similarly, the total number of trade remedy measures applied by Members in 2024 (153) increased by 50% from the 102 measures applied in 2023.

3.48. Anti-dumping actions are the most numerous among trade remedy initiations and measures applied. Since the first review period, most anti-dumping actions have targeted products in the metals, chemicals, plastics and rubber sectors. Metals, chemicals, and machinery products accounted for the largest share of countervailing initiations during the review period.

3.49. Safeguard measures are applied on all sources of the imported product under investigation,<sup>16</sup> and are subject to different rules and timelines compared with anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures. Initiations of safeguard investigations peaked in 2019 with 30 cases, but have since declined sharply, reaching only 4 in 2022 before increasing to 16 in 2024.

<sup>13</sup> Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB), as of 21 October 2025.

<sup>14</sup> Based on annual 2024 trade figures.

<sup>15</sup> This Section is without prejudice to Members' right to take trade remedy actions under the WTO.

<sup>16</sup> With the exception of exporting Members covered by the special and differential treatment provided for developing countries in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

**Anti-dumping measures<sup>17</sup>**

3.50. The total number of anti-dumping initiations increased by 313% between 2022 and 2024 (Table 3.9). While anti-dumping investigations do not necessarily lead to the imposition of measures, an increase in the number of investigations initiated is an early indicator of a likely increase in the number of measures imposed. Between 2022 and 2024, a total of 323 anti-dumping measures were applied. As it can take up to 18 months for an anti-dumping investigation to be concluded, the measures applied in a given period may not necessarily be the result of investigations initiated in the same period.

**Table 3.9 Number of initiations of anti-dumping investigations and measures applied, by Member**

Member	2022		2023		2024	
	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures
Argentina	9	10	6	6	1	4
Australia	3	1	3	0	16	0
Bahrain, Kingdom of; Kuwait, State of; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of; United Arab Emirates <sup>a</sup>	0	2	4	5	3	1
Brazil	0	5	7	3	37	6
Canada	2	4	1	1	8	4
Chile	0	0	2	0	0	0
China	2	2	1	1	11	2
Colombia	0	0	3	0	6	3
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	1	0
Egypt	1	1	0	0	2	0
European Union <sup>b</sup>	3	8	10	5	29	6
Georgia	0	0	0	0	3	0
India	29	8	45	14	81	33
Indonesia	0	2	10	0	11	3
Israel	0	0	0	0	2	0
Japan	0	2	0	0	1	0
Korea, Republic of	5	3	3	7	3	2
Malaysia	0	0	1	1	9	0
Mexico	4	1	4	6	11	6
Morocco	1	2	2	1	3	1
New Zealand	1	1	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	1	10	0	1	7	4
Paraguay	1	0	0	0	0	0
Peru	1	0	1	1	1	1
Philippines	0	0	1	1	0	0
Russian Federation <sup>c</sup>	0	3	5	2	1	0
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of <sup>d</sup>	0	0	4	0	3	4
South Africa <sup>e</sup>	3	10	1	7	8	2
Chinese Taipei	3	0	1	3	1	1

<sup>17</sup> Anti-dumping and countervailing investigations are counted based on the number (*n*) of exporting countries or customs territories affected by an investigation. Thus, one anti-dumping or countervailing investigation involving imports from *n* countries/customs territories is counted as *n* investigations.




Member	2022		2023		2024	
	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures
Thailand	0	5	0	0	3	0
Türkiye	0	7	6	1	23	6
Ukraine	0	0	0	4	7	0
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	5	0
United States	19	15	64	14	65	39
Uruguay	0	1	1	0	0	1
Viet Nam	0	3	4	1	6	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>368</b>	<b>130</b>

- a Notified by all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member States collectively, as investigations are initiated by the GCC regional investigating authority on behalf of all GCC member States.
- b The European Union is counted as one.
- c Notified by the Russian Federation, but investigations are initiated by the Eurasian Economic Union on behalf of all of its members, i.e. Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Belarus (non-WTO Member) collectively.
- d Notified by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia individually, as these investigations are initiated by its own investigating authority and not by the GCC regional investigating authority.
- e Notified by South Africa, but investigations are initiated at the level of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) on behalf of its member States (also for Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia).

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.51. Chart 3.7 shows that anti-dumping initiations and measures have fluctuated considerably over the 2008–2024 period. Initiations peaked at 355 in 2020, before dropping sharply in 2022 (89) and then surging again to 368 in 2024, the highest level since 2002. Measures generally follow the trend in initiations with a time lag, reaching their highest point in 2021 (286) in response to the 2020 spike in investigations. The sharp rebound in initiations in 2024 signals the potential for a corresponding increase in measures in the near future.

3.52. Twenty-nine exporting Members were affected by new anti-dumping investigations in 2022, while 42 were affected in 2023 and 46 in 2024. Imports from China were the most frequent subject of anti-dumping initiations during the three reporting periods, accounting for 39% of all investigations. Imports from India and Thailand, respectively, accounted for 6% of all initiations.

**Chart 3.7 Number of initiations of anti-dumping investigations and measures applied, 2008-2024**

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.53. There was little change in terms of the products affected by anti-dumping investigations initiated between 2021 and 2024, with the majority of initiations focused on products in the metals, chemicals, and plastics, and rubber sectors.

3.54. At the regular meetings of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices on 30 October 2024 and on 30 April 2025<sup>18</sup>, concerns were raised with respect to 50 anti-dumping investigations. Most of these concerns (78%) were raised with respect to anti-dumping actions by China (8), India (6), Türkiye (6), Morocco (5), the European Union (4), Indonesia (4), Brazil (2), Republic of Korea (2), and the United States (2). The remaining trade concerns were raised with respect to individual anti-dumping actions by Australia, Canada, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Viet Nam.

3.55. Other issues and concerns raised at the regular meetings were: (i) the duration of certain United States anti-dumping measures; (ii) European Union Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation (EU) 2018/825; (iii) the duration of certain Chinese anti-dumping measures; (iv) importance of prompt notifications for transparency purposes; (v) transitional reviews, continued application by the United Kingdom of the European Union's anti-dumping measures conducted after Brexit; (vi) Canada's inclusion of Particular Market Situation examinations in its anti-dumping investigations; (vii) negative effects of the geopolitical situation on the Ukrainian economy, its infrastructure, vital production facilities, capacities, cost of production, production, export potential and the ability of the interested parties to defend their interests in anti-dumping investigations; (viii) ad hoc notifications for all investigations conducted; and (ix) the potential use of trade remedy investigations as means of political retaliation.

<sup>18</sup> WTO documents [G/ADP/M/66](#), 28 November 2024; and [G/ADP/M/67](#), 5 June 2025, respectively.

### Countervailing measures

3.56. The data reveal a significant increase in initiations of countervailing investigations in 2024, rising from 27 in 2023 to 64 initiations. Meanwhile, the overall number of measures applied increased more moderately, from 11 in 2023 to 15 in 2024 (Table 3.10). The sharp increase in initiations relative to measures applied may be explained by the time lag between initiations and the conclusion of investigations, as investigations can take up to 18 months. Given the 2024 data on increased initiations, a further upturn in the number of measures applied may be expected in the near future.

3.57. Between 2022 and 2024, 27 exporting WTO Members were affected by new countervailing investigations. Imports from China were the most frequent subject of investigations (41), accounting for 37% of all investigations during this period. Imports from India (18), the second most frequent subject, accounted for 16% of initiations, followed by imports from Indonesia (5), which accounted for 5% of the total number of initiations.


**Table 3.10 Number of initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, by Member**

Member	2022		2023		2024	
	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures
Australia	0	0	0	0	9	0
Brazil	0	2	1	0	0	0
Canada	2	2	1	1	1	1
China	0	0	0	0	1	0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	1	0
European Union <sup>a</sup>	1	3	2	0	3	1
India	3	3	3	3	3	0
Mexico	0	0	0	0	1	0
United Kingdom	2	0	1	2	0	0
United States	11	8	19	5	45	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>15</b>

a The European Union is counted as one.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.58. Chart 3.8 illustrates the trends in the number of initiations of countervailing investigations and measures from 2008 to 2024. Over this period, both initiations and measures show noticeable fluctuations. Initiations peaked in 2024 with 64 investigations, marking the highest level since 2008. Measures reached their highest point in 2021 with 41 measures, before declining and fluctuating in subsequent years.

**Chart 3.8 Number of initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 2008-2024**

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.59. At the regular meetings of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on 29 October 2024 and 29 April 2025<sup>19</sup> concerns were raised with respect to countervailing duty investigations by Australia (1), China (1), the European Union (2), and the United States (7).

3.60. Other issues and concerns raised at the regular meetings were: (i) the elimination of export subsidies by the Members that received extensions under Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement; (ii) the low and declining levels of compliance with the notification and transparency obligations in the SCM Agreement; (iii) the alleged discriminatory subsidies policies and measures of the United States; (iv) subsidies and overcapacity; (v) France's electric vehicle (EV) alleged subsidy scheme; (vi) United States' use of adverse facts available in certain CVD investigations; (vii) United States' countervailing duty investigations regarding transnational subsidies; (viii) Kazakhstan's proposed preferences for domestically produced agricultural machinery; (ix) United States' determinations of public body and *de facto* specificity in certain countervailing investigations; (x) challenges of United States' information requests in certain countervailing investigations; (xi) United States' alleged incorrect appreciation of duty refunds and remissions on export goods in certain countervailing investigations.

### Safeguard measures

3.61. Safeguard measures are temporary measures applied in response to increased imports of goods that are causing serious injury, and are applied on products from all sources, i.e. all exporting countries/customs territories.<sup>20</sup> Safeguard measures are subject to different rules and timelines than anti-dumping and countervailing measures and are, therefore, not directly comparable to these other types of trade remedies.

<sup>19</sup> WTO documents [G/SCM/M/129](#), 2 December 2024 and, [G/SCM/M/131](#), 3 June 2025, respectively.

<sup>20</sup> With the exception of exporting Members covered by the special and differential treatment provided for developing countries in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

3.62. In 2024, 16 safeguard investigations were initiated compared to the 12 initiations in 2023 (Table 3.11). The number of measures applied also increased from five in 2023, to eight in 2024.

**Table 3.11 Number of initiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, by Member**

Member	2022		2023		2024	
	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures
China	0	0	0	0	1	0
European Union <sup>a</sup>	0	0	0	0	1	0
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0	1
India	1	0	1	2	1	1
Indonesia	0	0	5	0	2	0
Jordan	0	0	0	0	1	0
Madagascar	1	0	4	2	2	3
Morocco	1	0	0	0	1	0
Philippines	0	1	1	0	1	0
South Africa <sup>b</sup>	0	0	0	0	1	0
Tunisia	1	0	0	1	0	0
Türkiye	0	1	1	0	3	2
United States	0	0	0	0	1	1
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>8</b>


a The European Union is counted as one.

b Notified by South Africa, but investigations are initiated at the level of the Southern African Customs Union, i.e. also in respect of Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia.

Note: Some notifications are ambiguous about the timing when the measures took effect. For those, an additional notification clarifying, *ex post*, the effective date of the measure is sometimes filed. For this reason, the number of applications of measures in a given period indicated in past reports may differ from the figures indicated in the most recent report. The same applies to the following chart.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.63. Chart 3.9 shows the number of initiations of safeguard investigations and application of measures on a calendar-year basis. As shown in the Chart, the figures for 2022 (four initiations and two measures) and 2023 (12 initiations and five measures) were among the lowest since 1995. The number of initiations in 2024 were slightly higher than in 2023. This was the highest number of initiations recorded in a calendar year since 2020. The number of measures applied also increased from 2023 to 2024, but remained lower than previous years. Overall, the levels of safeguard actions remain relatively low in historical terms.

**Chart 3.9 Number of initiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, 2008-2024**

Note: Data for 2024 cover January to June.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.64. At the meetings of the Committee on Safeguards held on 28 October 2024 and on 28 April 2025<sup>21</sup>, concerns were raised with respect to 23 safeguard investigations by China (1), Colombia (1), the European Union (2), India (1), Indonesia (5), Madagascar (1), Morocco (1), Philippines (1), South Africa (2), Türkiye (4), United Kingdom (1), United States (2), Viet Nam (1).

### 3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures<sup>22</sup>

3.65. This Section covers matters related to SPS transparency, including specific trade concerns discussed in SPS Committee meetings, during the period from 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025. In addition, a separate Section highlights developments under the recently adopted Sixth Review of the SPS Agreement.

3.66. Under the SPS Agreement, WTO Members are obliged to provide an advance notice of intention to introduce new or modified SPS measures<sup>23</sup>, or to notify immediately when emergency measures are imposed. The main objective of complying with SPS notification obligations is to inform other Members about new or changed regulations that may significantly affect international trade. Therefore, an increased number of notifications does not automatically imply greater use of protectionist measures, but rather enhanced transparency regarding food safety and animal and plant health measures, most of which are, presumably, legitimate health-protection measures.

<sup>21</sup> WTO documents [G/SG/M/65](#), 4 December 2024; and [G/SG/M/66](#), 3 June 2025, respectively.

<sup>22</sup> Information presented in this Section was retrieved from the [ePing SPS&TBT Platform](#), Viewed at: <https://eping.wto.org/>. This Section is based on notifications to the WTO for the period 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025. Specific trade concerns (STCs) are raised at SPS Committee meetings, and this Section summarizes the STCs raised at the 13-15 November 2024, 19-20 March and 18-19 June 2025 SPS Committee meetings. More detailed searches on STCs have been retrieved from the [Trade Concerns Database](#), viewed at: <https://tradeconcerns.wto.org/en>.

<sup>23</sup> Transparency obligations are contained in Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement.


3.67. In the period from 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025, 2,097 SPS notifications (regular and emergency, including revisions and addenda) were submitted<sup>24</sup> to the WTO, a 2.5% increase compared with the previous 12-month period (2,046 notifications from 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024). The share of notifications from developing Members, accounting for 75% (1,565 notifications) of the total number, was slightly higher than the 73% (1,500 notifications) corresponding to the previous 12-month period (Chart 3.10).

3.68. During the review period, WTO Members submitted 1,852 regular SPS notifications (including revisions and addenda), 75% (1,396 notifications) of which were submitted by developing Members. Compared with the previous 12-month period, the total number of regular notifications increased by about 1.5%, while those submitted by developing Members increased by about 6%.

3.69. The total number of emergency notifications (including revisions and addenda) increased by 11% in the current review period (245 compared with 221 during the previous 12-month period); however, while the proportion of all emergency notifications (including revisions and addenda) submitted by developing Members remained higher than the proportion of emergency notifications submitted by developed-country Members, constituting 69% of the total of emergency notifications, there has been a decrease of 6% in the total emergency notifications submitted by developing Members compared with the previous 12-month period (169 compared with 180). High percentages of emergency notifications by developing Members have been considered consistent with the general trend of most emergency measures being notified by developing Members, perhaps because they have less extensive SPS regulatory systems compared with those of developed-country Members. Consequently, when facing emergency challenges, developing Members are more likely than developed-country Members to introduce new regulations or change existing ones.

3.70. Many Members follow the recommendation to notify SPS measures even when they are based on a relevant international standard<sup>25</sup>, as this substantially increases transparency. In this context, of the 1,234 regular notifications (excluding addenda) submitted from 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025, 46% indicated that at least one international standard, guideline or recommendation was applicable to the notified measure (Chart 3.11). Of these, about 91% indicated that the proposed measure was in conformity with the applicable international standard.

**Chart 3.10 Number of SPS notifications, including regular, emergency, revisions and addenda**




Source: WTO Secretariat.

<sup>24</sup> For this Report, "submission" refers to the date of circulation.

<sup>25</sup> WTO document [G/SPS/7/Rev.5](#), 16 January 2023, para. 2.3. WTO document [G/SPS/7/Rev.5](#) was updated in January 2023 to reflect relevant changes in the set of tools available for Members to search for SPS related information, namely the new [ePing SPS&TBT Platform](#).



**Chart 3.11 Regular and emergency SPS notifications (excluding addenda) and international standards**

Note: Codex Alimentarius (Codex), World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, founded as OIE) and International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC).

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.71. International standards often provide useful guidance regarding measures to address disease outbreaks and other emergency situations. Indeed, 174 out of 182 (about 96%) emergency notifications (excluding addenda) submitted during the review period indicated that an international standard, guideline or recommendation was applicable to the notified measure.

3.72. Of the 1,234 regular notifications (excluding addenda) submitted during the review period, the majority (68%) were related to food safety.<sup>26</sup> The remainder related to plant protection, animal health, and the protection of the Member's territory from other damage from pests, and to a lesser extent, the protection of humans from animal diseases or plant pests. Regular notifications usually contain more than one objective.

3.73. Of the 182 emergency measures (excluding addenda) notified in the same period, the majority (95%) related to animal health, followed by those related to food safety, the protection of humans from animal diseases or plant pests, plant protection, and the protection of the Member's territory from other damage from pests. Emergency notifications may also contain more than one objective.

3.74. The WTO Secretariat prepares annual transparency reports containing detailed information on the implementation of the transparency provisions of the SPS Agreement.<sup>27</sup>

3.75. While there is no formal provision for "counter notification", concerns regarding the failure to notify an SPS measure, or regarding a notified measure, can be raised as an STC at any of the regular meetings of the SPS Committee each year.

<sup>26</sup> The objective of an SPS measure falls under one or more of the following categories: (i) food safety; (ii) animal health; (iii) plant protection; (iv) protection of humans from animal/plant pests or diseases; and (v) protection of territory from other damage from pests. Members are required to identify the purpose of the measure in their notifications. It is common for more than one objective to be identified for a measure.

<sup>27</sup> See the latest revision of WTO document [G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.17](#), 25 February 2025.

3.76. Three SPS Committee meetings were held during the reporting period: on 13-15 November 2024, 19-20 March and 18-19 June 2025.<sup>28</sup> More capital-based delegates came to Geneva, and the margins of the SPS Committee meetings<sup>29</sup> provide important opportunities for delegations to discuss and resolve trade concerns bilaterally. Several STCs had been withdrawn or not raised by certain Members during the review period.

3.77. At the March 2025 meeting, Peru removed one previously raised STC: Panama's undue delays in the renewal of authorizations for plants of fishery and livestock enterprises ([ID 509](#)).

3.78. At the June 2025 meeting, the European Union withdrew two STCs: Australia's long approval procedures for market access applications ([ID 599](#)); and Australia's non-application of regionalization for African swine fever ([ID 600](#)). India withdrew two new STCs: Saudi Arabia's undue delay in listing of Indian fishery establishment and EU rejection of mineral oil hydrocarbons (MOSH/MOAH) in rice consignments. The Russian Federation withdrew one previously raised STC: South Africa's delays in granting SPS access for poultry, beef, pork, fish and seafood ([ID 564](#)). Argentina withdrew one previously raised STC: Japan's restrictions on poultry meat ([ID 601](#)). Japan withdrew China from the list of responding Members for STC: China; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; Russian Federation – Import restrictions on aquatic products after the discharge of ALPS treated water ([ID 574](#)).

3.79. In the three SPS Committee meetings, 23 STCs were raised for the first time (Table 3.12), and 56 previously raised STCs were discussed again.<sup>30</sup> 42 previously raised STCs were raised in the three meetings.<sup>31</sup> Of these, 10 addressed persistent problems that have been discussed 16 times or more (Table 3.13). In addition, eight STCs raised for the first time in the review period were discussed again in March or June 2025.<sup>32</sup>

**Table 3.12 New STCs raised in the SPS Committee meetings of November 2024, March and June 2025**

ID	New STCs
<a href="#">608</a>	Viet Nam's procedure for the listing of exporting establishments - Circular 04/2024
<a href="#">607</a>	Thailand's ban on imports of aquaculture shrimp from India
<a href="#">606</a>	Thailand's new regulation to mitigate presence of aflatoxins in peanut kernels ( <a href="#">G/SPS/N/THA/216/Add.1</a> )
<a href="#">605</a>	Uncertainty over coffee beans exports to the People's Republic of China
<a href="#">604</a>	Türkiye's prohibition on the importation of live cattle
<a href="#">603</a>	EU Technical Regulation 'Commission Implementing Decision of 22 December 2011 on emergency measures regarding unauthorized genetically modified rice in rice products originating from China and repealing Decision 2008/289/EC'
<a href="#">602</a>	The Philippines' delays in resuming imports of sterilized processed pork products
<a href="#">601</a>	Japan's restrictions on poultry meat
<a href="#">600</a>	Australia's non-application of regionalization for African swine fever
<a href="#">599</a>	Australia's long approval procedures for market access applications
<a href="#">598</a>	Delays in Korea's approval procedures for animal products
<a href="#">597</a>	Thailand's unjustified suspension of Brazilian exports of beef and edible offal
<a href="#">596</a>	US lengthy approval procedures for plant products
<a href="#">595</a>	Thailand's import restrictions due to African swine fever
<a href="#">594</a>	South Africa's undue delays in providing the results of the pest risk analysis for the export of kiwifruit
<a href="#">593</a>	China's import restrictions on animal products in relation to bluetongue disease
<a href="#">592</a>	Withdrawal by France of the approval of thiacloprid for fresh fruits and vegetables
<a href="#">591</a>	Hong Kong, China's restriction on spice imports due to established limits of ethylene oxide
<a href="#">590</a>	UK reduction of current MRL of imazethapyr

<sup>28</sup> See summary reports in [G/SPS/R/115](#), [G/SPS/R/116](#), and [G/SPS/R/117](#).

<sup>29</sup> The November 2024, March and June 2025 meetings were held in person, and Members were also able to participate remotely via a virtual conferencing platform (WTO documents [WTO/AIR/SPS/47](#), 25 October 2024, [WTO/AIR/SPS/49](#), 28 February 2025, and [WTO/AIR/SPS/51](#), 28 May 2025).

<sup>30</sup> The 56 previously raised STCs, which were discussed again were STC IDs 193, 332, 356, 382, 392, 406, 431, 439, 441, 442, 446, 448, 466, 471, 485, 487, 490, 498, 501, 503, 508, 509, 516, 518, 521, 526, 529, 530, 532, 533, 534, 539, 542, 543, 544, 546, 548, 549, 550, 552, 553, 554, 557, 558, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 568.

<sup>31</sup> These were STC IDs 193, 306, 332, 382, 392, 406, 431, 439, 441, 446, 448, 466, 508, 516, 520, 521, 527, 532, 533, 534, 539, 542, 543, 544, 548, 552, 553, 554, 556, 561, 562, 563, 565, 568, 569, 574, 575, 577, 579, 580, 581 and 585.

<sup>32</sup> These were STC IDs 586, 591, 593, 596, 597, 598, 603 and 604.

ID	New STCs
<a href="#">589</a>	UK non-renewal of the approval of the active substance mancozeb
<a href="#">588</a>	EU reduction of current MRL of acetamiprid
<a href="#">587</a>	The Russian Federation's delay in listing of establishments for export of egg products
<a href="#">586</a>	The Russian Federation's delay in listing of establishments for export of dairy products

Source: WTO Secretariat.

**Table 3.13 Previously raised SPS STCs discussed in the November 2024, March and June 2025 meetings, raised 16 times or more<sup>33</sup>**

STC ID	Title of the STC	Member(s) responding	Member(s) raising the concern (total number of Members supporting)	First date raised (times subsequently raised)	Primary objective
<a href="#">193</a>	General import restrictions due to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)	Several Members (over 19)	European Union, United States (4)	22/06/2004 (53 times)	Animal health/Animal diseases
<a href="#">382</a>	European Union legislation on endocrine disruptors	European Union	Argentina, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States (50)	25/03/2014 (31 times)	Food safety
<a href="#">406</a>	China's import restrictions due to highly pathogenic avian influenza	China	European Union, United States (2)	16/03/2016 (25 times)	Animal health/Animal diseases
<a href="#">392</a>	China's import restrictions due to African swine fever	China	European Union	15/07/2015 (23 times)	Animal health/Animal diseases
<a href="#">431</a>	South Africa's import restrictions on poultry due to highly pathogenic avian influenza	South Africa	European Union (3)	02/11/2017 (21 times)	Animal health/Animal diseases
<a href="#">439</a>	United States import restrictions on apples and pears	United States	European Union	01/03/2018 (21 times)	Plant health
<a href="#">441</a>	Indonesia's approval procedures for animal and plant products	Indonesia	European Union, Russian Federation (4)	12/07/2018 (20 times)	Other concerns
<a href="#">448</a>	EU Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) for alpha-cypermethrin, buprofezin, chlorothalonil, chlorpyrifos, chlorpyrifos-methyl, cypermethrin, diflubenzuron, ethoxysulfuron, glufosinate, imazalil, ioxynil, iprodione, mancozeb, molinate, picoxystrobin and tepraloxymid	European Union	China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States (27)	01/11/2018 (19 times)	Food safety
<a href="#">446</a>	EU review of legislation on veterinary medicinal products	European Union	Argentina, United States (10)	12/07/2018 (17 times)	Food safety
<a href="#">466</a>	The Philippines' trade restrictions on imports of meat	Philippines	European Union (1)	07/11/2019 (16 times)	Animal health/Animal diseases

Source: WTO Secretariat.

<sup>33</sup> Further information on the STCs previously raised during the review period is available in the [ePing SPS&TBT Platform](https://tradeconcerns.wto.org/en/stcs?searchParameterDomainIds=2). Viewed at: <https://tradeconcerns.wto.org/en/stcs?searchParameterDomainIds=2>.

3.80. Of the 23 STCs raised for the first time in the three SPS Committee meetings, 8 (35%) concerned food safety, 11 (48%) concerned measures covering animal health/animal diseases, 3 (13%) related to plant health and 1 (4%) covered other concerns.<sup>34</sup> Regarding the 56 previously raised STCs during the review period, 18 concerned measures covering food safety, 17 concerned animal health/animal diseases, 4 related to plant health and 17 covered other types of concerns. Of the 79 STCs raised or discussed during the review period, 26 concerned measures covering food safety, 28 covered animal health/animal diseases, 7 concerned plant health and 18 related to other types of concerns. Discussions among Members in the SPS Committee continue to be multifaceted and dynamic.

3.81. The WTO Secretariat prepares annual reports containing detailed information on STCs discussed in the SPS Committee.<sup>35</sup> Members are invited to provide updates of the status of the STCs they have raised under the dedicated agenda item, helping to ensure that WTO databases are kept updated. Since 2013, the Secretariat has periodically contacted Members to request information on the status of STCs (resolved, partially resolved or not resolved) that have not been raised for two years. The most recent exercise was conducted in November 2024 and the results were circulated in document [G/SPS/GEN/2261](#), which also includes results from similar exercises in 2013, 2017, 2020 and 2022. In the 2024 exercise, 40 Members were contacted, reporting 41 STCs as resolved and 26 STCs as partially resolved.<sup>36</sup>

3.82. At the November 2024 meeting, the Secretariat provided an update on the annual report on the use of the procedure to encourage and facilitate the resolution of specific sanitary or phytosanitary issues among Members in accordance with Article 12.2 ([G/SPS/61](#)), contained in document [G/SPS/GEN/2259](#). The report included information on a request from Brazil concerning the export of products to Nigeria ([G/SPS/GEN/2189](#)) linked to STC [ID 523](#). In the SPS Committee, Brazil and Nigeria had indicated their willingness to pursue bilateral discussions. As Nigeria did not provide a written response to Brazil's request, it was considered not to have accepted Brazil's request, and no ad hoc consultations had taken place.

3.83. At the March 2025 meeting, South Africa reported on the partial resolution of [STC ID 326](#) on Thailand's restrictions on table grapes, apples and pears. Market access had been granted for grapes in 2015 and for apples in 2024, and South Africa looked forward to finalising the PRA for pears.

3.84. Five thematic sessions were held during the reporting period.<sup>37</sup> During the November 2024 meeting week, two thematic sessions were held on: (i) emerging risks and new agricultural technologies to address them, based on a joint proposal submitted by Canada and the European Union; and (ii) Codex guidelines for voluntary third-party assurance programmes, based on a proposal by Belize. During the March 2025 meeting week, the Secretariat organized a two-day thematic session on innovative regulatory approaches to facilitate safe trade, based on proposals by Australia, India, Indonesia, and the United States. During the June 2025 Committee meeting week, a thematic session on addressing Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) through SPS measures in international trade, based on a proposal submitted by the European Union. Finally, an intersessional thematic session on Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) was held on 30 September 2025, based on a proposal from Côte d'Ivoire, on behalf of the G90, to review progress in implementing the MC13 S&DT Declaration.<sup>38,39</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Other issues such as certification requirements, or control, inspection or approval procedures.

<sup>35</sup> See the latest revision of the annual report on STCs [G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.25](#) (25 February 2025) and the [Trade Concerns Database](#).

<sup>36</sup> In WTO document [G/SPS/GEN/2261](#), the status of STC 108 should be marked as partially resolved rather than resolved, as Israel has not reported on its possible resolution.

<sup>37</sup> 11-12 November 2024, 17-18 March 2025, 17 June 2025, and 30 September 2025.

<sup>38</sup> Please visit the SPS Events, Workshops and Training webpage to access programmes, reports, presentations and recordings of the thematic sessions and workshop: [WTO | Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures — events, workshops and training](#).

<sup>39</sup> See also the SPS Chairperson's report to the CTD SS as a follow-up to the MC13 S&DT Declaration (WTO document [G/SPS/73](#), 28 November 2024).

### Follow-up to the Sixth Review of the SPS Agreement

3.85. At its March 2025 meeting, The Committee adopted the Report of the Sixth Review of the Operation and Implementation of the SPS Agreement ([G/SPS/74](#) and [G/SPS/74/Add.1](#)). The Sixth Review outlines a set of recommendations to guide the future work of the SPS Committee. Key recommendations include:

- Establishment of a transparency working group, with an initial 2-year mandate. This group may explore ways to improve SPS notifications and the [ePing SPS&TBT Platform](#), examine Members' commenting practices (including the possible adaptation of the TBT Good Practice Guide), address challenges in determining whether a measure falls under SPS or TBT, and revise the recommended transparency procedures and related resources;
- Launch of a pilot mentoring programme to support interested developing Members in engaging more effectively on SPS matters and enhancing the transparency of their SPS regulations;
- Continued collaboration with Codex, WOA, and the IPPC, with the SPS Committee serving as a hub for information exchange among these standard-setting bodies.
- Further dialogue and thematic sessions on a range of topics, including those under the MC12 SPS Declaration Work Programme. These include modern challenges and emerging risks, regionalization, innovative approaches, digital tools, maximum residue limits, and facility registrations.

### 3.4 Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)

3.86. WTO Members continued to use the TBT Committee's transparency mechanisms to notify their TBT measures and to discuss and often resolve specific trade concerns (STCs) non-litigiously. Most of the new regular TBT notifications submitted by WTO Members during the review period referred to protection of human health or safety as their main objective. A total of 201 STCs were discussed during the review period.

#### Notifications submitted to the TBT Committee

3.87. Under the TBT Agreement, WTO Members are required to notify their intention to introduce new or modified technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, or to notify adopted emergency measures immediately. The principal objective of complying with the TBT notification obligations is to inform other Members about new or changed regulations that may significantly affect trade and provide an opportunity for comments.

3.88. From 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 (the review period), WTO Members submitted 2,718 new regular notifications of TBT measures.<sup>40</sup> Members which notified the most measures during the review period - 47% of all new regular notifications - were Tanzania (232), Kenya (223), Rwanda (214), China (207), Uganda (204), Burundi (145), Malawi (139), the United States (90), the Republic of Korea (87), and the European Union (77). Most of these new regular TBT notifications indicated as their main objective protection of human health or safety. Various other notifications related to quality requirements, prevention of deceptive practices and consumer protection, consumer information, and labelling, harmonization, reducing trade barriers and facilitating trade and protection of the environment. During the review period, Members submitted three AI-specific notifications, bringing the total number of notifications in this area to 5 since 2021.

3.89. A total of 1,789 follow-up notifications (i.e. addenda, corrigenda, or supplements) were submitted during the review period. The frequent use by Members of follow-up notifications is beneficial as it increases transparency and predictability across the measures' regulatory lifecycle.

<sup>40</sup> Viewed at: [ePing SPS&TBT platform](#).

### Measures discussed in the TBT Committee (STCs)<sup>41</sup>

3.90. WTO Members use the TBT Committee as a forum for discussing trade issues related to specific TBT measures proposed or maintained by other Members.

3.91. Issues can range from requests for additional information and clarification to questions on the consistency of measures with TBT Agreement disciplines. The overall trend suggests an increasing use of the TBT Committee as a forum for Members to raise and resolve trade concerns non-litigiously.

3.92. A total of 201 (39 new and 162 previously raised) STCs were discussed during the three Committee meetings that fell within the review period. The 39 new STCs concerned TBT measures by the European Union (11); India (8); Indonesia (7); Australia (2); China (2); the State of Kuwait (2); and one<sup>42</sup> each by the Kingdom of Bahrain, Chile, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. These new STCs covered regulations on a wide range of products (e.g. electric vehicle batteries, chemicals, electrical products, self-driving vehicles, mobile machinery, food and liquor products, home appliances, cosmetics, textiles, biodegradable plastic products, energy and warehouse storage systems), and dealt with a variety of issues (e.g. certification, labelling, packaging, methodologies for calculating and verifying the carbon footprint, circularity, eco-design and traceability requirements).

3.93. During the review period, several Members shared progress of their discussions of six STCs.

3.94. During the three Committee meetings covered by the review period, 11 persistent STCs were discussed (these STCs have each been previously raised on more than 16 occasions in the TBT Committee meetings).

### 3.5 Policy developments in agriculture

3.95. The Committee on Agriculture (CoA) provides a forum for Members to discuss matters related to agricultural trade, and to consult on matters related to Members' implementation of commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). The review work of the CoA is based on Members' notifications regarding their commitments and on matters raised under Article 18.6 of the AoA, commonly referred to as Specific Implementation Matters (SIMs). The CoA has also been tasked with monitoring the implementation of specific outcomes reached under the agriculture negotiations. Additionally, it takes up other matters, including the follow-up to the Marrakesh Decision on Least-developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs). The Committee undertook a dedicated work programme to consider the food security concerns of least-developed and net food-importing developing countries (LDCs and NFIDCs) following instructions from the 12<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Conference<sup>43</sup> and, in April 2024, adopted a report<sup>44</sup> containing a set of recommendations by consensus. Since then, the Committee has deliberated on the follow-up to the agreed recommendations of the work programme.

3.96. Between mid-October 2024 and mid-October 2025 (the review period), the CoA held four regular meetings, on 26-27 November 2024, 24-25 March, 23-24 June, and 25-26 September 2025.<sup>45</sup> Members posed a total of 834 questions<sup>46</sup>, of which 349 questions concerned SIMs under Article 18.6, 396 questions concerned individual notifications, 24 questions concerned overdue notifications,

<sup>41</sup> This Section takes account of the STCs raised in the TBT Committee meetings of 5-8 November 2024, 26-28 March and 25-27 June 2025.

<sup>42</sup> This STC was raised regarding the measure of 7 Members (the State of Kuwait, Oman, Kingdom of Bahrain, Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen).

<sup>43</sup> WTO document [WT/MIN\(22\)/28 - WT/L/1139](#), 17 June 2022.

<sup>44</sup> WTO document [G/AG/38](#), 17 April 2024.

<sup>45</sup> WTO documents [G/AG/R/112](#), 20 December 2024; [G/AG/R/113](#), 14 April 2025; [G/AG/R/114](#), 7 July 2025; and [G/AG/R/115](#), to be issued.

<sup>46</sup> Questions can be accessed through the compilation of questions issued for each CoA meeting under WTO documents [G/AG/W/251](#), 12 November 2024 (26-27 November meeting); [G/AG/W/252](#), 10 March 2025 (24-25 March meeting); [G/AG/W/255](#), 6 June 2025 (23-24 June meeting); and [G/AG/W/256/Rev.1](#), 17 September 2025 (25-26 September meeting). All questions and answers are available in the Agriculture Information Management System ([AG-IMS](#)).



33 questions were in relation to the follow-up to the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition<sup>47</sup>, and 32 concerned the follow-up to the TRQ Bali Decision.<sup>48</sup>

3.97. Domestic support continued to dominate discussions in the CoA. About 88% of questions under individual notifications and 60% of SIMs under Article 18.6 concerned domestic support policies. Of the 147 SIMs raised during the review period, 100 were raised for the first time. More than half of the new SIMs (66) concerned domestic support policies. Members sought clarification on support policies targeting specific sectors or products, including livestock (Türkiye's Agricultural Production Plan), cereals (Brazil's options contract on cereal; Brazil's price support mechanisms; China's new development plan; Colombia's price support system for green paddy rice; Republic of Korea's action plan to increase domestic wheat sufficiency rate; Myanmar's price support programmes for rice; Oman's strategic stockpiles/reserves for key food items; Thailand's rice support), eggs (Canada's Poultry and Egg On-Farm Investment Program; U.S. initiative to combat avian flu and reduce egg prices), sugar (India's sugar support), dairy (Canada's applied administered price for skim milk powder; Canada's Supply Management Processing Investment Fund; New Zealand's Resilient Dairy Program), and soybeans and cotton (India's subsidies to cotton and soybeans; Republic of Korea's soybean policies). There were 49 SIMs raised on domestic support policies with a wider sectoral scope implemented by Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, the European Union, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Paraguay, Switzerland, Thailand, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

3.98. Measures potentially limiting market access was the second area of interest in the CoA. Some 33 questions concerning notifications and 35 SIMs were raised during the review period. On notifications, most questions (28) concerned imports under tariff rate quotas (TRQs). Out of the 35 SIMs concerning market access policies, 24 were discussed for the first time. These new SIMs related to policies potentially affecting market access of specific products or groups of products including alcoholic beverages (India's tariff reduction on Bourbon Whiskey imports), cereals (Indonesia's policy to reduce dependency on imports of key commodities; Japan's Simultaneous Buy and Sell system; Philippines' suspension on rice imports), livestock and poultry (Angola's poultry and pork; Bangladesh's import policies; Indonesia's beef import quota), and fertilizers (EU's tariffs on agricultural products and fertilizers from the Russian Federation and Belarus). Six SIMs related to the United States' tariff policies, including bilateral agreements or frameworks with the European Union, Japan, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and Viet Nam. The remaining SIMs focused on broader market access policies implemented by Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Türkiye and the United States.

3.99. Eight SIMs raised during the period concerned covered policies that potentially subsidized exports of agricultural products; six of the them were raised for the first time, including Australia's initiative to improve overseas market access, and its Food and Fibre to Market (FF2M) - Industry Partnership Program; Canada's Agriculture and Food Export Program; U.S. Agricultural Trade Promotion Programs; U.S. support to Wisconsin's producers on export; and the U.S. Specialty Crop Block Grants.

3.100. Three measures that potentially limited or restricted exports of foodstuffs were also subject to specific questions in the Committee during this period including Ghana's export restriction on soybeans; India's export duty on molasses; and Türkiye's export restrictions. The questions focused on the consistency of policies with WTO rules, the consideration of affected importers' interests, and the importance of timely Table ER notifications. Finally, one new SIM was raised to China, requesting information on its technical and financial assistance provided to LDCs and NFIDCS in the context of the NFIDC Ministerial Decision.

3.101. Of the SIMs discussed during the reporting period, 47 were follow-ups to issues previously raised in Committee meetings. Several of these matters have been recurring topics in the CoA, with some brought up repeatedly over the years. Notably, seven SIMs have each been discussed more than a dozen times (one of them as many as 25 times) across various CoA meetings, collectively generating a total of 210 questions. This includes Canada's new milk ingredient class - raised 25 times; India's public stockpiling - raised 15 times; Canada's tariff-rate quota for cheese - raised 15 times; EU's deforestation and forest degradation strategy - raised 14 times; India's export restrictions - raised 13 times; India's transport and marketing assistance and Nigeria's import

<sup>47</sup> WTO document [WT/MIN\(15\)/45](#) - [WT/L/980](#), 21 December 2015.

<sup>48</sup> WTO document [WT/MIN\(13\)/39](#) - [WT/L/914](#), 11 December 2013.

prohibitions on certain agriculture products - raised 12 times each. Other agricultural policies from 25 Members were also the subject of repeated concerns under Article 18.6.<sup>49</sup>

### Food security, technology transfer

3.102. Food security has continued to feature prominently on the agenda of the CoA, especially since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the period under review, the Committee continued its follow-up on the agreed report and recommendations under the Work Programme, pursuant to paragraph 8 of the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity. Since the adoption of the report in April 2024, this item has remained a standing agenda point in all formal Committee meetings covered by this report. The adopted recommendations cover several important aspects, including export restrictions, international food aid, the contribution of the WTO agricultural subsidy framework to enhancing agricultural productivity and resilience, and inter-agency collaboration on food security. Members have actively engaged in advancing the recommendations, with several follow-up actions already undertaken. For instance, the third triennial review of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition in 2024 drew directly on the recommendations in [G/AG/38](#), informing the Committee's decision to establish a new notification format for export competition under Table EC:1.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, during the annual NFIDC Decision monitoring exercise in November 2024, Members initiated discussions on revising the NF:1 format to enhance transparency in reporting technical and financial assistance to LDCs and NFIDCs. Further discussions are ongoing, including within the WTO Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance (WGTDF) which has been tasked with examining specific concerns raised by LDCs and NFIDCs regarding the financing of food imports.

3.103. References to the war on Ukraine have continued to feature in the CoA's discussions, both within the broader dialogue on food security under the dedicated Work Programme targeting the food security concerns of LDCs and NFIDCs, and within the Committee's Q&A-based review process. Contributions by international organizations, particularly in describing grain market developments, also frequently addressed geopolitical developments and conflicts and their impact on global food security. Several Members have continued to express concerns over the ongoing war on Ukraine and its impact on global food security. The Russian Federation submitted written questions, covering issues such as economic and trade sanctions, port restrictions, customs duties exceeding WTO bindings, prohibitions on access to ports, and banking and financial restrictions.

3.104. The Committee has actively engaged on the topic of technology transfer in agriculture, following the July 2023 submission by the African Group (WTO document [G/AG/W/238](#), 5 July 2023 and other symbols). In 2024, three thematic sessions organized by the WTO Secretariat helped deepen Members' understanding of the role of technology transfer in enhancing agricultural productivity. In 2025, discussions shifted toward how WTO rules could support the development of technological capacities and enhance production capabilities. Members' constructive proposals have focused on how Members can utilize policy tools under the AoA to foster innovation and share best practices, particularly in support of developing country Members. The Committee has remained engaged in facilitating experience-sharing and identifying practical approaches to promote agricultural research and technology dissemination.

### 3.6 General and economic support measures

3.105. Reporting on general economic support measures has been part of the trade monitoring exercise since its inception in 2009 following the Global Financial Crisis. There is a high degree of variation in terms of both the frequency of such policies and the transparency which surrounds them. WTO Members have expressed continued interest in understanding the evolving trends and implications of these policies, which now often extend beyond traditional economic objectives to encompass broader considerations of national security and resilience.

3.106. In response to the Director-General's request for information for the Trade Monitoring Exercise on 5 March and 1 September 2025, 35 WTO Members<sup>51</sup> volunteered information on

<sup>49</sup> Angola, Australia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, the European Union, Iceland, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zambia.

<sup>50</sup> WTO document [G/AG/2/Add.2](#), 16 December 2024.

<sup>51</sup> Albania; Australia, the European Union (counting the EU-27 and its member States separately); Hong Kong, China; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; the United Kingdom and Viet Nam.



1,013 general economic support measures, a significant increase from the 328 measures recorded for the same period in 2024.

3.107. Economic support measures appear to remain significant, but overall, the focus seems to have shifted somewhat towards non-financial interventions and increased importance on strategic and broader policy objectives. External data sources offer broader coverage of such measures.


3.108. The following box on Industrial Policies was contributed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

### Box 3.3 Industrial Policy: Reacting to Times of Crisis

It is commonplace to say that industrial policy is back, but comprehensive data on industrial policy are not readily available. The New Industrial Policy Observatory (NIPO), an initiative launched by the IMF in collaboration with the Global Trade Alert (GTA) that monitors industrial policy for 75 countries worldwide, aims to fill this gap (Evenett et al., 2024). This monitoring exercise defines industrial policy as any targeted government intervention aimed at developing or supporting specific domestic firms or industries to achieve national economic or non-economic (e.g. national security, public health, or environmental) objectives (IMF, 2024). According to NIPO data, there were 4,179 and 3,820 such measures implemented in 2023 and 2024, respectively. Although measures are sometimes discovered with a lag, the first 6 months of 2025 already revealed 1,611 measures.

An important question still largely unanswered is how industrial policies have evolved over time. A new IMF Working Paper explores industrial policy developments since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) with the aid of Large Language Models (LLMs). The LLM techniques are first trained on NIPO data for the years 2023 and 2024 and then used to identify GTA measures between 2009-2023 with conventional and new industrial policy motives: GVC resilience, national security or geopolitical concerns, climate mitigation, and strategic competitiveness. Measures targeting products from predefined lists of "strategic" sectors are also classified as industrial policy.

**Figure 1 2020 marks a turning point in industrial policy activity**



Note: Cumulative stock of measures.


Source: Evenett *et al.* (2025).

These criteria yield a total of 34,248 industrial policy interventions between 2009-2023. Advanced Economies (AEs) account for 52% of measures and Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs) for 48%. China (17%), the European Union (19%), and the United States together (16%) account for around 52% of interventions. Several new stylized facts about the post-GFC industrial policy landscape are revealed:

- First, 2020 marks a structural shift in the number of industrial policy interventions (Figure 1). The COVID-19 pandemic was catalytic, exposing supply chain vulnerabilities in critical products, but policy activity did not abate even as countries exited the pandemic.

- Second, during and after the onset of the GFC, the most frequently cited industrial policy motives were competitiveness and climate. Meanwhile, since 2020, new-style industrial policies motivations such as supply chain resilience, national security, and geopolitical concerns have come to the fore (Figure 2).
- Third, the share of countries implementing such trade policies, in particular subsidies, has risen markedly since the GFC.

**Figure 2 New industrial policies with LLM-assigned motive**



Note: Cumulative stock of measures. For measures with multiple motives, each motive is given equal weight.

Source: Evenett *et al.* (2025).

Econometric analysis of countries' actions at the level of detailed products confirms notable shifts around 2020 are not merely present on aggregate:

- First, exposure to imports from geopolitically distant trading partners turns from negatively correlated to positively correlated with policies targeting a given product, suggesting growing interest in reducing risks from global dependencies.
- Second, industrial support by other countries for a given product turns from a negative to a positive driver of intervention, consistent with renewed tit-for-tat dynamics.
- Third, correlation with comparative advantage switches from positive to negative, implying a shift in focus to new and less established sectors.
- Finally, correlation with the stock of existing industrial policies targeting a given product changes from negative to positive, consistent with an aggregate acceleration in interventions and growing sectoral concentration of support.

Future research using this historical data can shed light on the dynamic impacts of non-market interventions in shaping comparative advantage, spillover effects on other countries, and the success of variously motivated measures in meeting their objectives.

Evenett, Simon, Adam Jakubik, Fernando Martín, and Michele Ruta. 2024. "The return of industrial policy in data." *The World Economy* 47(7): 2762-2788.

Evenett, Simon, Adam Jakubik, Jaden Kim, Fernando Martín, Samuel Pienknagura, Michele Ruta, Sandra Baquie, Yueling Huang, and Rafael Machado Parente. 2025. "Industrial policy since the great financial crisis." IMF Working Papers No. 2025, forthcoming.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024. How to Cover Industrial Policies in IMF Surveillance Broad Considerations. Policy Paper No. 2024/008.


Source: IMF, authored by Adam Jakubik and Michele Ruta. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

3.109. The following Box on stated motives for industrial policy measures was contributed by the Global Trade Alert (GTA).

### Box 3.4 From Clean Energy Transition to Supply of Security: Reframing Industrial Support in 2024–2025

Governments are increasingly justifying industrial policy measures on security-of-supply grounds. Comparing the two periods in Figure 1 (October 2023–September 2024 and the same months in 2024–2025) the percentage of interventions citing Security of Supply rose from 20% to 27%. At the same time, references to National Security and Geopolitical Concerns expanded from 26% to 36%. In addition, Strategic Competitiveness as a stated motive edged up from 25% to 28%. The striking counter-movement was in Climate Change Mitigation, a stated motive that fell from 29% of selective policy intervention to just 10%. Together these shifts indicate a reframing of industrial policy from accelerating decarbonisation toward assuring reliable and dependable access to inputs and components amid geopolitical tension.

**Figure 1 Stated motives for industrial measures covering critical minerals are shifting toward enhancing security of supply and national security considerations**



Source: NIPO (October, 2025).

Source: GTA - New Industrial Policy Observatory (NIPO), authored by Simon J. Evenett, and Fernando Martín.

3.110. The following Box on critical-minerals policies was contributed by the Global Trade Alert (GTA).


### Box 3.5 From Support to Shields: Import Measures Dominate 2025 Critical-Minerals Policy Mix

Commercial policy affecting critical minerals pivoted from financial support to import curbs during the reporting year. In the first quarter of the period (October–December 2024), corporate subsidies accounted for roughly half of recorded interventions each month—about 46% in October, 57% in November, and 48% in December. Beginning in early 2025 the composition began to change. Import measures (including trade defence) accelerated through Q1 and peaked in April at about 79% of interventions, with subsidies contributing one tenth that month. Although subsidies briefly recovered to ~26% in May, import measures again dominated into late summer—~69% in August and ~73% in September—while subsidies settled in the mid-teens by the end of the period (~13% in September). Other instruments—such as export measures, FDI-related actions, and localisation/procurement—appear intermittently, remaining secondary to the two headline tools.

Taken together, the month-by-month evidence points to a more restrictive policy stance toward critical-minerals trade by mid-2025: a system that started the year subsidy-heavy became barrier-heavy by Spring and remained so into September, as trade policy became an increasing foreign policy tool. This shift heightens the risk of tit-for-tat responses, underscores the value of policy transparency and sunseting of

interventions, and raises the premium on cooperative approaches that deliver supply security with fewer trade distortions.

**Figure 1 Trade measures affecting critical minerals grew in importance during the reporting period**



Source: GTA (2025).

Source: GTA, authored by Simon J. Evenett.

3.111. The following Box on corporate subsidies in the critical minerals sector was contributed by the Global Trade Alert (GTA).

### Box 3.6 Diminished Fiscal Largesse


The 2024–2025 policy year witnessed reduced pledges of corporate subsidies in the critical minerals sector when compared with earlier years, punctuated by a single spike in May. For most months the green series in the chart below which shows the monthly subsidy allocation sits in low single digits—roughly USD 5–8 billion in February–March, about USD 2 billion in April, zero in June, a small pickup in July (low single digits), near zero in August, and zero again in September.

By contrast, corporate subsidy allocations in 2023–2024 (the blue line) featured a very large April surge of roughly USD 78 billion, plus a December bulge near 25 billion and a July uptick around 12 billion, with other months modest. Whereas the 2022–2023 subsidy allocations (revealed by the red line in the figure below) shows a more event spread over time: October (~11 billion) and December (~19 billion) at the start of the period, then smaller pulses through spring and another July (~19 billion) rise, followed by August (~9 billion).

Taken together, these series point to lower and less persistent monthly allocations in 2024–2025. This pattern is consistent with governments moving from headline pledge cycles to execution of previously announced packages. Outside of a few flagship announcements in May, new subsidy awards tend to be tighter and more targeted. The cooling of fiscal firepower may help account for border measures and regulatory tools moving to the fore of the policy mix documented in recent months, as documented elsewhere in this report.

Three considerations follow. First, budget constraints and prioritisation appear to weigh more heavily. After several years of high state outlays, fiscal space is tighter and programmes are advancing through contracting and build-out phases, which naturally reduces the cadence of large, front-loaded pledges. Second, the instrument mix is shifting toward non-fiscal levers. To influence supply chains without big outlays, authorities may be leaning more on trade-defence actions, technical regulations, and procurement frameworks—tools that can bite quickly even when finance ministries are cautious. Third, support is becoming more selective. The lone May spike likely reflects a handful of high-salience projects; otherwise, new measures look narrower in scope and frequently conditioned on security-of-supply outcomes (e.g. offtake or domestic-processing requirements).

**Figure 1 Financial allocations from October 2024 to September 2025 tended to be lower than in previous years**



Source: GTA (2025).

Source: GTA, authored by Simon J. Evenett, and Fernando Martin.

### 3.7 Other selected trade policy issues

3.112. This Section provides a brief overview of other trade policy issues where important developments took place during the review period.

#### Aid for Trade

3.113. The Aid for Trade initiative launched at the WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2005 is approaching its 20th anniversary in 2026. Following the 2024 Global Review, Members' discussions focused on revitalising Aid for Trade discussions. At an informal session on 13 November 2024 Members expressed their views on the work going forward. They welcomed accessible information on Aft flows and stressed the need for better data on South-South cooperation and private finance. The need for examining Aft methodology was also highlighted. Members acknowledged the need for greater ownership by beneficiaries and donors, including on monitoring and evaluation. They called for innovative approaches using local evidence and knowledge, including drawing on lessons learned and experience-sharing. The need for examining the impact of trade-related capacity building support in terms of implementation of trade rules was considered an important priority. The role of Aid for Trade in helping developing economies identify evolving trade needs was also recognised.

3.114. These deliberations set the foundations for the Roadmap to the 20th anniversary: reinforcing trade potential which offered an opportunity to Members to examine Aid for Trade methodology, to exchange views on Aid for Trade towards trade policy and regulations and to explore emerging opportunities aimed at bolstering digital trade and strengthening supply chain resilience in the course of 2025. "[Aid for Trade: challenges and success stories](#)" capture the experiences shared by developing economies, including LDCs. The latest trends and takeaways from the discussions in 2025 were also [published](#).

3.115. Since the start of the initiative, over USD 730 billion has been disbursed in Aid for Trade to help developing economies, including LDCs, become more active players in global trade. In 2023, Aid for Trade disbursements fell by 6% in real terms from USD 53 billion in 2022 to USD 50 billion in 2023. In 2023, USD 14 billion was disbursed to LDCs and USD 3.7 billion to Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs). In terms of sectors, over the period of 2006-2023, 52% of total Aft

disbursements went to economic infrastructure followed by productive capacity (45%), and support to trade policy of regulations represented only 3%.

### Committee on Rules of origin

3.116. Since mid-October 2024, no specific trade concerns have been raised at the Committee on Rules of origin (CRO). However, in some instances, least-developed countries have expressed concerns about specific aspects related to the rules of origin and other origin requirements applied by WTO Members who grant non-reciprocal trade preferences. Some Members have also complained about a lack of transparency related to non-preferential rules of origin and have therefore encouraged other Members to notify a description of their practices in this respect using a notification template proposed by the Chairperson of the CRO in 2024.

### Committee on Trade and Development

3.117. Members focused on reinvigorating the work of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD).<sup>52</sup> In particular, Members examined the implementation of the special and differential treatment provisions across various WTO Agreements.<sup>53</sup> Members also explored a way forward on a process related to the consideration of the Gulf Cooperation Customs Union in the WTO.<sup>54</sup> The WTO Technical Assistance and Training (TA) Plan 2026-2027 was adopted.

3.118. Several requests from Members were also discussed, including two requests from India to enhance the CTD's functioning based on its Terms of Reference and to reinvigorate discussions in the CTD as per the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce; a communication from China "[Heightened Trade Turbulence and Responses from the WTO](#)"; and a request from Barbados and South Africa on the follow-up in the CTD on the WTO retreat "Trade as a tool for development and way forward".

3.119. Priorities of small economies also featured prominently in Members' discussions. Members examined trade trends of small economies and examined ways of bolstering food security and building resilience. Challenges and opportunities for small economies in using e-commerce and digital ecosystems to drive competitiveness were also discussed.

### Council for Trade in Goods

3.120. The Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) met formally on three occasions during the review period. At the 2-3 December 2024 meeting<sup>55</sup>, 35 trade concerns were raised, three of which were new issues and 32 had been previously raised. This marked a slight reduction from past meetings, which is explained by the combination of some concerns into one, and the launch of disputes on some of the issues previously raised at the CTG. As with previous meetings, several of these concerns appeared to have their origin in political tensions and from unilateral trade-related environmental measures, which also coincided with having the largest number of co-sponsors and/or interest from Members taking the floor at the meeting: European Union – Implementation of Non-Tariff Barriers on Agricultural Products<sup>56</sup>; European Union – Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/334 Regarding Maximum Residue Levels for Clothianidin and Thiamethoxam in or on Certain Products<sup>57</sup>; European Union – Deforestation Free Commodities<sup>58</sup>; Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States – Unilateral Trade Restrictive Measures Against Russia<sup>59</sup>. There are also concerns that see a high number of interventions related to more technical matters, such as technical regulations and taxes considered to be discriminatory. Trade concerns were raised on a wide range of measures, and covering products from agricultural commodities, information technology products (including

<sup>52</sup> Informal open-ended consultations were organized on 3 October 2024, 7 February and 23 May 2025. The informal consultations laid the groundwork for the regular sessions of the CTD held on 15 November 2024, 26 March, 18 June and 14 October 2025.

<sup>53</sup> WTO document [JOB/COMTD/15](#) and Add.1, 14 March 2025 and 6 June 2025.

<sup>54</sup> WTO document [JOB/COMTD/16](#) and Add.1, 14 March 2025 and 7 October 2025.

<sup>55</sup> WTO document [G/C/M/150](#), 27 January 2025.

<sup>56</sup> See [Trade Concerns Database, ID 137](#).

<sup>57</sup> See [Trade Concerns Database, ID 200](#).

<sup>58</sup> See [Trade Concerns Database, ID 203](#).

<sup>59</sup> See [Trade Concerns Database, ID 189](#).

microchips, semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment), forestry and food products; strategic commodities and rare earths<sup>60</sup>, such as gallium, germanium, graphite, antimony, tungsten, magnesium, and aluminium; and specific products, such as electric vehicles, electric batteries, energy drinks, copper, cosmetics, liquors, , air conditioners, apples and pears, cheese, pulses, cosmetics, and tyres. Most of the concerns raised have targeted measures by the European Union (10), China (7), India (7), and the United States (5).

3.121. The 9-10 April 2025 CTG meeting<sup>61</sup>, was the first opportunity that Members had to discuss the 2 April announcements on reciprocal tariffs by the United States and certain responses. It provided a forum for Members to raise their concerns, as well as for the United States to announce that these were emergency actions which did not impinge on US tariff commitments and WTO obligations. Also at this meeting, 35 trade concerns were raised, four of which were new and related to environmental regulations, import and export restrictions, and the United States' recent tariff actions (United States – Reciprocal Tariffs and Other Tariff Measures<sup>62</sup>). These concerns related to a wide range of measures relating to trade in goods across the Membership, including non-tariff barriers, environmental policies, import taxes, import/export restrictions, national security, halal certification, subsidy schemes, export controls, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, discriminatory domestic taxes, administrative procedures, and trade disruptive and restrictive measures. Most of the concerns raised during the meeting targeted measures by the European Union (9), India (6), China (5), and the United States (5).

3.122. At the 7-8 July 2025 CTG meeting<sup>63</sup>, a total of 36 trade concerns were raised, of which two were raised for the first time and 34 had been previously raised. Members introduced six agenda items into the meeting's agenda in relation to recent global tensions, including Communications from the United States in Response to the Notifications by the European Union, India, Japan, and the United Kingdom Proposing to Suspend Concessions under Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards – Request from the United States; Fragmentation of Global Trade Through Tariffs and the Global Costs – Request from Canada, the European Union, and Norway; and four trade concerns raised by China regarding the United States' Reciprocal Tariffs and Other Tariff Measures<sup>64</sup>; New Section 301 Tariffs on Certain Goods from China and New Investigation on Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding industry of China<sup>65</sup>; Series of Disruptive Policy Measures on the Global Semiconductor Industry Chain and Supply Chain<sup>66</sup>; and Disruptive and Restrictive Measures in the Name of National Security<sup>67</sup>. In all, trade concerns addressed a wide range of measures, including safeguard measures, import and export prohibitions and controls, import licensing procedures, technical regulations, discriminatory internal taxes, SPS measures, and transparency-related obligations. These concerns spanned sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, semiconductors, electronics, automotive components, alcoholic beverages, and processed food products. The discussions reflected both ongoing efforts to clarify the scope and implementation of specific measures, as well as broader questions regarding their potential trade impact and consistency with WTO rules. Most of the concerns targeted measures by the European Union (10), India (6), the United States (6), and China (4).

## Dispute Settlement

3.123. Measures taken by a WTO Member can be the subject of dispute settlement proceedings when another Member believes that such measures violate an agreement or a commitment contained in the WTO covered agreements.<sup>68</sup> Between mid-October 2024 and mid-October 2025 (the review period), WTO Members filed 12 new requests for consultations<sup>69</sup> (Chart 3.12). In addition, the WTO dispute settlement system continued to administer proceedings that were initiated

<sup>60</sup> See China – Export Control Law and Restrictions on Trade in Strategic Products, [Trade Concerns Database, ID 112](#).

<sup>61</sup> WTO document [G/C/M/151](#), 16 May 2025 and [G/C/M/151/Add.1](#), 4 June 2025.

<sup>62</sup> See [Trade Concerns Database, ID 227](#).

<sup>63</sup> WTO document [G/C/M/152](#), 31 July 2025.

<sup>64</sup> See [Trade Concerns Database, ID 227](#).

<sup>65</sup> See [Trade Concerns Database, ID 219](#).

<sup>66</sup> See [Trade Concerns Database, ID 195](#).

<sup>67</sup> See [Trade Concerns Database, ID 205](#).

<sup>68</sup> Measures can also be challenged through dispute settlement proceedings if they nullify or impair benefits accruing to a Member under a WTO agreement.


<sup>69</sup> A request for consultations is the first step in the dispute settlement process.



before the review period. At the end of September 2025, panel proceedings in seven disputes were ongoing, along with one arbitration proceeding regarding the level of nullification or impairment.

3.124. The subject matter of the new disputes initiated during the review period spanned a wide range of issues covered under the GATT 1994, the SCM Agreement, the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Customs Valuation Agreement, the Import Licensing Agreement, the Agreement on Rules of Origin, the Trade Facilitation Agreement, the TRIPS Agreement, and Accession Protocols.

**Chart 3.12 Requests for consultations, 1995-2025**



Note: Based on data for January to mid-October 2025.

Source: WTO Secretariat.


3.125. During the review period, five panel reports and one arbitration award were circulated. Of the five panel reports circulated, one was adopted, one is pending consideration by the Dispute Settlement Body, another panel report reflected that the parties had reached a mutually agreed solution<sup>70</sup>, and the remaining two panel reports were appealed.<sup>71</sup> The arbitration award was notified to the Dispute Settlement Body pursuant to Article 25.3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.

3.126. In the absence of a functioning Appellate Body, certain WTO Members have resorted to other means to ensure effective resolution of disputes. A group of WTO Members have set up an interim appeal arrangement based on the arbitration provisions contained in Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. At the time of this publication, 58 WTO Members have joined this initiative. Since the beginning of 2020, parties to 16 disputes have agreed to an alternative appeal mechanism based on arbitration proceedings under Article 25 of the DSU. Notably, during the review period, parties to two disputes reached mutually agreed solutions that were notified to the DSB (Chart 3.13).

<sup>70</sup> In accordance with Article 12.7 of the DSU, the panel report contained a brief description of the facts of the case and reported that a solution had been reached.

<sup>71</sup> Currently, these appeals cannot be considered, as in the absence of consensus among WTO Members to launch the selection process for Appellate Body members, all seven positions on the Appellate Body remain vacant.



**Chart 3.13 Outcomes of disputes 2020-2025**

Note: Based on data for January to mid-October 2025.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

### Electronic commerce

3.127. Discussions under the Work Programme on E-commerce intensified in the second half of 2024. Members identified a number of topics of interest and held dedicated discussions on issues related to the digital divide – such as connectivity, digital infrastructure and digital industrialization; legal and regulatory frameworks for digital trade, in particular for online consumer protection, personal data protection, and cybersecurity; and emerging issues, namely the impact of AI and emerging technologies. On these issues, delegations shared their national and regional experiences, identified challenges and opportunities, and discussed the role of the WTO in supporting the digital economy. Members also discussed the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, including with inputs from international organizations and the private sector. While Members will continue to delve deeper into some of these issues, since September, work has mainly focused on preparation for MC14 and on discussing a draft text for Ministers' consideration.

3.128. Under the Joint Initiative on Electronic Commerce, negotiations of the Agreement on Electronic Commerce were concluded in 2024. Supported by 71 Members, the text contains articles that aim at enabling electronic transactions and promoting digital trade facilitation, ensuring an open environment for digital trade, and promoting trust in e-commerce. A request for its incorporation into Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement was submitted to the General Council in February 2025, but there was no consensus to adopting the decision. Efforts are ongoing to promote broader participation in the agreement, build consensus for its incorporation, and foster better understanding of its provisions.

### Fisheries Subsidies

3.129. The Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS) entered into force on 15 September 2025, after two-thirds of the WTO's 166 Members deposited instruments of acceptance with the WTO Director-General. As of mid-October 2025, 114 Members have accepted the AFS. Prior to entry into force, Members engaged in a technical workstream to develop the document templates, procedures, and practices that will be followed in the Committee on Fisheries Subsidies (CFS). The CFS was established upon entry into force and its first meeting is expected to take place in the coming months, after the appointment of its Chair.

3.130. The WTO Fisheries Funding Mechanism, known as the Fish Fund, was established in November 2022 to support developing and LDC Members in implementing the Agreement. The Fund became fully operational upon entry into force of the AFS. As of October 2025, contributions and pledges to the Fish Fund amounted to USD 18 million.<sup>72</sup> The Fund's first call for proposals opened in June 2025 and closed on 9 October 2025, generating strong interest. The Steering Committee of the Fish Fund will meet in November to take funding decisions. Further calls for proposals are planned for 2026.

3.131. In parallel to the path towards entry into force of the AFS and setting up the CFS, work among delegations on agreeing to the Additional Provisions on Fisheries Subsidies continued at an intensive pace, with the Chair circulating a Draft Consolidated Chair Text on 29 November 2024 and holding several rounds of meetings and consultations during the course of 2025. Despite most Members being ready to accept the draft text as it was or with some fine-tuning, consensus could not be reached.

### General Council

3.132. During the review period, the following agenda items were taken up at the General Council at the request of China, the European Union and Brazil, respectively: "*Heightened Trade Turbulence and Responses from the WTO*"<sup>73</sup>, "*Fragmentation of Global Trade through Tariffs and the Global Costs*"<sup>74</sup>, and "*Respecting the Rules-Based Multilateral Trading System*"<sup>75</sup>. In April 2025, the Chairperson of the General Council had initiated informal consultations with WTO Members to explore the nexus between the current economic climate and its impact on the multilateral trading system – with the view to understanding the shifting landscape of global trade and how it influenced the collective work at the WTO.<sup>76</sup> In light of these consultations, the Chairperson convened an Informal Information Session at the level of Heads of Delegation on 19 May 2025.<sup>77</sup>

3.133. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement<sup>78</sup>, the General Council has undertaken the annual review of this decision at its regular session in July 2025. During the review period, the implementation of paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Ministerial Declaration on the WTO Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future Pandemics were taken up in the General Council under the agenda item "*Follow-up to outcomes of Ministerial Conferences*".<sup>79</sup> On 15 September 2025, the General Council formally took note of the entry into force of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.<sup>80</sup>

### Government Procurement

3.134. The plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 2012 (GPA 2012) aims to open up Parties' government procurement markets to suppliers from other Parties, and to make government procurement more transparent and predictable. In 2025, Timor-Leste became the first LDC WTO Member to submit an application to accede to the Agreement. GPA Parties also advanced substantially on the accessions of Albania and Costa Rica.

3.135. Two new observers – Guatemala and Barbados – joined the Committee on Government Procurement (CGP) in 2025.

<sup>72</sup> The following WTO Members have contributed to the Fish Fund: Australia; Canada; the European Union; Finland; France; Germany; Iceland; Japan; Liechtenstein; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; the Republic of Korea; Spain; Sweden; and the United Arab Emirates.

<sup>73</sup> WTO documents [WT/GC/M/216](#), 26 February 2024, [WT/GC/M/217](#), 24 April 2024, and [WT/GC/M/218](#), 17 June 2024. See also [WT/GC/272](#), 8 May 2025 and [WT/GC/272/Add.1](#), 22 July 2025.

<sup>74</sup> WTO document [WT/GC/M/217](#), 24 April 2024.

<sup>75</sup> WTO document [WT/GC/M/218](#), 17 June 2024.

<sup>76</sup> The Chairperson's full report was circulated in document [JOB/GC/435](#), 22 July 2025.

<sup>77</sup> The session dwelt on the challenges and explored concrete solutions to demonstrate the Membership's collective responsibility in addressing the impact of the current economic climate, particularly for the most vulnerable.

<sup>78</sup> WTO documents [WT/MIN\(22/30](#) – [WT/L/1141](#), 22 June 2022.

<sup>79</sup> See in particular WTO documents [WT/GC/M/213](#), 18 December 2023, [WT/GC/M/215](#), 12 February 2024, [WT/GC/M/217](#), 24 April 2024 and [WT/GC/M/218](#), 17 June 2024.

<sup>80</sup> WTO document [WT/GC/M/219](#) (forthcoming).

3.136. To enhance the transparency of its work, the CGP adopted two decisions on the derestriction of historical GPA-related documents ([GPA/CD/7](#) and [GPA/CD/8](#)).

3.137. The CGP received four notifications regarding domestic legislative changes from three Parties, including one from Canada notifying the entry into force of regulatory amendments to implement a new interim policy on reciprocal procurement. The policy limits access to Canada's federal non-defence procurement market to Canadians and trading partners who provide reciprocal access to Canada via trade agreements, including the GPA 2012. Outside of the Committee context, the United States and the European Union issued a joint statement in 2025 on a framework on an agreement on reciprocal, fair and balanced trade, in which they agreed to address a lack of reciprocity in procurement with respect to third countries.

3.138. In 2024, the Committee noted two catalogues developed by Parties participating in the Work Programme on Sustainable Procurement. The catalogues cover (i) green public procurement (GPP)-related provisions that Parties have implemented domestically, and (ii) GPP-related provisions that Parties have included in international instruments, including FTAs. These catalogues are the first results to emerge from the Committee's Work Programme on Sustainable Procurement and can be accessed via the [e-GPA Gateway](#).

3.139. In 2025, the WTO Secretariat launched a [Notification Submission System](#) (NSS) that enables online submission of all GPA-related notifications by Parties through the e-GPA Gateway.

### **Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)**

3.140. Building on proposals from its members, the MSME Group organized thematic sessions throughout the year focused on bridging the gap between local businesses and international organizations through business support organizations; promoting MSME trade inclusion through good regulatory practices; advancing digital and paperless trade; and addressing challenges related to low-value shipments and informality.

3.141. The MSME Group continued to implement the December 2020 Package<sup>81</sup> and to update the compendia launched at MC13 on Access to Finance by Women-led MSMEs<sup>82</sup> and Special Provisions for MSMEs in Authorized Economic Operator Programs.<sup>83</sup>

3.142. The MSME Group held a second Joint Solutions Lab in November 2024 on "Empowering Women-led MSMEs: unlocking Growth through Intellectual Property" together with WIPO. The MSME Group also celebrated the outcome of the fifth ICC-ITC-WTO MSME Group Small Business Champions competition themed "Completing the Loop: Helping Small Businesses Contribute to the Circular Economy". This initiative, organized in partnership with UNCTAD and drawing more than 2,000 applications, recognized two winners and two runners-up.

3.143. Further, the MSME Group held a fifth annual meeting with business representatives in June 2025, and documents continued to be received from the private sector under the [INF/MSME/P](#) document symbol. The MSME Group held its fourth Trade4MSMEs Network meeting in October 2025 bringing together International Organizations at the intersection of trade and small businesses.

3.144. The MSME Group was launched by 88 WTO Members at MC11 in December 2017 to improve MSME trade access and its membership has since grown to 103.

### **Policy trends on trade and women's economic empowerment**

3.145. Since its establishment in 2020 by 130 WTO Members, the Informal Working Group on Trade and Gender (IWG) has been leading the organization's work on women's economic empowerment within the WTO. In the 2024–2025 period, more than two-thirds of WTO Members under review reported on gender-responsive trade policies as part of their Trade Policy Reviews.

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<sup>81</sup> WTO document [INF/MSME/W/4/Rev.2](#), 11 December 2020.

<sup>82</sup> WTO documents [INF/MSME/W/46/Rev.4](#), 4 August 2025 and [INF/TGE/W/7/Rev.4](#), 4 August 2025.

<sup>83</sup> WTO document [INF/MSME/W/47/Rev.4](#), 3 September 2025.

3.146. In this context, recent global trends show a strong policy focus on women's economic empowerment into trade, SME development, and financial inclusion frameworks. Governments are prioritizing tailored capacity-building programmes (including mentorship) that enhance women's participation in entrepreneurship and global value chains. Notable initiatives include targeted MSME support, concessional loans, and financial literacy programmes that improve women's access to credit, business networks, and markets.

3.147. Members are increasingly embedding women's economic empowerment provisions in free trade agreements and international cooperation, with dedicated chapters, participation in WTO (IWG, WEIDE Fund) and APEC gender initiatives, as well as regional frameworks like AfCFTA's Women and Youth protocol. Diaspora and network programmes further extend opportunities for women entrepreneurs to connect with international markets and strengthen trade relations.

3.148. Sector-specific strategies are a prominent trend. Women are actively supported in agriculture, fisheries, tourism, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and handcrafts, reflecting both economic potential and historical female labour concentrations. Programmes in tourism and community-based enterprises promote women's employment beyond traditional roles, while agro-processing, artisanal production and digital trade initiatives provide pathways to higher-value participation and economic empowerment. Structural reforms, including child care expansion, pay equity measures, and formal recognition of women-led businesses, complement these economic strategies.

3.149. Financial inclusion remains a core priority, with credit lines, export finance schemes and digital financial platforms targeting women entrepreneurs particularly in underserved and rural areas. Governments increasingly leverage concessional financing, grants, and targeted funds to facilitate business growth, scaling up and participation in global trade.

3.150. Overall, the emerging trend is a holistic approach combining policy, sectoral programmes, and financial inclusion (including trade finance), aiming to integrate women into economic expansion and recovery, MSME growth, and trade opportunities while addressing structural and cultural barriers to equitable economic participation and advancement.

### **Regional trade agreements (RTAs)**

3.151. Notification activity during this review period was much lower compared to previous years as Members notified 7 RTAs (including two accessions), with the majority covering both goods and services.<sup>84</sup> Among these, four entered into force during the review period.

3.152. The total number of RTAs notified to the WTO and in force as of 15 October 2025 stood at 376. As part of the Transparency Mechanism for RTAs, the Secretariat has also confirmed with Members an additional 61 RTAs that are in force but remain non-notified.<sup>85</sup> In the last year, at least 18 new RTAs have entered into force, of which only 3 have been notified to the WTO. The CRTA has recently been devoting attention to reduce the number of non-notified RTAs.

3.153. Of the 376 notified RTAs, Europe continues to participate in most (177), East Asian Members in 109, and South America in 73, only partially reflecting the number of Members in each geographic group.<sup>86</sup> Other regions participate in less RTAs. During the review period, three of the seven notified RTAs had participation from Europe, three from the Middle East, two from Asia/Oceania, and two from Africa, including the African Continental Free Trade Area. Similar trends can be seen among the at least 18 new RTAs that entered into force: ten had participants from Asia/Oceania, nine from the Middle East, and five from Europe.

3.154. Following changes to US trade policy from early 2025, many Members have expanded the number of RTAs they are negotiating, and/or accelerated their negotiations. Several high-profile RTAs were signed or concluded during the review period, including the EFTA-Thailand, UK-India, EFTA-MERCOSUR, and EU-MERCOSUR agreements, and numerous dormant negotiations have restarted. At least 20 agreements were newly signed during the review period, primarily with

<sup>84</sup> The WTO RTA Database (viewed at: <http://rtais.wto.org>) provides updated information on all RTA notifications submitted by WTO Members.

<sup>85</sup> WTO document [WT/REG/W/195](#), forthcoming.


<sup>86</sup> The WTO RTA database provides additional details.

participation from the Middle East (10 RTAs, all signed by the UAE<sup>87</sup> of which 4 with African countries), Asia/Oceania (10), as well as Europe (participating in 6).

3.155. The United States itself also concluded a number of framework deals with other Members. These deals are characterized as being non-binding by all parties, and tariff changes have primarily been applied by the US so far under executive orders. Such tariffs are generally lower than the April 2025 reciprocal tariffs applying to many other Members, but they are higher than MFN tariffs that were in place in 2024, and discussions are ongoing among Members as to how to increase transparency regarding these deals.

3.156. RTAs continue to increasingly cover provisions going beyond market access, including on issues for which there are few or no WTO rules, and more recent RTAs generally include all key provisions more frequently (Chart 3.14). Comparing the coverage of provisions in RTAs that entered into force during the past five years to the coverage of provisions in all notified RTAs indicates that, for example, provisions on gender were included in RTAs twice as frequently during the last five years as previously (in 60% of these RTAs compared to less than 30% in all RTAs). More than 50% of the more recent RTAs contain provisions on e-commerce (35% among all), while provisions relating to the environment, competition, labour, or SMEs also are notably included more frequently. At the same time, less than 20% of RTAs eliminate all tariffs for at least one Party among RTAs that entered into force in the past five years, a lower share than compared to all RTAs.

**Chart 3.14 Key provisions in RTAs**



Note: Figures are based on 362 RTAs (out of 376) notified to the WTO and currently in force; 75 of which have entered into force in the last 5 years. For more details on these provisions, see: [https://rtais.wto.org/USERGUIDE/Glossary\\_MT\\_Eng.pdf](https://rtais.wto.org/USERGUIDE/Glossary_MT_Eng.pdf).

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.157. A novel feature in recent RTAs is the inclusion of chapters related to energy and raw materials. This is the case for example in the RTAs of the European Union with Chile (in force since

<sup>87</sup> As some RTAs entered into force, the UAE now has at least 18 primarily bilateral RTAs in force, most of them yet to be notified. Prior to 2023, the UAE was a Party to two bilateral and four plurilateral RTAs, three of which involved the Gulf Cooperation Council.

February 2025) and in EU's modernized RTA with Mexico (concluded in early 2025), as well as in the ongoing negotiations between India and Chile. As they have become more frequent, they still remain rare, while other instruments relating to critical minerals, such as Memoranda of Understanding or of Cooperation have also become more frequent, addressing issues such as access to resources, research and development, the development of value chains in resource-rich countries, standards, and trade restrictions. Chapters on trade and sustainable development are increasingly including enforceable provisions, at times under a specific dispute settlement mechanism.

3.158. Provisions relating to the digital economy continue to be of interest to Members as well. Following the earlier conclusion of some stand-alone agreements relating to the digital economy, some Members have also included related issues in new or existing RTAs. For example, the recently concluded Digital Economy Agreement between EFTA and Singapore would be included as a chapter in the existing EFTA-Singapore FTA, and all the RTAs concluded by the UAE contain digital provisions. While no new Parties acceded to the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement between Chile, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Singapore, accession negotiations are taking place with Costa Rica and Peru and China, Canada, El Salvador, the UAE, and Ukraine have lodged an accession request.

3.159. With unusually structured agreement-like constructions becoming more prominent, and the global network of concluded RTAs growing quickly, understanding the impact such changes have on other elements of the multilateral trading system remains timely.

### Trade Financing

3.160. Developing country Members continue to identify the lack of trade finance as a major obstacle to their participation in global trade. The WTO and the International Finance Corporation conducted in-depth analyses of trade finance markets in selected fast-growing emerging economies, quantifying market size and estimating the potential expansion of trade if barriers to trade finance were reduced. The main findings, published in 2023-25, indicate that in the countries examined in West Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal), the lower Mekong region (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam), and the West Hemisphere (Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico), only a limited share of trade is currently supported by trade and supply chain finance. In advanced economies, this share is at least 60% while in West Africa is 25%, in Viet Nam 20% and in Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico about 10%.

3.161. In Mexico and neighboring countries, the limited use of trade and supply chain finance is largely attributable to firms' restricted access to the financial system. In Mexico, only a quarter of importers and exporters have access to bank credit and 70% of the country's total supply came from the three largest banks. In West Africa, most of the market focuses on traditional instruments such as letters of credit and pre-shipment finance. Supply chain finance remains scarce, even in countries largely engaging in supply chain-oriented trade. In Cambodia, Viet Nam, and Mexico, supply chain finance supports less than 1% of total trade. When trade finance is available, it is expensive compared to developed markets. The average price of a letter of credit is around 2 to 5% of the value of the transaction, while working capital loans, often offered as a substitute for trade finance, often average 15% annual interest rate. Using general computable economic modelling, it is estimated that, on average, doubling the coverage of trade finance would lead to an 8% increase in trade flows, mostly benefiting regional trade and local SMEs, and second-tier domestic suppliers of international supply chains. The three reports mentioned above provide insights into potential solutions that could be promoted locally or internationally, for trade finance to be a driver of greater trade inclusiveness. At the multilateral level, roundtables have been convened among key institutions involved in trade finance, with a view to boosting access to trade finance in low-income regions.

### Trade and environment

3.162. At the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), delegations continued discussions towards revitalizing its role as the main forum for dialogue on trade and environment.<sup>88</sup> Discussions were supported by a broad range of Members' submissions<sup>89</sup>. In the context of its meetings, thematic

<sup>88</sup> Annual Report 2024, WTO document [WT/CTE/31](#), 12 December 2024.

<sup>89</sup> "Key Considerations for Trade-related Climate Measures: Suggested Approaches towards a Sustainable Future", the Republic of Korea, WTO document [WT/CTE/W/267](#), 21 March 2025; "Sustainable Agriculture in Brazil", Brazil, WTO document [WT/CTE/W/268](#), 30 April 2025; "Perspectives on LDC Environment-Friendly Trade



discussions<sup>90</sup> and the Sixth Trade and Environment Week<sup>91</sup>, the main focus of discussions in the CTE was on trade and climate measures. The CTE Chair, Ambassador Erwin Bollinger (Switzerland), whose mandate was reconducted for another year, is working with delegations towards deepening the discussion on this topic, including through new, more informal approaches.

3.163. In support of Members' discussions, the WTO Secretariat carried out several activities on trade and environment, including a two-week Advanced Course on Trade and Environment in Geneva for 30 officials from developing and least-developed Members and observers.<sup>92</sup> It also worked with several institutions, including the Asian Development Bank<sup>93</sup>, International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)<sup>94</sup>, the World Bank and the World Economic Forum (through the Action on Climate and Trade initiative)<sup>95</sup>, the World Meteorological Organization<sup>96</sup>, and the UN Ocean Conference<sup>97</sup>.

3.164. Some WTO Members continued their work through other platforms. For example, the 48 co-sponsors of the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR<sup>98</sup>) initiative met 4 times in the period, advancing work on all three pillars and deepening Member and stakeholder experience-sharing on pathways to reform. The 78 co-sponsors of the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD<sup>99</sup>) met on six occasions, covering the initiative's four working groups and including a high-level stocktaking and planning plenary meeting in December 2024.<sup>100</sup> The 83 co-sponsors of the Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade (DPP<sup>101</sup>) met five times and held six events, including three regionally focused workshops to advance discussions on specific "points of focus"<sup>102</sup> towards concrete, pragmatic, and effective MC14 outcomes.

## Trade Facilitation

3.165. The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) entered into force on 22 February 2017, when two-thirds of WTO Members presented their instruments of acceptance amending the Marrakesh Agreement to incorporate the TFA into Annex 1A (Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods). During the review period, the Democratic Republic of Congo ratified the TFA, taking the total number of ratifications to 161 Members, representing 97% of the membership.

3.166. The current global rate of implementation of TFA commitments stands at 75.4%. During the review period, Members submitted 113 notifications which are summarized in Chart 3.15. These included 26 notifications by LDCs.

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and Trade-Related Climate Challenges", LDC Group, WTO document [WT/CTE/W/266/Rev.1](#), 9 May 2025; "Non Binding Guidance on Methodologies for Measuring Embedded Emissions", WTO document [WT/CTE/W/269/Rev.2](#), 26 September 2025, Australia, Chile, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom.

<sup>90</sup> See [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/envir\\_e/envir\\_0402202509\\_e/envir\\_0402202509\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_0402202509_e/envir_0402202509_e.htm). and [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/envir\\_e/envir\\_0104202510\\_e/envir\\_0104202510\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_0104202510_e/envir_0104202510_e.htm).

<sup>91</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/envir\\_e/envir\\_30062025\\_e/envir\\_30062025\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_30062025_e/envir_30062025_e.htm).

<sup>92</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/news24\\_e/tra\\_13dec24\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/tra_13dec24_e.htm).

<sup>93</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/news24\\_e/envir\\_18dec24\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/envir_18dec24_e.htm).

<sup>94</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/publications\\_e/hydrogenirena112024\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/hydrogenirena112024_e.htm).

<sup>95</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/news23\\_e/envir\\_20apr23\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/envir_20apr23_e.htm).

<sup>96</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/publications\\_e/electransition1124\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/electransition1124_e.htm).

<sup>97</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/spno\\_e/spno60\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spno_e/spno60_e.htm).

<sup>98</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/envir\\_e/fossil\\_fuel\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/fossil_fuel_e.htm).


<sup>99</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/tessd\\_e/tessd\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tessd_e/tessd_e.htm).

<sup>100</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/news24\\_e/tessd\\_05dec24\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/tessd_05dec24_e.htm).

<sup>101</sup> Viewed at: [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/ppesp\\_e/ppesp\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ppesp_e/ppesp_e.htm).

<sup>102</sup> See: [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/ppesp\\_e/dpp\\_points\\_of\\_focus\\_e.pdf](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ppesp_e/dpp_points_of_focus_e.pdf)

**Chart 3.15 Number of TFA notifications received by WTO Members between 11 October 2024 and 30 September 2025**



Source: WTO, TFA database. Viewed at: <https://www.tfadatabase.org>.

3.167. During the review period, the TFAF assisted newly acceded WTO Member Comoros in preparing the notifications under the Trade Facilitation Agreement; Congo and Mauritania in taking stock of their TFA implementation progress, and Cameroun in preparing project documents. It also approved and delivered approved project preparation grants for Kenya and Senegal to advance border agency collaboration and pre-arrival processing.



## 4 POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE IN SERVICES

### Regular measures affecting trade in services

4.1. Between mid-October 2024 and mid-October 2025, 124 new measures affecting trade in services were identified – a figure comparable to those reported in recent years. About two thirds of these measures were liberalizing trade in services or improving the regulatory framework. The remaining third of the measures were trade-restrictive. More than half of the measures were horizontal policies affecting trade for many services sectors and/or multiple modes of supply. Half of these horizontal measures specifically impacted mode 3 (commercial presence), while about a quarter concerned mode 4 (movement of natural persons) and a fifth Internet- and other network-enabled services. One-fifth of the measures were related to financial services, followed by transport, telecommunication, and other services (e.g., business, distribution, education, tourism, and entertainment), each representing approximately 10% of the measures reported.

4.2. The [Trade Monitoring Database](#) (TMDb) provides additional information on these new measures introduced by 52 Members and 4 Observers (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Uzbekistan).<sup>1</sup>

### Measures affecting supply through commercial presence and across various sectors

4.3. During the review period, half of the measures introduced aimed to liberalize the supply through commercial presence. For example, effective on 19 February 2025, [Bangladesh](#) lifted some foreign exchange restrictions by allowing local subsidiaries of foreign companies to remit service payments to their parent or group companies abroad without prior central bank approval (up to 10% of their net profit). It also allowed outward remittances through authorized dealers when the parent or group company held more than 50% of shares and the services received were not locally available. [The Philippines](#) introduced a new measure effective on 19 September 2025, further liberalizing access to land for foreign investors (maximum lease term of private land increased to 99 years in a single lease term from the previous limit of 50 years with a one-time 25-year extension). On 17 December 2024, [Mozambique](#) issued a decree aimed at simplifying the recruitment of foreign employees by foreign investors. Under the new regulation, foreign workers may be hired through one of four regimes: authorization, quotas, investment projects, and short-term work. Additionally, shareholders, directors, and representatives of foreign companies are exempt from the requirement to demonstrate the unavailability of local talent. Furthermore, 10% of the fees paid by companies for foreign worker permits will be allocated to employment promotion initiatives.

4.4. Under its 2025 Market Access Negative List issued on 24 April 2025, [China](#) partially liberalized several service sectors for foreign investment—including television drama production and telecommunication services. It also introduced on 2 December 2024 measures to lower thresholds and broaden the channels for foreign investors to make strategic investments in listed companies, and it eased restrictions on foreign-invested companies using domestic loans for equity investments and reinvestment capital needs. Although also affecting other modes of supply, China also accelerated the Comprehensive Pilot Program for Expanding the Opening-up of the Service Industry by increasing the number of pilot areas from 11 to 20 and outlining 155 pilot tasks across 14 focus areas—including telecommunications, finance, healthcare, tourism, and logistics— notably easing restrictions on foreign investment and operations in certain activities (effective on 11 April 2025).

4.5. Several Members adopted more stringent requirements pertaining to the screening of foreign investment. In [Ireland](#), a new screening mechanism entered into force on 6 January 2025 aligning national procedures with the European Union Regulation (EU) 2019/452 on the screening of foreign direct investment. The framework applies to investments from third countries (excluding parties from the European Economic Area and Switzerland) and subject certain transactions to review by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment based on security and public order considerations. In [Greece](#), a new FDI screening law entered into force on 23 May 2025, establishing reviews on national security and public order considerations for (i) investments by non-EU investors in sensitive sectors; (ii) EU investors controlled by third-country persons/governments; and (iii) EU investors in which a third-country holds more than a 10% stake.

<sup>1</sup> The inclusion of any measure in TMDb implies no judgement by the WTO Secretariat on whether or not such measure, or its intent, is protectionist in nature. Moreover, nothing in the TMDb and the Trade Monitoring Reports should be interpreted as expressing any judgement, either direct or indirect, on the consistency of any measure referred to with the provisions of any WTO agreement.

4.6. On 5 March 2025, Canada released updated Guidelines on the National Security Review of Investments, broadening the scope of reviews to include economic security considerations and introducing enhanced scrutiny of state-linked investors. Indonesia issued Regulation No. 28 of 2025 on 5 June 2025, expanding its risk-based business licensing system to additional sectors (e.g. creative economy, electronic systems and transactions service). While streamlining procedures, the system strengthens the supervision of regulated sectors. Hungary eased some of its some foreign investment screening rules by reinstating the 30-business-day review period, extendable by 15 calendar days for standard foreign direct investment transactions. Also, the state's pre-emption right in the event of a blocking decision for most sectors was removed.

4.7. The United States issued on 21 February 2025 a Memorandum on America First Investment Policy whereby, *inter alia*, restrictions on foreign investment in assets (critical technology, critical infrastructure, personal data, and other sensitive areas) from partners and allies will be eased in proportion to their distance/independence from the investment and technology-acquisition practices of foreign adversaries or threat actors. Additionally, an expedited fast-track process will be established, and environmental reviews for any investment exceeding USD 1 billion will be accelerated.

### Measures related to communication services, e-commerce, and digitally enabled services

4.8. 17 Members and one Observer adopted new measures in relation to the communications sector, Internet- and other network-enabled services and computer services. For telecommunications services, those measures were mostly trade facilitative or improved the regulatory framework. For example, the National Assembly of Viet Nam promulgated on 19 February 2025 a pilot framework opening telecommunications services to full foreign ownership, notably for facilities-based services and low-earth orbit technologies for a five year period. Chinese Taipei opened seven mobile satellite services frequency bands and expanded the number of fixed satellite services bands to twelve effective on 16 June 2025.

4.9. Myanmar enacted a new law regulating cybersecurity services, Digital Platform Services (DPS) and the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). The new law notably outlines the licensing requirements for cybersecurity service providers, which have to be incorporated under the Companies Law, and DPS providers with at least 100,000 Myanmar users, which must register as companies and maintain data storage devices. In China, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law effective on 15 October 2025 extended oversight to cross-border e-commerce platforms by introducing extraterritorial jurisdiction and liability for data and algorithmic misuse, thereby tightening regulatory control.

4.10. Cameroon imposed on 23 December 2024 stringent conditions on the transfer of personal data to countries without adequate data protection laws. Such transfers can only occur if safeguards like binding corporate rules or standard contractual clauses are in place. In Botswana, the new Data Protection Act 2024 was introduced, effective on 14 January 2025 and regulating cross-border data transfers. It requires that a copy of the data be retained in the country and allows transfers only under conditions such as an adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards (e.g., binding corporate rules or approved codes of conduct).

4.11. In Kenya, the Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024 effective on 27 December 2024, replaced the Digital Service Tax (1.5%) with a Significant Economic Presence (SEP) tax, imposing 10% on gross turnover and 30% on taxable profit for non-resident persons conducting business over a digital marketplace. A non-resident has an SEP where the user is in Kenya, excluding services supplied through a permanent establishment, income already subject to withholding tax, and digital services supplied to an airline in which the government holds more than 45% shareholding. India removed the 6% tax on digital advertising on 1 April 2025, facilitating online business activities (Finance Bill No. 14 of 2025).

### Financial services

4.12. Many new policies were implemented in the banking and other financial services sector, a number of which were trade facilitating. For example, the legislative assembly of El Salvador approved on 7 August 2025 a law enabling domestic and foreign natural or legal persons, whether domiciled in the country or not, to be shareholders of investment banks, albeit with acquisitions of

over 1% of share capital requiring prior authorization from the Superintendency of the Financial System. The law authorizes the creation of investment banks specializing in asset management, financial advisory, mergers and acquisitions, structured financing, and market analysis. Ethiopia, an observer, allowed on 17 December 2024 foreign banks to re-enter the financial sector whether through subsidiaries, branches, or equity acquisitions in domestic banks. This had not been possible for 50 years.

4.13. There were also some restrictive measures which were introduced. Türkiye amended its rules, requiring that foreign loans used by residents be obtained exclusively through domestic banks, effective 24 January 2025. Previous exemptions for overseas activities and export-backed loans were repealed. Algeria, an observer, released on 19 November 2024 new rules requiring that foreign digital banks enter into mandatory partnerships with Algerian banks, with at least 30% of the banks' equity held by the Algerian partner. They also require that the head office be established in the country. Thailand published on 19 November 2024 the licensing requirements for foreign commercial banks wishing to operate branches. Among other stipulations, the guidelines state that the Minister of Finance, with advice from the central bank, will determine the application period for establishing a branch based on its necessity and appropriateness.

### Transport services

4.14. In the transport services sector, several economies introduced reforms aimed at liberalization. The Philippines introduced a circular allowing foreign nationals to apply for a transport network vehicle service operator certificate with vehicles using non-combustion engines such as electric vehicles. In Argentina, Decree No. 340/2025—effective 22 May 2025—established a new exemption regime in maritime transport, allowing foreign vessels to obtain national registration and operate in domestic cabotage provided that at least 75% of their crew consists of Argentinian citizens or residents. India approved the new Merchant Shipping Bill on 11 August 2025, replacing the 1958 Act and relaxing the 100% Indian ownership requirement by permitting partial ownership by entities registered in India and cooperatives, and aiming to simplify regulatory procedures for ship ownership and registration.

4.15. In the United Kingdom, from 28 November 2024, passenger rail services currently operated under contract with the Department for Transport (franchises) will transfer into public ownership as existing contracts expire. In Switzerland, the Federal Council implemented the EU Mobility Package I, requiring, *inter alia*, proof that a transport company has an actual registered office in the country to prevent so-called letterbox companies.

4.16. On 17 April 2025, the United States introduced phased port fees targeting Chinese vessel operators and owners, Chinese-built vessels, and foreign vehicle carriers, along with restrictions on certain maritime transport activities. This measure took effect on 14 October 2025. China amended its Regulation on International Maritime Transportation, effective 28 September 2025, to enable remedial actions—including the suspension or termination of its obligations under an international maritime treaty—if a partner country or region fails to meet its commitments. The amendment also permits China to implement countermeasures against discriminatory practices affecting Chinese operators, vessels, or crew members in international shipping. Consequently, on 14 October 2025, Chinese port authorities began collecting a special port fee from US-flagged, -operated, or -owned vessels.<sup>2</sup>

### Other services sectors

4.17. Various measures were introduced in the legal services sectors, such as in the United Arab Emirates where lawyers/consultants are authorized to partner with international firms, effective on 15 March 2025, under the condition that they had at least 15 years head office and operations in at least 3 countries, and that all partners be individually licensed. On 13 May 2025, the Bar Council of India announced amendments to the "Rules Enabling Foreign Lawyers and Law Firms to Provide Legal Services Within India, 2022". Under the revised framework, foreign lawyers and law firms may now advise on foreign and international law, as well as international arbitration,

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<sup>2</sup> Note that as part of the latest trade and economic agreement between China and the United States on 30 October, both Members announced that they were suspending for one year the implementation of their respective port fees targeting each other's vessels.

on a non-litigious basis in India, provided that reciprocity is maintained. The amendments also establish new registration and renewal requirements and include a "fly-in, fly-out" scheme.

4.18. Measures in other services sectors include the introduction of a new decree in Viet Nam, effective 20 November 2024, requiring that foreign universities establishing branch campuses be ranked among the world's top 500 within the preceding three years. Branch campuses must also comply with Vietnamese standards on facilities and faculty qualifications. In Costa Rica, teachers, trainees, researchers and volunteers for educational and cultural purposes are added to the special migration category starting on the 24 February 2025.

4.19. A new measure permits foreign ownership in the retail pharmacies sector in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since 3 March 2025. Ownership was previously reserved to Saudi nationals.

### Measures affecting the supply through the movement of natural persons

4.20. Between mid-October 2024 and mid-October 2025 many Members introduced measures affecting the supply of services through the movement of natural persons. More than two thirds of those were trade facilitating. For example, Egypt extended to 180 days the duration of stay under the 'short-term work authorization approval' for foreign nationals after they receive an approval letter from the Ministry of Manpower. Viet Nam issued on 13 August 2025 a decree easing labour market tests and introducing new qualifying criteria for work permits and exemptions thereof. Lithuania removed on 1 January 2025 the labour market test for work permit authorizations, while still requiring satisfying relevant qualifications and minimum salary requirements. At the same time, a new regulation capped foreign workers at 1.4% of Lithuania's permanent population for work-based residence permits (excluding the European Union Blue Card permit). However, work authorizations can still be granted once the quota is reached if the applicant either earns at least 1.2 times the average gross salary, or is employed in a profession listed on the High Added Value Occupations List and receives the most recent average salary.

4.21. Several other new measures were restrictive such as in the Philippines where an economic needs test was implemented on 10 February 2025 to assess the economic implications of employing foreign nationals in specific sectors, occupations, or industries, based on current labour market information. In the United States, a new proclamation by the President on 19 September 2025 introduced a USD 100,000 application fee for H-1B foreign worker visas, payable by the employer; the new rule does not apply to existing visa holders.

### Trade concerns raised in the Council for Trade in Services (CTS)

4.22. At the CTS meetings held on 6 December 2024, 13 March, 13 June and 3 October 2025,<sup>3</sup> concerns were reiterated about: (i) cybersecurity measures in China (raised by Japan and the United States) and cybersecurity measures in Viet Nam (raised by Japan and the United States); (ii) measures of the United States regarding Chinese services and service suppliers (raised by China); and (iii) measures of India regarding Chinese services and service suppliers (raised by China).

### Air services agreements

4.23. Table 4.1 presents information on air services agreements (ASAs)<sup>4</sup> concluded or amended during the period under review. These include both new ASAs and revisions of existing ones. As far as can be assessed from available sources, most of these ASAs provide for improved access conditions than was previously the case.

<sup>3</sup> WTO documents [S/C/M/160](#), 30 January 2025; [S/C/M/161](#), 30 April 2025; [S/C/M/162](#), 25 July 2025; and [S/C/M/163](#) (forthcoming).

<sup>4</sup> The term "Air Transport Agreements" is used here to refer to Air Services Agreements, Memoranda of Understanding, Exchange of Notes, and other such relevant instruments.

**Table 4.1 Air transport agreements concluded or amended between January and October 2025**

Parties		Date of signature	Source
Jordan	Iraq	30/01/2025	<a href="#">Jordan, Iraq sign updated air services agreement</a>
Jordan	United Arab Emirates	10/02/2025	<a href="#">Jordan, UAE sign protocol amending provisions of 1998 air services agreement</a>
Nigeria	Canada	07/03/2025	<a href="#">Canada-Nigeria Air Service Agreement: A Historic Milestone</a>
Uganda	Ethiopia	04/04/2025	<a href="#">Uganda, Ethiopia Initial Air Services Agreement</a>
Dominica	Qatar	14/04/2025	<a href="#">Dominica and Qatar sign landmark Air Services Agreement to boost global connectivity</a>
Grenada	Qatar	14/04/2025	<a href="#">Grenada, Qatar Sign Second Air Services Agreement</a>
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	Liberia	14/04/2025	<a href="#">Saudi Arabia signs aviation deals at ICAO Conference in Doha</a>
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	Grenada	14/04/2025	<a href="#">Saudi Arabia signs aviation deals at ICAO Conference in Doha</a>
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	Ecuador	14/04/2025	<a href="#">Saudi Arabia signs aviation deals at ICAO Conference in Doha</a>
Trinidad and Tobago	Nigeria	14/04/2025	<a href="#">HISTORIC AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT SIGNED BETWEEN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND NIGERIA</a>
Kyrgyz Republic	Bahrain, Kingdom of	21/04/2025	<a href="#">Kyrgyzstan, Bahrain sign number of documents</a>
United States	Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	12/05/2025	<a href="#">Protocol of Amendment to the U.S.-Saudi Arabia Air Transport Agreement – NOT IN FORCE</a>
Serbia	Georgia	05/06/2025	<a href="#">Air Services Agreement Between Serbia and Georgia Signed</a>
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	Panama	16/06/2025	<a href="#">Saudi Arabia and Panama Sign Air Services Agreement at Paris Air Show 2025</a>
Somalia	Tanzania	01/07/2025	<a href="#">Somalia and Tanzania Renew Aviation Pact, Approve Direct Flight Route</a>
Serbia	Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	04/07/2025	<a href="#">Saudi Arabia Strengthens Air Connectivity with Serbia and Indonesia</a>
Tajikistan	United Arab Emirates	16/07/2025	<a href="#">Tajikistan and UAE sign intergovernmental agreement on air transport cooperation</a>
India	Kuwait, State of	16/07/2025	<a href="#">India and Kuwait sign air treaty to boost flight capacity to 18,000 seats weekly</a>
Nigeria	Egypt	21/07/2025	<a href="#">Nigeria and Egypt Strengthen Aviation Ties with New BASA Agreement</a>
Uzbekistan	Indonesia	01/08/2025	<a href="#">Uzbekistan and Indonesia Sign Deal to Expand Air Travel</a>
Nigeria	Brazil	25/08/2025	<a href="#">Nigeria, Brazil sign deal on direct flights, others</a>
Qatar	Algeria	02/09/2025	<a href="#">Qatar and Algeria Sign Air Transport Agreement To Expand Flight Operations</a>
Rwanda	Senegal	08/09/2025	<a href="#">Rwanda, Senegal sign bilateral air services agreement</a>
Bahrain, Kingdom of	Japan	19/09/2025	<a href="#">Bahrain and Japan Sign Consultation Document on Air Transport Services and Direct Flights</a>
Guyana	Oman	23/09/2025	<a href="#">Guyana, Oman sign air services agreement</a>
Oman	Syria	23/09/2025	<a href="#">Oman inks three air services agreements, MoU</a>

Parties		Date of signature	Source
Oman	Côte d'Ivoire	23/09/2025	<a href="#">Oman inks three air services agreements, MoU</a>
Morocco	Rwanda	25/09/2025	<a href="#">Morocco, Rwanda Sign Air Services Agreement as SAATM Integration Advances - Ecofin Agency</a>
Guyana	Rwanda	26/09/2025	<a href="#">Guyana signs 'open skies' Air Services Agreement with Rwanda - Stabroek News</a>

Source: WTO Secretariat.



## 5 POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

### Acceptance of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement

5.1. During the review period, Armenia deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement.<sup>1</sup>

### IP-related International, Regional and Bilateral Agreements

5.2. The Riyadh Design Law Treaty was adopted in November 2024. It aims to harmonise and simplify the protection of industrial designs, reflecting international efforts to streamline IP standards.<sup>2</sup>

5.3. At the regional level, the European Union updated its design regime. The Examination Guidelines for Registered European Union Designs came into force on 1 May 2025, with provisions covering digital and other new types of designs scheduled to take effect on 1 July 2026, demonstrating the focus on adapting IP frameworks to technological innovation.<sup>3</sup>

5.4. In Africa, the Arusha Protocol for the Protection of New Plant Varieties entered into force on 24 November 2024, granting the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) the authority to issue plant breeders' rights on behalf of its contracting states.<sup>4</sup> In early 2025, ARIPO issued notifications and amendments to Harare Protocol implementation instruments, highlighting ongoing efforts to enhance IP governance.<sup>5</sup> The African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) updated its patent and utility-model procedures and fee structures as of 1 January 2025, and launched a jurisprudence database in mid-2025, strengthening transparency and accessibility of IP information.<sup>6</sup>

5.5. Additionally, Brazil and India signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in Intellectual Property to foster the exchange of experiences, best practices, and technical knowledge, illustrating the value of bilateral collaboration in strengthening IP systems.<sup>7</sup>

### Developments in Domestic IP Regimes

5.6. Members and Observers continued to recognise the importance of integrating intellectual property into their broader agendas. El Salvador launched its National IP Strategy for 2024-2029 on 22 October 2024<sup>8</sup>, and Oman unveiled its National IP Strategy on 25 November 2024<sup>9</sup>; both emphasised innovation, competitiveness, and institutional coordination. Lao PDR<sup>10</sup> and Bhutan<sup>11</sup> started projects in May and June 2025, respectively, to develop their own national IP strategies, signalling interest among LDC Members in using IP as a tool for growth. In June 2025, Japan adopted a new National IP Strategy aimed at moving up from 12<sup>th</sup> to the world's top four in the Global Innovation Index<sup>12</sup> by 2035.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Viewed at: [WTO | Intellectual Property \(TRIPS\) and Public Health: Members Accepting Amendment](#).

<sup>2</sup> Viewed at: [WIPO Member States Adopt Riyadh Design Law Treaty](#).

<sup>3</sup> Viewed at: [2025 Designs reform edition of the EUIPO Examination Guidelines enter into force - EUIPO](#).

<sup>4</sup> Viewed at: [The Arusha Protocol \(ARIPO\)](#) and [Protocols - The Harare Protocol \(ARIPO\)](#).

<sup>5</sup> Viewed at: [The Harare Protocol Notice on Amendments \(ARIPO\)](#).

<sup>6</sup> Viewed at: [Fee schedule applicable to utility models and improvement certificates from January 1, 2025 - OAPI](#) and [Launch of jurisprudential database: a major advance for PI rights in French-speaking Africa. - OAPI](#).

<sup>7</sup> Viewed at: [Brasil e Índia assinam memorando para cooperação em PI — Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial](#) and [MOU between DPIIT and the Secretariat of Competitiveness and Regulatory Policy for Cooperation in the field of Intellectual Property - English.pdf](#).

<sup>8</sup> Viewed at: [Estrategia-Nacional-de-Propiedad-Intelectual-ENPI-2024-EDITADO.pdf](#).

<sup>9</sup> Viewed at: [Oman News Agency](#).

<sup>10</sup> Viewed at: [WIPO and Lao PDR Launch the Development of a National Intellectual Property Strategy](#).

<sup>11</sup> Viewed at: [Bhutan Launches a National IP Strategy Development Project with WIPO](#).

<sup>12</sup> Viewed at: [World Intellectual Property Organization- 2025 Global Innovation](#).

<sup>13</sup> Currently, Japan is ranked 12<sup>th</sup> among the 139 economies featured in the Global Innovation Indicators of the World Intellectual Property Organization. The Strategy is available on: [Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters Prime Minister's Office of Japan](#).

5.7. Domestic IP regimes are constantly evolving, as Members adapt to rapid technological and economic change. Several launched consultations on prospective reforms, e.g. Canada invited public comments on proposed changes to the Madrid System which governs trademark ownership between June-July 2025<sup>14</sup>; the European Commission invited input on the forthcoming European Innovation Act<sup>15</sup>; and the United Kingdom initiated consultations on the Copyright and Artificial Intelligence Law in December 2024<sup>16</sup>, Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in July 2025<sup>17</sup>, and the design framework in September 2025.<sup>18</sup>

5.8. Table 5.1 below presents trade-related measures concerning intellectual property rights communicated by Members to the WTO Secretariat during the review period.

**Table 5.1 Legislative and Administrative Developments**

Member	Measure	Date of entry into force
Albania	Law No. 52/2025 on Trademarks aligns domestic legislation with EU and international standards, introducing simplified registration, stronger protection for well-known trademarks, and improved enforcement procedures.	16/08/2025
Albania	Law No. 53/2025 on Patents governs patents, utility models, and supplementary protection certificates (SPCs).	16/08/2025
Andorra	Decree 491/2024 establishes measures related to the conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, prohibiting the sale, licensing, or transfer of intellectual property rights, and access to protected materials, to entities in or for use in the Russian Federation.	23/12/2024
Argentina	Decree 138/2025 updates rules on the collective management of copyrights and related rights, allowing authors to manage rights individually or through one or more collective management organisations.	28/02/2025
Argentina	Decree 143/2025 harmonises earlier decrees with Decree 138/2025, authorising collective management societies to represent performers, actors, dancers, audiovisual directors, and their heirs for the exploitation of fixed performances or works.	28/02/2025
Argentina	Decree 150/2025 updates and regulates the role of SADAIC (Argentine Society of Music Authors and Composers) in the collective management of musical works.	28/02/2025
Australia	Copyright Regulations of 1969 were amended to extend protection to secondary uses of phonograms.	01/01/2025
Brazil	Ordinances INPI/PR No. 10 and GM/MDIC No. 110 update applicable fees.	07/08/2025
Chile	Expert fees were revised based on Annual Tax Units (UTA).	01/01/2025
China	Guidelines on Advancing High-Quality Development of the Copyright Sector were issued to strengthen copyright protection and promote international cooperation.	17/07/2025
China	SwordNet 2025 campaign targets online copyright infringement and piracy, aiming to strengthen enforcement, ensure fair competition, and promote a rules-based digital market.	01/05/2025
China	China's State Council Regulations on Handling Foreign Intellectual Property Disputes establish a framework for resolving international IP disputes.	01/05/2025
China	Measures for the Administrative Adjudication and Mediation of Patent Disputes provide the framework for resolving patent disputes through administrative procedures.	01/02/2025
China	Administrative Reconsideration Rules of the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) have been updated to simplify applications, enable online filing, and expand representation to include patent and trademark attorneys.	01/02/2025
Colombia	Resolution No. 37177 defines the administrative process for protecting and enforcing the country brand.	17/06/2025

<sup>14</sup> Viewed at: [Public consultation on the principle of dependency under the Madrid System](#).

<sup>15</sup> Viewed at: [Commission seeks feedback on the future European Innovation Act - Research and innovation](#).

<sup>16</sup> Viewed at: [Copyright and Artificial Intelligence - GOV.UK](#).

<sup>17</sup> Viewed at: [Consultation on Standard Essential Patents \(SEPs\) - GOV.UK](#).

<sup>18</sup> Viewed at: [Consultation on changes to the UK designs framework - GOV.UK](#).



Member	Measure	Date of entry into force
European Union	Regulation (EU) 2024/2822 reforms the EU designs regime.	01/05/2025
European Union	Directive (EU) 2024/2823 modernises design rules to incorporate digital technologies and promote convergence across the EU.	08/12/2024
European Union	EUIPO Guidelines for Examination in Trademarks and Designs were updated to align with the EU design reform.	01/05/2025
Ireland	Regulation No. 558/2024 aligns the domestic trademark regime with the Madrid Protocol.	15/10/2024
Indonesia	Regulation No. 1/2025 clarifies the legal standing and rights of inventors who have implemented an invention before filing a patent application.	23/01/2025
Indonesia	Law No. 13/2016 on Patents (as amended) expands patentability, extends the grace period, and simplifies administrative procedures.	28/10/2024
Myanmar	Notification No. 1/2025 updates fees for establishing collective management organisations.	28/02/2025
Myanmar	Notification No. 88/2024 revises the IP Agency Rules.	26/11/2024
Myanmar	Notification No. 181/2024 reorganises the Central Committee on Copyright.	30/10/2024
Myanmar	Notification No. 2/2024 updates patent fees.	22/10/2024
Myanmar	Notification No. 79/2024 specifies the forms required to establish collective management organisations.	16/10/2024
Nigeria	Revised Collective Management Regulation enhances transparency, governance, dispute resolution, and enforcement in collective management, aligning licensing and royalty practices with international standards.	28/01/2025
Russian Federation	Resolution No. 592 defines the procedure and rates for calculating remuneration for the use of "orphan" works, including literary, artistic, musical, and photographic works whose authors or rights holders are presumed unknown.	16/05/2025
Russian Federation	Federal Law No. 235-FZ amends Paragraph 3 of Article 1350 of the Civil Code, extending from six to twelve months the period for filing a patent application after public disclosure of an invention.	03/08/2025
Russian Federation	Federal Law No. 494-FZ amends the Law on Patent Attorneys, simplifying registration procedures by abolishing registration certificates and enabling public verification of attorney status through the official register.	01/09/2025
Russian Federation	Decree No. 458 sets rules for investing funds held in nominal accounts by collective management organizations, allowing them to invest fees collected for the use of "orphan" works and to use investment income to cover certain expenses. Applicable until 1 September 2031.	01/09/2025
Russian Federation	Decree No. 1369 establishes rules for providing genetic material related to intellectual property rights to bioresource centres.	12/09/2025
Singapore	Amendment to Rule 21(3)(d) of the Madrid Protocol Regulations allows trademark holders to replace national registrations with international ones for part of the listed goods and services.	01/02/2025
Singapore	Fee updates apply across IP categories, including patents, trademarks, designs, plant varieties, geographical indications, and hearing or mediation procedures.	01/09/2025
Chinese Taipei	Amendments to the Regulations on Copyright Dispute Mediation address practical needs in dispute resolution and streamline the settlement of copyright cases.	25/05/2025
Chinese Taipei	Amendments to Articles 7-1 and 8 of the Fee-Charging Standards of Trademarks establish the Trademark Professional Capability Certification System.	20/06/2025
Ukraine	Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 195 amends procedures for granting permission to use patented inventions or utility models concerning medicines.	27/08/2025
Ukraine	Law No. 4454 allows applications for the registration, manufacture, and storage of generic medicines before patent expiry and strengthens enforcement against premature market entry.	05/06/2025
Ukraine	Law No. 4362-IX repeals wartime IP protection measures and reinstates timelines for actions such as fee payments and trademark renewals.	31/05/2025

Member	Measure	Date of entry into force
Ukraine	Resolution No. 585 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine amends procedures governing the status of orphan works, phonograms, and videogames, and the maintenance of the related register.	28/05/2025
Ukraine	Resolution No. 1279 of the Cabinet of Ministers amends the regulation on representatives for intellectual property related to plant varieties.	12/11/2024
Ukraine	Order of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food No. 2821 approves the procedure for extending intellectual property rights to plant varieties.	30/10/2024
Ukraine	Order of the Ministry of Economy No. 23301 establishes rules for preparing, filing, and examining applications for inventions and utility models.	25/10/2024
United Kingdom	Order 2024 No. 1077 aligns the domestic trademark regime with the amended Madrid Protocol Regulations, allowing the partial replacement of a national registration with an international registration for specific goods or services.	21/11/2024
Uruguay	Executive Decree 11/24 regulates the registration of software applications with the National Directorate of Industrial Property.	20/02/2025
Uruguay	Uruguay acceded to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).	07/01/2025

Note: The Table contains communications by Members and Observers to the WTO Trade Monitoring Exercise.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

### TRIPS Council

5.9. During the review period, the TRIPS Council met formally in November 2024 and in March and June 2025, alongside several informal meetings.

5.10. In November 2024, Members discussed the proposed process for the Review of the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1, engaged in pandemic preparedness, and shared domestic initiatives directed to integrating the study of intellectual property laws and regulations into school and university curricula.<sup>19</sup>

5.11. In March 2025, the annual Workshop on the Implementation of Article 66.2 was held back-to-back with the formal Council meeting and fostered constructive dialogue between LDC and developed Members on technology transfer. Discussions highlighted key sectors, challenges, and the need for clearer evidence of IP-based transfers, better coordination, and tailored support. During the Council meeting, Members also exchanged national experiences through technology transfer case studies<sup>20</sup> and explored the role of intellectual property in serving the public interest.<sup>21</sup>

5.12. At the June 2025 meeting, Members continued discussing technology transfer case studies<sup>22</sup>, access to patent information<sup>23</sup>, and trade-related IP data.<sup>24</sup> The Secretariat updated Members on TRIPS-related technical cooperation, including efforts to adapt training delivery to virtual and hybrid formats.

<sup>19</sup> WTO document [IP/C/W/715](#), 22 October 2024.

<sup>20</sup> WTO document [IP/C/W/717](#), 22 October 2024.

<sup>21</sup> WTO document [IP/C/W/718](#), 10 March 2025.

<sup>22</sup> WTO document [IP/C/W/717](#), 22 October 2024.

<sup>23</sup> WTO document [IP/C/W/720](#), 16 June 2025.

<sup>24</sup> WTO document [IP/C/W/721](#), 16 June 2025.

## 6 TRANSPARENCY OF TRADE POLICIES

### Notifications and surveillance in WTO Councils and Committees<sup>1</sup>

6.1. This Section provides a factual overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' notifications to the WTO. Notifications are the primary instrument for ensuring transparency in the multilateral trading system. They are submitted by each Member and reviewed by the relevant bodies of the WTO. The importance attached by WTO Members to this issue explains the very elaborate system of notifications and cross-notifications put in place under the terms of most agreements. Transparency in trade and in trade policy making is fundamental for allowing trade policy makers and businesses make informed decisions, and markets to operate more efficiently.

6.2. The overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' notifications to the WTO illustrates that, with a few exceptions, compliance with notification requirements of the various WTO Agreements continues to be very uneven. Despite efforts by some delegations to bring their notifications further up to date, the general sense is that progress on this front remains too slow. The lack of compliance with notification obligations across WTO bodies is problematic because it undermines individual agreements and, more generally, the operation of the multilateral trading system. There are several reasons for low compliance with notification requirements, and an important one relates to capacity constraints of many WTO Members, despite the efforts by the WTO Secretariat and individual Committees. The poor notification compliance must be addressed collectively by the WTO membership.

### Agriculture

6.3. The CoA continued its review of the implementation of commitments under the AoA primarily on the basis of notifications submitted by Members. Twelve distinct notification requirements are applicable in the domain of agriculture, covering the following areas: market access, domestic support, export subsidies, export prohibitions or restrictions, and the follow-up to the NFIDC Decision. The applicability of a notification requirement to a Member is largely dependent on the specific commitments it has assumed under the Agreement on Agriculture. In many cases a limited number of notification requirements will apply for a particular Member. Simultaneously, there are a few notification requirements especially in the area of agricultural subsidization (i.e. Tables DS:1 and ES:1) that apply to all WTO Members. Out of the 12 notification requirements, the following 5 are "regular" or "annual" notification requirements: (i) imports under tariff and other quotas (MA:2); (ii) special SGs (MA:5); (iii) domestic support (DS:1); (iv) export subsidies (ES:1); and (v) total exports (ES:2).<sup>2,3</sup>

6.4. At each meeting, the Committee reviews Members' compliance with their notification requirements under the AoA based on a background document prepared by the Secretariat. The latest revision<sup>4</sup> considered by the CoA at its September 2025 meeting showed that for the period 1995-2023, there were a total of 2,114 outstanding regular notifications, which represented around 23% of expected notifications.<sup>5</sup> Out of the five annual notification requirements, Domestic Support (DS:1) and Export Subsidy (ES:1) notifications have the highest number of outstanding notifications with 1,066 and 843 of notifications pending, respectively (Chart 6.1).


<sup>1</sup> Notifications in the SPS and TBT Committees are dealt with in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this Report.

<sup>2</sup> Annual notifications are required to be submitted no later than a certain number of days following the end of the year in question, in accordance with the deadlines set out in the Committee's Notification Requirements and Formats in WTO document [G/AG/2](#), 30 June 1995.

<sup>3</sup> Starting in the implementation year 2025, the notification requirements and formats for "ES notifications" contained in [G/AG/2](#) (pages 24-25) shall be replaced by the requirements set out in the Committee's Decision in [G/AG/2/Add.2](#) of 16 December 2024, requiring Members to submit a Table EC:1 notification by 30 June each year, with the first such notifications due by 30 June 2026 covering the reporting year 2025.

<sup>4</sup> WTO document [G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.57](#), 9 September 2025.

<sup>5</sup> *Ad hoc* notification obligations applicable only upon maintenance of a specific measure (e.g. Table ER:1 required upon the application of export restrictions) as well as the annual notifications where it was not possible to determine *a priori* whether the concerned notification requirement would be applicable (e.g. Table NF:1 applicable to donor Members only) are excluded.

**Chart 6.1 Outstanding notifications per type of notification requirement, 1995-2023**

a This number represents the count of reported years and does not necessarily match the number of notifications submitted since some notifications covered more than one year.

Source: WTO document [G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.57](#), 11 September 2024.

### Anti-dumping

6.5. Pursuant to Article 16.4 of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (the Anti-Dumping Agreement), all Members are required to submit to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, on a semi-annual basis, reports of any anti-dumping actions taken within the preceding six months, using an agreed standard form. Members that have not taken anti-dumping actions during a given six-month period are required to submit a simple nil notification. Members that have not established an authority competent to conduct anti-dumping investigations have the option to make a one-time notification indicating that fact, which remains valid unless and until they establish an investigating authority, in lieu of submitting nil notifications every six months.

6.6. Sixty-two Members<sup>6</sup> submitted semi-annual reports, either of anti-dumping actions taken, or of no actions having been taken, during the six-month period July - December 2024. 50 Members have submitted one-time nil notifications covering the same period. The remaining 27 Members failed to submit semi-annual reports in respect of anti-dumping actions during the period July - December 2024. Few, if any, of these non-notifiers are likely to have taken anti-dumping actions as they have never notified the establishment of an investigating authority.

### Balance-of-Payments Restrictions

6.7. Notification obligations in relation to restrictions to safeguard a country's balance of payments stem from Articles XII and XVIII of the GATT 1994 and the Understanding on Balance-of-Payments (BOP) Provisions (described in Table 6.1).

<sup>6</sup> The European Union is counted as one.

**Table 6.1 Notification procedures for BOPs restrictions**

Legal source	Notification requirement	Type
GATT Article XII:4(a)	Any Member applying new restrictions or raising the general level of restrictions by a substantial intensification of the measures applied under this Article shall immediately after instituting or intensifying such restrictions (or, in circumstances in which prior consultation is practicable, before doing so) consult with Members as to the nature of its BOP difficulties, alternative corrective measures which may be available, and the possible effect of the restrictions on the economies of other Members	<i>Ad hoc</i> , followed by annual consultations
GATT Article XVIII:12(a)		<i>Ad hoc</i> , followed by biennial consultations
Understanding on BOP Provisions, para. 9		<i>Ad hoc</i> , followed by a yearly consolidated notification

Source: WTO Secretariat.

6.8. The last BOP consultations were completed in July 2017 and no Member has notified the Secretariat of the imposition of measures for BOP purposes since then.

### Customs valuation

6.9. Notifications in the area of customs valuation stem not only from the Agreement on Customs Valuation itself, but also from several Decisions that have been adopted by the Committee on Customs Valuation. There are four main notification requirements.

6.10. Article 22 of the Agreement on Customs Valuation and a Decision of the Committee contained in WTO document [G/VAL/5](#), 13 October 1995, require the submission of the complete texts of national legislation (laws, regulations, etc.) that deal with customs valuation, as well as any changes to such laws and regulations. Members must also provide answers to a "Checklist of Issues" provided for in the Annex to WTO document [G/VAL/5](#). During the review period, there was a marked uptick in notifications submitted by Members. The number of Members that have notified their customs valuation legislation stands at 121, including 6 Members during the period of review, whereas the number of Members that have provided their answers to the Checklist of Issues stands at 94, including 10 Members during the period of review.

6.11. In addition, Members are required to notify the Committee of the date of application of the Decision on the treatment of interest charges in the customs value of imported goods<sup>7</sup>, and Members that apply paragraph 2 of the Decision on the valuation of carrier media bearing software for data processing equipment must notify the Committee of their practice.<sup>8</sup> As of mid-October 2025, 75 Members have submitted notifications relating to the Decision on the treatment of interest charges, including 10 Members during the period of review, and a total of 71 Members have submitted notifications with regard to the Decision on the valuation of carrier media, including 8 Members during the period of review.

### Integrated Database (IDB)

6.12. Market access transparency is anchored on reliable and updated information. The IDB is the repository of Members' officially approved data on tariffs and imports and other market access information, including applied internal taxes and other duties and charges.

6.13. Chart 6.2 shows the completeness of tariff and import notifications to the IDB directly submitted by Members or collected by the Secretariat. As of 6 October 2025, the overall completeness of IDB notifications stood at 85% for tariffs and 78% for import statistics. The

<sup>7</sup> GATT document [VAL/6/Rev.1](#), 1 October 1984.


<sup>8</sup> GATT document [VAL/8](#), 10 October 1984.

coverage of the 2025 tariff information which was due for 30 March 2025 was at 41%. The coverage of the 2023 import statistics was 46%.

6.14. The IDB notifications' coverage varies among Members. As shown in Table 6.2, 49 Members (36%) have complete tariff information, and 47 Members (35%) have complete import statistics in the IDB. The table also shows high percentages of Members with at least 6 years of outstanding notifications - 36% for tariffs and 38% for imports.

6.15. The IDB data are disseminated in different WTO online portals and are used to calculate the statistics published in the World Tariff Profiles (WTP), a yearly compendium of comprehensive market access indicators.

**Chart 6.2 Completeness of IDB tariff and import notifications, 2016-2025**



\* Notifications of imports for 2024 and 2025 were not due at the time of reporting.

Note: Tariff notifications for 2024 for Comoros and Timor-Leste are included (2023 import notifications not yet required). The deadline for 2025 tariff notifications was on 30 March 2025 and for 2023 import notifications on 31 October 2024. The completeness of notifications is calculated on the basis of the number of Members' schedules (i.e. EU member States are included in the European Union's schedule, and Liechtenstein in Switzerland's). Information provided by the European Union on the period since 1 January 2021 covers its current 27 member States. For the period until 31 December 2020, tariff information provided by the European Union also covers the United Kingdom.

Source: WTO Secretariat, as of 6 October 2025.

**Table 6.2 Completeness<sup>a</sup> of notifications among Members**

Number of years with outstanding data	Tariffs (up to 2025)		Imports (up to 2023)	
	No. of Members	%	No. of Members	%
None (complete data)	49	36	47	35
1-2 years	23	17	21	15
3-5 years	16	12	16	12
6 or more years	50	36	52	38
Total number of Members' schedules	138	100	136	100

a The completeness of notifications is calculated on the basis of the number of Members' schedules (i.e. EU member States are included in the European Union's schedule, and Liechtenstein in Switzerland's). Information provided by the European Union on the period since 1 January 2021 covers its current 27 member States. For the period until 31 December 2020, tariff information provided by the European Union also covers the United Kingdom.

Source: WTO Secretariat, as of 6 October 2025.

## Preferential trade arrangements

6.16. Under the Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs), which was established in December 2010<sup>9</sup>, newly notified PTAs are to be considered in dedicated sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), on the basis of factual presentations prepared by the Secretariat. Since the establishment of the Transparency Mechanism, 13 PTAs have been notified to the WTO. Four of these have been considered by the CTD in dedicated sessions, while a fifth one is planned for consideration at the Dedicated Session in November 2025. Some factual presentations are currently under preparation, while for several other PTAs, the Secretariat is awaiting information from notifying Members for the preparation of the factual presentations. Regular updates are provided at each meeting of the CTD's dedicated session regarding the PTAs that are to be considered.

6.17. The Transparency Mechanism for PTAs also stipulates that an electronic database on individual PTAs is to be maintained by the Secretariat. The Database on PTAs<sup>10</sup> currently contains information on 37 PTAs. Table 6.3 provides an overview of the PTAs included in the database, which is updated primarily on the basis of information provided by the Members implementing PTAs.

**Table 6.3 PTAs of WTO Members**

WTO Member	Number of PTAs	Name or description of PTA
Armenia	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Australia	2	Generalized System of Preferences
		South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement <sup>a</sup>
Canada	2	Generalized System of Preferences
		Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff
Chile	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
China	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
European Union	4	Generalized System of Preferences
		Trade preferences for countries of the Western Balkans
		Trade preferences for Pakistan <sup>b</sup>
		Trade preferences for the Republic of Moldova <sup>c</sup>
Iceland	1	Generalized System of Preferences
India	1	Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs
Japan	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Kazakhstan	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Republic of Korea	1	Preferential Tariff for LDCs
Kyrgyz Republic	2	Duty-free treatment for LDCs <sup>d</sup>
		Generalized System of Preferences
Montenegro	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
Morocco	1	Duty-free treatment for African LDCs
New Zealand	2	Generalized System of Preferences
		South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement <sup>a</sup>
Norway	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Russian Federation	2	Generalized System of Preferences (01/01/2010-10/10/2016) <sup>d</sup>
		Generalized System of Preferences (as of 10/10/2016)
Switzerland	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Chinese Taipei	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
Tajikistan	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
Thailand	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs <sup>e</sup>
Türkiye	1	Generalized System of Preferences
United Kingdom	2	Generalized System of Preferences (01/01/2021-18/06/2023) <sup>f</sup>
		Developing Countries Trading Scheme (as of 19/06/2023)
United States	6	African Growth and Opportunity Act <sup>g</sup>
		Andean Trade Preference Act <sup>h</sup>
		Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
		Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
		Generalized System of Preferences <sup>i</sup>
		Trade preferences for Nepal

a Australia and New Zealand both provide preferences under this PTA.

b The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December 2013.

c The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December 2015.

d The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 10 October 2016.

<sup>9</sup> WTO document [WT/L/806](#), 16 December 2010.

<sup>10</sup> WTO, PTA database. Viewed at: <http://ptadb.wto.org>.



- e The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December 2020.
- f The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 18 June 2023.
- g Entry into force: 18 May 2000. Extended until 30 September 2025.
- h The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 July 2013.
- i The renewal of the GSP program requires a legislative act by the United States Congress.

Source: WTO PTA Database.

### Preshipment inspection

6.18. Article 5 of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (PSI) provides that Members shall submit to the Secretariat copies of the laws and regulations under which they put the Agreement into force, as well as copies of any other laws and regulations relating to PSI. Changes in such laws and regulations shall also be notified immediately after their publication. Since the last report, two Members submitted a notification relating to PSI, bringing the total number of Members that have made such a notification to 121.

### Rules of origin

6.19. There are 3 types of rules of origin that Members have agreed to notify to the WTO Secretariat:

- i. Preferential rules of origin applied in the context of regional trade agreements: all WTO Members have notified to the WTO that they have entered regional trade agreements. The details about these agreements are notified to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) including information about the applicable rule of origin. The CRO has decided that a notification to the CRTA is sufficient and does not require a separate notification to the CRO.
- ii. Preferential rules of origin applied in the context of non-reciprocal trade preferences for least-developed countries: for preference-granting WTO Members, such origin requirements must be separately notified to the CRO ([G/RO/LDC/N](#) series). The information notified must use a template agreed to by the Committee.<sup>11</sup> Some Members have regularly updated their notifications and only two Members have not submitted the relevant information to the CRO. [Document G/RO/W/163](#) contains regular updates about the status of these notifications.
- iii. Non-preferential rules of origin applied in the context of trade policy purposes as defined by Article 1 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin and notified under Article 5: As of end of September 2025, 57 Members have informed the CRO that they apply non-preferential rules of origin while 61 other Members have informed the CRO that they do not. Twenty-one Members have not yet submitted the necessary information. Annex 1 of the [Committee's Annual Report to the Council for Trade in Goods](#) contains the detailed list of Members under each category. Members are encouraged to update their notifications using the template contained in WTO document [JOB/RO/8/Rev.3](#), 15 October 2024.

### Safeguards notifications

6.20. Unlike the Anti-Dumping Agreement or the SCM Agreement, the Agreement on Safeguards does not oblige Members to submit semi-annual reports. The Agreement on Safeguards requires Members to immediately notify individual safeguard actions, such as the initiation of an investigation or the imposition of a measure. The number of notifications regarding initiations and impositions are explained in Section 3.2 of this Report. In addition, pursuant to Article 12.6 of the Agreement on Safeguards, all Members are required to notify to the Committee on Safeguards their laws, regulations and administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures. As of 26 September 2025, 80 Members had notified their legislations, while 48 Members had notified that they had no such legislation. 11 Members had not filed any notification.

<sup>11</sup> WTO document [G/RO/84](#), 6 March 2017.

## Services


6.21. Between mid-October 2024 and mid-October 2025, 18 new notifications were made under various GATS provisions.

6.22. Out of the new notifications submitted, 14 were made under GATS Article III:3. This Article requires Members to notify to the Council for Trade in Services, at least annually, of any regulatory changes that significantly affect trade in services covered by its specific commitments. During the reporting period, there was a decrease in notifications compared to the previous six years.

6.23. Three agreements concerning economic integration in services were notified under GATS Article V:7. These agreements were referred to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements for consideration. Annual notifications under this article decreased during the reporting period, continuing a broader trend of a relative slowdown over the past decade.

6.24. One notification was made under GATS Article VII:4. This Article requires Members to notify to the Council for Trade in Services any new or existing mutual recognition agreements or arrangements. While notifications under this article have increased between 2018 and 2022, the past years saw a departure from that trend.

**Chart 6.3 Notifications pursuant to GATS Articles III:3, V:7 and VII:4, 1995-2025**



Note: 2025 data covers up to 30 September 2025. Changes to previously submitted notifications are not counted. Figures on Article V:7 include agreements of the EC/EU with its future member states and EU-enlargement agreements.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

## State Trading Enterprises

6.25. The Working Party on State Trading Enterprises reviews notifications of state trading enterprises, reporting to the CTG. Since 2004, these notifications have been due every two years. Table 6.4 presents the number of notifications received in each of the years in which a new and full notification was due.

**Table 6.4 Status of new and full STE notifications (due on 30 June of the year shown)**

Year	1995	1998	2001	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022	2024
Number of Members that have notified	65	65	72	64	63	66	66	62	65	71	57	52	53	43

Note: As of 24 September 2025.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

### **Subsidies and countervailing measures**

6.26. The trends in the status of compliance with the obligation to notify subsidies to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under Article 25.1 during the period 1995-2021 are shown in Table 6.5. Subsidy notifications are required every two years, and the deadline for Members to submit their 2025 new and full subsidy notifications was 30 June 2025.

6.27. A significant decline is observed in the percentage of Members notifying subsidies, decreasing from 51% in 1995 to 42% by 2023. The percentage of Members making a "nil" notification has also decreased, moving from 26% in 1995 to 7% in 2023. When combining the data for those that notified subsidies and those that made a "nil" notification, the overall rate of notifications has seen a notable decline. In 1995, 77% of Members provided some form of notification, and this decreased to 30% by 2025. Over the same period, the share of Members providing no notifications more than tripled, rising from 23% in 1995 to 70% in 2025.

**Table 6.5 Status of subsidy notifications (due on 30 June of the year shown)**

	Per cent share of total														
	1995	1998	2001	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019	2021	2023	2025
Members that notified subsidies	51	40	45	45	48	49	49	48	50	49	48	46	41	43	27
Members that made a "nil" notification	26	17	15	14	13	12	18	22	19	19	16	11	10	8	3
Subtotal notifying Members	77	56	60	60	62	61	67	70	70	68	63	57	51	51	30
Members that did not make any notification	23	44	40	40	38	39	33	30	30	32	37	43	49	49	70

Note: As of 29 September 2025.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

6.28. Pursuant to Article 25.11 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, all Members are required to submit to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, on a semi-annual basis, reports of any countervailing actions taken within the preceding six months, using an agreed standard form. Members that have not taken countervailing actions during a given six-month period are required to submit a simple nil notification. Members that have not established an authority competent to conduct countervailing duty investigations have the option to make a one-time notification indicating that fact, which remains valid unless and until they establish an investigating authority, in lieu of submitting nil notifications every six months.

6.29. Fifty-nine Members<sup>12</sup> submitted semi-annual reports, either of countervailing actions taken, or of no actions having been taken, during the six-month period July - December 2024. 48 Members have submitted one-time nil notifications covering the same period. The remaining 32 Members failed to submit semi-annual reports in respect of countervailing actions during the period July - December 2024. Few, if any, of these non-notifiers are likely to have taken countervailing actions as they have never notified the establishment of an investigating authority.

<sup>12</sup> The European Union is counted as one.


## Transparency of TRIPS

6.30. Historically, notifications peaked in 1996, when developed-country Members notified existing laws or amendments that implemented the TRIPS Agreement. From 2000 onwards, notifications have primarily come from developing Members and recently acceded Members.<sup>13</sup>

6.31. The 2025 Secretariat's Annual Report on Notifications and Other Information Flows showed uneven fulfilment of ongoing notification duties notwithstanding 125 submissions in 2024, including 116 laws under Article 63.2. The uptake of the e-TRIPS system has increased since 2019, with Members submitting 96% of their notifications via the platform.<sup>14</sup>

6.32. During the review period, 17 WTO Members submitted a total of 53 notifications to the TRIPS Council, under Article 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. Chart 6.4 shows the laws and regulations notified from 1995 to 15 October 2025.

**Chart 6.4 Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2 from 1995 to 15 October 2025**




Source: WTO Secretariat, e-TRIPS.

6.33. The cumulative total of laws and regulations notified until 15 October 2025 was 6,292 legal texts. Significant gaps in the coverage of more recent laws and legislative amendments remain, as several Members have not updated their initial notifications for over a decade. Chart 6.5 below, shows the notifications by subject matter from 1995 to 15 October 2025.

<sup>13</sup> Viewed at: [e-trips.wto.org](https://e-trips.wto.org).

<sup>14</sup> WTO documents [IP/C/W/716](#) and [IP/C/W/716/Corr.1](#), 22 April 2025.

**Chart 6.5 Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2 by Subject Matter, from 1995 to 15 October 2025**



Source: WTO Secretariat, e-TRIPS.